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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies price behaviour, the determinants of inflation, threshold 
effects, and policy rules in Indonesia. Using data from January 2002 to April 
2008, the study reveals that the ‘relative’ law of one price holds. This is proven 
by the variability of one product across cities being lower than the variability of 
all products in one city. The variability of the product is explained well by the 
cost of transportation and the level of development. Employing panel 
regression, this study also shows that prices of 35 sub-categories within 45 
cities in Indonesia exhibit convergence. The average speed of convergence for 
perishable goods is about 9 months, for non-perishable goods 32-36 months, 
and for services 18-19 months.  
 
Inflation in Indonesia is found to be affected by expected inflation (backward-
looking expectations and forward-looking expectations), the output gap, 
exchange rate depreciation, and money growth. Backward-looking inflation 
expectations dominate the form of inflation expectations. Using data from 
1980:1 to 2008:12 and employing Generalized Method of Moments, this study 
finds non-linearity in the Phillips curve.  
 
The effect of exchange rate depreciation on CPI inflation is found to be linear. 
However, the effect of money growth on inflation is not linear; there are two 
threshold values identified. The study shows that the higher the growth of 
money, the less the impact on inflation is.   
 
To guide policymakers, this thesis derives simple, but efficient policy rules. 
Using monthly data from 1980 to 2008 and simulating deterministically the 
small open macroeconomic model, the study reveals that the inflation forecast-
based rule with contemporaneous output gap (IFBG) is the most efficient rule 
for Indonesia. The rule suggests that the central bank should react strongly on 
the inflation deviation from the target, react moderately on the output gap and 
smooth the interest rate. The optimal horizon is 3-4 quarters. Including 
exchange rate in the policy rule causes deterioration in economic performance. 
 
 
JEL Classifications : C22; C23; C51; E31; E51; E58; F14; F15. 
Thesis Supervisors : Dr. Paul M. Turner and Prof. Maximilian J. B. Hall. 
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1 Heading 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Background 
 
It is well accepted that the central objective of macroeconomic policy is to have 
high and sustainable economic growth coupled with low inflation. On the one 
hand, high economic growth is determined by factors such as the quantity of 
capital, a qualified labour force, and advanced technology. These factors can be 
influenced by the government through fiscal policy and other ‘technical’ 
policies, such as policies in trade, education, agriculture, industry, 
employment, and so on. On the other hand, low inflation can be achieved by 
conducting a sound monetary policy, since in the long run inflation is generally 
believed to be a monetary phenomenon, while in the short and medium term 
inflation is influenced by the relative elasticity of wages, prices, and the interest 
rates. Therefore, many economists argue that the target of monetary policy 
should be inflation only.  
 
A small amount of inflation can be viewed as having a beneficial effect on the 
economy, since it gives room for the central banker to stimulate the economy 
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and for the businessmen to grease the wheels of commerce (see, for example, 
Groshen and Scweitzer, 1997). Because many prices are sticky downwards and 
tend to creep upwards, the effort to attain a zero inflation rate (a constant price 
level) punishes other sectors with falling prices, profits, and employment. 
Efforts to attain complete price stability (zero inflation) can also lead to 
deflation since to set off positive inflation at some periods, negative inflation at 
some other periods are required. This is generally viewed as a negative by 
Keynesian because of the downward adjustments in wages and output, and the 
difficulties faced in repaying nominal debt.      
 
Shoe leather costs, menu costs, relative price distortions, and tax distortions are 
some examples of the costs of high inflation. When inflation is more variable 
and less predictable the cost is even higher. Empirically, inflation is more 
variable and less predictable when it is higher (see, for example, Okun, 1971; 
Taylor, 1981; Ball and Cecchetti, 1990). When inflation is low, there is a 
consensus that it should be kept low, so that inflation is steady and predictable. 
When inflation is moderate or high, however, there is disagreement about the 
importance of reducing it; indeed, the cost of slightly greater inflation may 
appear small. As a result, inflation is variable and difficult to predict. Greater 
inflation variability increases uncertainty, lowers welfare, and increases 
reluctance to undertake investment projects. High inflation might be viewed by 
firms and individuals as a result of poor government performance. Inflation 
can also be viewed as a ‘tax’ since it reduces the purchasing power of the cash 
balances held by the private sector.  
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As many central banks believe that, in the long run, they can affect only 
inflation, not real variables, such as output, their attentions are focused more 
on combating inflation. Central banks that engage in activist policy may be 
prone to higher inflation, but no higher output and employment (Bernanke, 
Mishkin, Laubach and Posen, 1999). Consequently, within the last decade many 
central banks have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for the conduct 
of monetary policy. This framework was pioneered by New Zealand in 1990, 
and it was then followed by the central banks of Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and other countries.  
 
The inflation-targeting framework does not imply that the central bank should 
focus only on controlling inflation, neglecting other objectives, such as 
achieving sustainable growth. Rather, inflation targeting is characterized by 
three main elements. First, there is an explicit target for inflation and a 
commitment to achieve it. The target is typically low and usually specified as a 
range of a few percentage points. Second, there is a priority on achieving the 
inflation target relative to other targets. The central banks in inflation-targeting 
countries place more weight than other central banks on the behaviour of 
inflation. And third, transparency and accountability of the central bank are 
emphasised more. Bernanke, et al. (1999) define inflation targeting as ‘a 
framework for monetary policy characterized by the public announcement of official 
quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time 
horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is monetary 
policy’s primary long run goal’. 
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Following the trend, the central bank of the Republic of Indonesia, Bank 
Indonesia (BI), implicitly adopted inflation targeting as a new framework of 
monetary policy in 1999 after the establishment of the Central Bank Act. This 
Act marked the beginning of a new chapter in monetary policy in Indonesia. 
The Act mandated BI to aim at an inflation target and to direct its monetary 
policy to achieve the target. This new framework was to replace the money 
targeting which was previously adopted in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.  However, BI explicitly announced to the public that formal 
inflation targeting was adopted in July 2005 after the Central Bank Act was 
amended in 2004. Since then, BI has used the BI rate as a policy rate. Under this 
Act, the inflation target is set by government for a certain period ahead1, and it 
is announced to the public that BI intends to achieve it.  
 
The central bank is also required to explain publicly what caused the inflation 
observed and what policy actions are being taken to achieve the inflation 
target. Therefore, as part of accountability, BI regularly produces a Quarterly 
Report which is submitted to Parliament. In this report, not only an analysis of 
inflation is provided, but also an evaluation of macroeconomic conditions and 
the outlook for the economy.  
 
Under this new framework, it is important to have a better understanding of 
the monetary transmission mechanism as well as knowledge of the inflation 
process. It is also important to notice that the conduct of monetary policy needs 
                                                 
1 Currently, the time period is three years. In setting the inflation target, government consults 
with BI and related technical departments, such as the transportation department, the labour 
force department, the national planning agency, the trade department, and the industrial 
department.     
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to be forward-looking since monetary policy only affects inflation and output 
with lags. Therefore, the policymakers need a guide to set the policy rate, i.e. a 
monetary policy rule.  
 
Even though the conduct of inflation targeting in Indonesia is not as strict as in 
New Zealand, where the Governor of the central bank could be dismissed if the 
target is missed, the performance of the Board of Governors in BI could be 
assessed to be poor if they fail to achieve the target. So far, the performance in 
achieving the inflation target in Indonesia has not been very satisfactory. From 
Table 1.1 we can see that BI has achieved the target only three times, i.e. in 
2002, 2004 and 2007. To build credibility, the central bank has to prove to the 
public that it can hit inflation target for a long period.  
 
Table 1.1: Inflation target versus actual inflation 
 
Year Inflation Target Actual Inflation
2000 5 – 7% 9.35%
2001 6 – 8.5% 12.55%
2002 9 – 10% 10.03%
2003 8 – 10% 5.06%
2004 4.5 – 6.5% 6.40%
2005 6 + 1% 17.11%
2006 8 + 1% 6.60%
2007 6 + 1% 6.51%
2008 5 + 1% 11.06%
2009 4.5 + 1% 2.57%*
 
 Source: Indonesia Economic Report, various years. 
 * As of October 2009    
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1.2  The Objectives 
 
Given that inflation is intensely damaging, therefore it should be combated, 
this thesis studies price behaviour and inflation’s determinants, before 
proposing a ‘formula’ to guide monetary policy in Indonesia. Our objectives in 
this thesis are fourfold:  
 
First, we study the price behaviour of 35 products in 45 cities and test whether 
they converge to national prices. We further investigate by answering the 
following questions. Is the variability of the price of the same product across 
the cities smaller than the variability of prices of all products in the same city?  
Do transaction costs and the level of development matter to price dispersion? 
Do prices in Indonesia tend to converge? If so, how fast is the speed of 
convergence? Is the price convergence linear? Does distance really matter to 
price convergence?  
 
Second, we analyze the determinants of inflation and the shape of the Phillips 
curve. Specifically, we answer the following questions. Do the output gap, the 
exchange rate, and monetary aggregates matter for inflation? Which monetary 
aggregate has the biggest impact on inflation? Is the relationship between 
inflation and the output gap symmetric or asymmetric? If it is asymmetric, 
what is the best model for the asymmetric relationship?  
 
Third, regarding the Phillips curve defined above, we examine the threshold 
effects of exchange rates and monetary aggregates on inflation. Are there any 
threshold values? If so, what are they?   
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Fourth, to give guidance for BI to help set the policy rate, we derive simple, but 
efficient monetary policy rules for Indonesia. What type of rule is most 
efficient? What are the values of inflation gap and output gap parameters? 
How forward-looking should the rule be? Is it necessary to include the 
exchange rate in the policy rule? 
 
1.3   The Outline of the Thesis 
 
The following provides a guide to the remaining chapters.  
 
Chapter two analyses price variability and price convergence. First, we test 
whether the law of one price holds in Indonesia by calculating the ratio of the 
price variability of different products within cities to the price variability of the 
same product across cities. We expect that the ratio is bigger than one. Second, 
we regress the transportation costs, proxied by the distance between cities, and 
the level of development of the city, proxied by the size of population, on the 
absolute price difference between cities and the benchmark city, Jakarta. We 
expect that the coefficient of the distance is positive and the coefficient of the 
population is negative. Third, we apply a standard panel regression and 
calculate the half-life time of each product. This half-life time indicates the 
speed of convergence. Fourth, we augment the basic model with the square of 
the initial price difference to see whether non-linearity exists. Fifth, we also 
augment the basic model with the interaction between the initial price 
differences with the distance between cities to see the impact of distance on the 
speed of convergence.   
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Chapter three investigates the determinants of inflation. We use a hybrid, new 
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) specification where inflation depends on 
lagged inflation, expected inflation, the output gap, and other factors. As 
measurement of the output gap contains uncertainty since it is unobservable, 
we measure it using different techniques, i.e. the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, 
the structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR), and the peak-to-peak 
method. Since the real output series contain a structural break in 1997, we 
adjust the results from using the HP filter and the SVAR model during the 
financial crisis and for some periods after that. We also investigate whether the 
inflation-output relationship is linear. Some non-linear relationship are 
evaluated, i.e. the time varying model, the kinked function, the cubic function, 
the L-shaped function, the trend function, and the variance function. The best 
model is chosen based on the signs of the parameters, the level of significance, 
the adjusted R-squared, and the value of the log likelihood functions (LLF).   
 
Chapter four tests the non-linearity of the effects of the exchange rate 
depreciation and money growth effects on inflation by using the threshold 
model. In this model, we investigate whether there are threshold values for the 
exchange rate and money growth that has a different impact on inflation. This 
depends on the size of the change in the variable. The specification of the 
Phillips curve used in this chapter is the same as that in chapter three. Since the 
threshold is not identified, so that the classical tests, such as t-test, have non-
standard distribution, we follow Hansen (1997, 2000) to bootstrap the data to 
calculate the critical values.    
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Chapter five derives efficient policy rules through deterministic simulation in a 
small open-economy model. Three types of policy rule are evaluated, i.e. the 
Taylor rule, the inflation forecast-based rule (IFB), and the inflation forecast-
based rule with contemporaneous output gap (IFBG). Since the role of the 
exchange rate is important, we also include the exchange rate in the policy 
rules. Through simulation, we vary the parameters for the inflation gap, the 
output gap, the exchange rate change, and the interest rate smoothing, as well 
as the horizon. Each set of parameters produces a loss value. We define the loss 
function as the sum of the variances of the inflation gap and the output gap, 
plus the variance of interest rate changes. Three scenarios are evaluated: (i) 
when the central bank is concerned with inflation, output, and the interest rate; 
(ii) when the central bank is concerned with inflation and output; and (iii) 
when the central bank acts as an “inflation hawk”. The efficient rule is chosen 
based on the minimum value of the loss function. Models with using the ‘peak-
to-peak’ output gap and a non-linear Phillips curve are employed to compare 
the results with a base model.    
 
Chapter six ends the thesis with some concluding remarks. We also note the 
contribution of the thesis.         
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2 Heading 
 
 
 
Chapter Two  
Price Variability and the Speed of Convergence 
 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
Study of the empirical validity of the law of one price is enormous. The 
literature has shifted the focus from examining international markets only to 
both international and domestic markets, and from using time series data to 
using panel data. The availability of data for individual products in each region 
makes it possible to the researchers to test the law within domestic markets.    
 
The difference between a national and a regional economy is that a regional 
economy is more open since there is tariff-free trade, using a single currency, 
and subject to more similar tastes and customs. When evaluating prices within 
a single country, it is expected that there will be more rapid price convergence 
across regions within a single country than across countries, since intra-country 
markets for products, labour, and capital are presumably better integrated. 
Moreover, the tax system and trade policy are more similar within a country 
than between countries.  
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Examining price index convergence within a country gives a better 
understanding of price movements in different regions, as it is crucial for the 
prediction of the impact of monetary policy on regional inflation (Cecchetti, 
Mark, and Sonora, 2000). The intra-country study may also be useful for 
estimating how big the trade barrier among regions is, as studied in 
Gluschenko (2004). The term price convergence is often linked with economic 
integration.  
   
Some studies use the prices of specific commodities, while other studies use a 
price index. On the one hand, even though the prices of specific commodities 
are much clearer to describe and easier to understand and can be used in a 
more rigorous strategy in testing the “law of one price” than a price index (i.e. 
car price, magazine price, Big Mac price), they suffer from a lack of data 
availability, especially for a long time series. Moreover, the number of 
commodities examined is only a small fraction of the total number of 
commodities in an economy. On the other hand, there is a large literature on 
purchasing power parity, exchange rates, and other issues of international 
macroeconomics using data on price indices. Economic analysis at the 
macroeconomic level has to depend on aggregate information, such as the price 
index. In particular, studying price index convergence within a country links 
more closely to the literature in international macroeconomics and monetary 
policy than the studies based on prices of specific commodities.       
 
A number of recent studies focus their attention on price convergence within a 
country. Some of them are Parsley and Wei (1996) who study price 
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convergence in the U.S., Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2000) who also focus on 
the U.S., Ratfai (2003) who focuses on Hungary, Horvarth and Vidovic (2004) 
who focus on Slovakia, Gluschenko (2004) who focuses on Russia, Fan and Wei 
(2006) who focus on China, and Morshed, Ahn, and Lee (2006) who focus on 
India. 
 
This chapter aims to study price convergence within an emerging market 
country, namely Indonesia. It will be a useful comparative study to investigate 
what happens to a developing country such as Indonesia whose geography is 
different from other countries, such as the U.S., Russia, India, and China, in 
that it has many islands. Hence, there are likely to be more obstacles to 
domestic trade. The study of the dynamics of price indices in Indonesia is not 
only academically interesting, but it also has profound policy implications. If 
the economy is not integrated, the more difficult and challenging it is for the 
monetary authority to control inflation. Our empirical analysis investigates 
price index movements in Indonesia with a monthly dataset that consists of an 
aggregate consumer price index (CPI) and 35 product (category) price indices 
in 45 major cities over 76 months. 
 
As stated in the introduction, this chapter tries to answer the following 
questions. (1) Does the law of one price hold in Indonesia? (2) Do transaction 
costs and the level of development matter for price variability? (3) Do city 
prices converge to national prices? If so, how fast is the speed of convergence? 
(4) Is there any non-linearity in price convergence? (5) Does price convergence 
depend on distance?  
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
theory of price convergence and some empirical works. Section three describes 
the data. Section four tests whether the relative LOOP holds in Indonesia. 
Section five analyzes the impact of transportation costs and the level of 
development on price variability in Indonesia. Section six analyzes the speed of 
price convergence in Indonesia. Section seven discusses non-linearity of price 
convergence. Section eight discusses the impact of distance on price 
convergence. Finally, section nine provides a summary and conclusions.  
 
2.2.  Literature Review 
 
A study of price convergence is often linked with the study of the law of one 
price (LOOP) and market integration. The LOOP states that, in an efficient 
market, an identical good must have the same price when expressed in a 
common currency. The intuition for this law is that all sellers demand the 
highest prevailing price and all buyers demand to pay the lowest current 
market price. In perfectly integrated markets, prices of similar goods ought to 
be equalized, when those prices are denominated in a common currency. If the 
prices in one location rise substantially above that in another, market forces 
would tend to move the prices back toward equality. In other words, the 
perfectly integrated market operates like a single market despite its spatial 
dispersion. Thus, the LOOP is basically based on two statements: (i) the price of 
goods and services, which are calculated in the same currency, should be 
identical in the long run; and (ii) temporary misalignment should quickly 
disappear since someone or firms can arbitrage price differentials.  
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The law itself does not apply inter-temporally, so prices for the same item can 
be different at different times in one market. The law also need not apply if 
buyers have less than perfect information about where to find the lowest price. 
In this case, sellers face a trade-off between the frequency and the profitability 
of their sales. Since some goods are not tradable, the LOOP is not applicable to 
all goods internationally (the Balassa-Samuelson effect). Thus, the consumption 
may be cheaper in some countries than in other countries because non-tradable 
goods or services (especially land and labour) are cheaper in less developed 
countries. This makes a typical consumption basket cheaper in a less developed 
country, even if some goods in that basket have their prices equalized by 
international trade. The relative price differential between tradable goods and 
non-tradable goods from high-income to low-income countries is a 
consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
 
Let ts  be the nominal exchange rate, 
*
tp  the foreign price, and tp  the domestic 
price. Absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) states that the (log) real 
exchange rate should be zero )0( * =−+ ttt pps  or, expressed in relative terms, 
that there should be no changes in the real exchange rate )0( * =∆−∆+∆ ttt pps . 
Yet the consensus estimates in cross-country studies of the half-lived deviation 
from PPP are three to five years (Rogoff, 1996); that is, convergence is present, 
but it is very slow. The speed of mean reversion is usually summarized by the 
half-life, the time necessary for half the effect of a given shock to dissipate.  
 
In international macroeconomics, a puzzle is still unresolved since there is little 
evidence of the LOOP. The law might only be valid for tradable goods. An 
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early example of the failure of the LOOP had been widely documented by Isard 
(1977). Froot, Kim, and Rogoff (1995) also conduct excellent surveys of many 
studies that find a “collapse of purchasing power parities”. In particular, these 
studies failed to reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a 
random walk, which implies that any deviation from the PPP is permanent. 
Another survey on the analysis of the LOOP in an international context is 
conducted by Sarno and Taylor (2002). Sarno and Taylor note that, in general, 
economic studies suggest rejection of the LOOP, while some studies, however, 
provide evidence that departure from the LOOP may dissipate over time when 
they are modelled in a non-linear framework.     
 
Price differentials tend to remain persistent over time, fading away only 
relatively slowly. Possible reasons for incomplete relative-price adjustment in 
cross-country studies are: (i) trade barriers, i.e. tariffs and quota; (ii) non-tariff 
barriers, i.e. bureaucratic matters; (iii) failure of exchange rates to adjust to 
shocks; (iv) monopoly firms; (v) sticky prices; (vi) transportation costs; (vii) the 
presence of non-traded goods; (viii) labour market segmentations; (ix) 
productivity differentials; (x) pricing to market; and (xi) informational 
asymmetries (see, for example, Cecchetti, et al., 2000;  Ratfai, 2003; Lutz, 2000). 
 
There are two versions of the LOOP, i.e. the absolute version and the relative 
version. On the one hand, the absolute version states that the price of the same 
product in different countries should be equal when valued in a common 
currency. Of course, this concept neglects physical arbitrage costs, such as 
transportation costs, taxes, “hidden” costs, etc. On the other hand, the relative 
version states that differences in price of the same product in different 
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countries gradually approaches zero over time. For testing domestic market 
integration, the above concept can be used whenever the price of (tradable) 
goods across regions is uniform. Many researchers have focused on testing the 
validity of the law of one price across countries. Some of them use price levels, 
while others use price indices. When they use a price index, they test a relative 
or “proportional” LOOP.    
 
Most of the empirical literature examines the validity of the relative version of 
LOOP for two main reasons. First, trading in two markets in order to profit by 
the difference in prices is not costless. Prices are very unlikely to be the same 
across locations since there exists transportation costs and trade barriers. 
Second, data for the prices of products are not readily available. For price 
comparisons, the researchers usually use price indices whose levels are 
arbitrary.     
 
As in Gluscenko (2004), the term ‘convergence of price’ has two fundamental 
concepts. Let rtP  denotes the price of a good in region r at time t, stP  denotes 
the price of a good in region s at time t, and strtrst PPP −=  denotes a price 
differential. Figure 2.1 illustrates the difference between the concepts: the thin 
lines in the figures depict the actual dynamic of prices, and the thick lines 
represent their theoretical (long-run) trajectories.   
 
Figure 2.1(a) shows that the prices in region r and region s tend to move in the 
same direction, only fluctuating around their long-run trajectories. Price 
disparities between regions are merely random shocks dying out over time. 
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Therefore, price difference between region r and region s converges to zero. 
This concept can be called a “short-run” convergence. 
 
Figure 2.1(b) shows that the prices in region r and region s move in different 
paths, but the same direction. The price in region s catches the price in region r 
up. Therefore, after a long period of time both prices will be the same or 
0lim =
∞→
rst
t
P . In general, the price disparity permanently diminishes over time; 
and the prices fluctuate around this general trend due to random shocks. This 
concept can be called a “long-run” convergence. 
 
 
 
Source: Gluscenko (2004) 
Figure 2.1: Two concepts of price convergence 
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The standard test for the LOOP in the voluminous literature involves analyzing 
short run price convergence. In essence, it is testing the time series TtrtP ,...,0}{ =  
and TtstP ,...,0}{ =  for cointegration. Because of disturbance, rstrst vP =  will be 
observed where rstv  are equilibrium errors. Assuming rstv  to be a first order 
autoregressive process, rstrstrsrst vv εβ ++= −1)1( , a testable version of the 
theoretical relationship 0=rstP  is                   
rstrstrsrst PP εβ +=∆ −1   across t=1, …, T with fixed (r,s).  (2.1) 
If 0<rsβ  then the LOOP holds, and hence regions r and s are integrated.  
 
One can add a constant term and the lag of rstP∆  to the above specification. A 
constant term represents country or product fixed effects that account for the 
difference in transportation costs, quality, or mark up. Therefore, it tests the 
relative LOOP. While including the lags of rstP∆  is used to account for possible 
serial correlation in the error term. Thus, the more common specification to test 
the LOOP is 
rst
k
h
hrsthrstrsrst ppcp εαβ +∆++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1 , (2.2) 
where p is the log of P.   
  
The expected time, θ , for it to adjust halfway back to zero following a one-time 
shock (its half-life) can be calculated as follows. Initialize by setting 00 =v . 
Then 11 ε=v  and 111 )1()1()( εββ θθ +=+= vvE t . The half-life is that θ  such that 
the expected value of tv  has reverted to half its initial post-shock size, i.e. the θ  
that sets 2/)( 11 ε=tvE . Therefore 11 5.0)1( εεβ θ =+ .  Since we have the same 1ε  
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term on both sides, we can eliminate them. Taking natural logarithms yields 
)5.0ln()1ln( =+ βθ . Finally, we have a formula for θ  as follows:  
)1ln(
)5.0ln(
βθ += . (2.3) 
 
Most of the seminal papers relating to price convergence focus on developed 
countries, such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hungary, Russia, 
the U.K., and other European countries. Only a few of them analyze developing 
countries. Moreover, they have primarily focused on cross-country analysis 
and aggregate price level differentials. The current study differs from much of 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) literature in two fundamental dimensions. 
First, it examines price convergence within a country. Second, it uses 
disaggregated data.     
 
A study on regional price convergence in Australia and New Zealand (NZ) has 
been conducted by Coleman and Daglish (1998). In their study, they use both 
aggregate CPI data and a set of 34 supermarket prices from 1984 to 1996 to test 
whether the speed of price convergence between Australia and NZ is similar to 
that within Australia. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is employed to 
test whether real exchange rate changes disappear over time or whether they 
are permanent. The use of the real exchange rates in this study is to capture the 
movement of the nominal exchange rate and the difference of price between the 
two countries. However, when evaluated in the same countries, the real 
exchange rate only captures the difference in price. They find that price 
behaviour in both countries is different. New Zealand prices are on average 
much lower than prices in Australia. Exchange rate pass-through is found to be 
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small and adjustment is low. These differences suggest that integration of both 
countries is far from complete.     
 
Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2000) study the dynamics of price indices for 
major U.S. cities using panel econometric methods. Evaluating 19 cities in 78 
years from 1918 to 1995 (annual data), they find a surprisingly low speed of 
convergence with a half-life of about nine years. Moreover, they are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the price differentials when 
tested using a univariate unit-root test. Transportation costs, differential speed 
of adjustment to shocks, and the inclusion of non-traded goods could be the 
causes of such a slow convergence rate.   
 
Goldberg and Verboven (2003) use European car market prices to analyze 
market integration and convergence to the law of one price. Using a large 
three-dimensional panel data set of 150 vehicle-makes in five markets 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K.) over the period 1970-2000, they 
find surprisingly strong evidence of convergence towards both the absolute 
and the relative versions of the law of one price. They also include a trend in 
their model to see the impact of EMU integration, but they find that it has only 
a small impact on the speed of convergence. 
 
Ratfai (2003) uses tradable prices to measure the speed of price convergence 
within Hungary. He uses monthly data for 20 goods in 20 cities from January 
1980 to January 2006.  A series of panel unit tests are employed, as developed 
by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002). He also applies a cross-sectional, gravity-type 
equation to measure the impact of distance among geographical locations and 
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of the number of people living in the region on the price differential. It is found 
that the speed of price convergence is very fast, i.e. 4 months, and the time-
invariant price differential depends on the size of the city, but not the 
geographical position.   
 
A study of price convergence in Slovakia is conducted by Horvath and Vidovic 
(2004). They use a large panel data set of monthly frequency final good and 
service prices in 38 Slovak districts over a five-year period (January 1997 to 
December 2001). They not only investigate the range of price differences across 
Slovak districts, but they also measure relative price variability across cities and 
across products. The variability in relative prices in the same district appears to 
be higher than the variability of prices of the same good across different 
districts. It is found that the speed of convergence to the absolute law of one 
price is lower than that found in U.S. cities, i.e. for non-perishable goods it is 
15.8 months, for perishable goods 12.2 months, and for services 46.2 months. 
However, the speed of convergence to the relative law of one price is 
considerably higher. 
 
For the Russian economy, Gluschenko (2004) tests the law of one price over the 
period 1994-2000. He uses the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test for Russia as a single 
market and finds that the degree of market integration is not high. Among 75 
markets, only 50% to 60% of the Russian markets are integrated. Applying the 
threshold model, he also shows that the barrier to market integration is rather 
high, i.e. 13% to 15% of price. As an alternative to the DF test, dynamic price 
dispersion is employed to test σ -convergence. (σ -convergence implies that 
prices are converged when the standard deviations of the prices across regions 
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are falling over time). The dynamics of cross sectional distribution are also 
analyzed to reveal whether there is a movement toward market integration. 
The study concludes that, even though the portion of the integrated region is 
not too high, among non-integrated regions there is a tendency toward market 
integration.     
 
In China, a study of price index convergence is conducted by Fan and Wei 
(2006). Applying panel unit root tests (Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test and Im-
Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test) and a non-linear mean reversion model to 36 major 
Chinese cities over the seven-year period 1998-2004, they find that the price is 
converged with a half-life only 3 to 4 months. This finding confirms the success 
of the market reforms implemented in China.  
 
Morshed et al. (2006) find that the speed of convergence in India is also fast, i.e. 
3 months. They evaluate monthly CPI from 1988 to 2001 across 25 major cities 
using cointegration analysis. Impulse response functions were obtained to 
calculate the rates of convergence. They also analyse how shocks can be 
transmitted from one city to another and find no systematic behaviour of 
transmission from one city to another. Their results suggest that the use of city 
distance to calculate the transport costs in the case of price formation in 
different cities warrants caution. 
 
Using a different methodology from the above researchers, Lutz (2002) 
employs a “before-after” approach, a “cross-sectional” approach, and a 
“difference-in-difference” approach to evaluate price convergence under EMU. 
The method that he employs is basically a comparison of the prices of specific 
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products from one time to another time. He analyses the price of the Big Mac 
(1987-2001), the Economist magazine (1995-2001), 17 cars (1995-2001), and a 
range of goods and services (1970-2000) before and after joining the EMU. The 
study concludes that the common currency had little impact on price 
convergence during the first three years of EMU.  
 
Jung and Doroodian (2000) employ Johansen’s multivariate cointegration 
approach to test the factor price convergence (FPC) in manufacturing sectors of 
seven European Community (EC) countries (Netherlands, the U.K., France, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Denmark), the U.S., and Canada from 1960 to 1991. 
The cointegration tests show that the FPC holds among the industrial countries 
as a whole. Having found the factor prices are cointegrated, they employ the 
error correction model (ECM) and find that there exists feedback causality 
between manufacturing labour costs in North America and Western Europe.    
 
Webber and White (2003) also study factor price convergence (FPC), but within 
four major European countries, i.e. Germany, Spain, Holland, and Italy. They 
present a new method for identifying FPC on the basis of concordance 
(convergence) and discordance (divergence). There are five alternative 
measurements, i.e. absolute difference, maximum to minimum ratio, switching 
difference, switching ratio, and convergence club. The methods they propose 
are comparing the wages of one country with other countries in a specific range 
of time. To obtain the significance level, they suggest using a bootstrapping 
method by drawing samples with replacement. Samples with replacement are 
taken from the observed sample to permit an estimate of the variability that can 
be attached to the sample statistic. It is found that the average regional factor 
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price for labour has converged throughout the period 1980 to 1990, but 
diverged between 1990 and 1994.  
 
Within the European area, Rogers (2001) analyzes the price index of 168 goods 
and services in 26 cities in 18 countries. He divides goods into traded goods 
and non-traded goods. By comparing standard deviations across regions and 
differences between the maximum and minimum of price indices, he shows 
that: first, between 1990 and 1999, the price in the EU is less dispersed, which is 
shown by a falling standard deviation; and second, non-traded goods are more 
dispersed than traded goods, and there is no evidence of convergence.  
 
Gil-Pareja and Sosvilla-Rivero (2008) examine price convergence in the 
European Union (EU) car market over the period 1995 to 2005. They use 45 car 
models from a biannual survey and regress time on the coefficient of variation 
(ratio of the standard deviation to the mean). It is found that the cross sectional 
dispersion decreases over time, which means that there is evidence of price 
convergence among EU 15 countries, but not before 1999. Price dispersion 
between 1995 and 1998 is due to exchange rate volatility.      
 
Cuestas and Ordonez (2007) test price convergence among Mercosur countries 
(Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) over the period 1980Q1 to 
2006Q4. Not only is the CPI considered, but also the real interest rate. The latter 
variable is used to capture convergence in the money markets. Convergence 
occurs when there is an equal long-term forecast of variables. Cointegration of 
a pair of variables is used to identify convergence; and a unit root test is 
employed to see whether the price differential is stationary. They conclude that 
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there exists good evidence of price and real interest rate convergence in 
Mercosur countries.    
 
Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2002) analyze the possible bias in aggregate 
price data in estimating the half-life of price differentials. Using aggregated and 
disaggregated price indices in the European Union from January 1960 to 
December 2000 and employing a fixed effects panel model and the LLC and the 
IPS panel unit root tests, they find that the half-life for aggregated data is 39 
months, whereas the half-life for disaggregated data is 27 months. The bias can 
be economically substantial due to differences in the dynamics of 
disaggregated price data compared with the aggregated data. From this result, 
they suggest using microeconomic price data to study price differentials.         
 
Parsley and Wei (1996) examine price convergence across 48 U.S. cities from the 
first quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1992. They use actual goods’ prices 
rather than price indexes, and so examine deviations from the “absolute” 
LOOP. The data consists of the prices of 10 services, 15 perishable goods, and 
26 non-perishable goods. Three empirical results are relevant. First, the average 
price difference for the same good (service) in different cities is approximately 
15 percent. Second, the prices of most goods and some services are mean 
reverting – that is the price difference is transient – and the rate of convergence 
is quite rapid. The estimated half-life for non-perishable goods is found to be 
5.3 quarters, for perishable goods 4.1 quarters, and for services 15.4 quarters. In 
order to test for a non-linear effect they add a quadratic term in the basic 
specification. It is found that a higher price differential has a higher rate of 
convergence than a smaller price differential. Third, price variation increases 
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with distance. For the price variation, they use mean absolute deviation and 
variance. It is found that, for both specifications, there is a positive relationship 
between price variability and distance, implying increasing cost to arbitrage if 
two cities are farther apart from each other.    
 
Engel and Rogers (2001) also study price convergence in the U.S. In contrast 
with Parsley and Wei (1996), they use new disaggregated data (price index) on 
consumer prices that is nearly 100 percent of consumer expenditure. They 
question whether the variability of price difference is purely a result of market 
segmentation or whether sticky nominal prices play a role. By employing a 43 
goods price index (and an overall CPI for the city) in 29 U.S. cities from 
December 1986 to June 1996, they find that the distance between cities accounts 
for a significant amount of the variation in prices between pairs of cities, but 
nominal price stickiness plays an even more significant role.   
 
Engel and Rogers (1996) compare the convergence to the law of one price intra-
country versus inter-country in both the U.S. and Canada. They use a 
disaggregated data price index for 14 commodities in 23 cities from June 1978 
to December 1994. The standard deviation of relative price is used to measure 
volatility for each of the 228 pairs of the price index. It is found that the 
volatility of prices between U.S. city pairs is generally slightly higher than that 
between Canadian city pairs, but cross-border city pairs have much higher 
volatility. They conclude that the currency in which price is denominated is 
important in itself and price across the border tends to differ more than the 
price within a country. The explanation they offer is that sticky prices set in 
local currencies generate excess volatility in price differentials.  
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A similar result is found in a study conducted by Rogers and Smith (2001), who 
examine price differentials in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The focus of their 
study is to measure the border effect of the U.S-Canada and the U.S-Mexico. 
Using the monthly CPI of 38 cities in North America and 8 cities in Mexico 
from January 1984 to December 1997, they find that the border effect on U.S.-
Mexican relative prices is larger than that on U.S.-Canadian prices. They argue 
that the border effect is present across U.S.-Mexican city pairs, but does not fall 
significantly when examined only in cities lying very close to the geographical 
border. This result shows that the border effect is not strictly a geographical 
phenomenon; rather, it may be related to the tax system, currency regime, or 
other factors. Using the prices of 276 highly disaggregated goods and services 
in Mexican cities, they also find that the variability of relative prices of different 
items declines during the stable peso sub-period, but by less than the decline in 
nominal and real exchange rate variability. 
 
2.3   Data  
 
The data used in this empirical exercise are mainly collected from Bank 
Indonesia (BI), the central bank of Indonesia. Actually, the only institution 
which is responsible for collecting and publishing the CPI in Indonesia is the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). However, the CBS only publishes the CPI 
and the price indices of seven groups of commodities in each city, i.e. (i) raw 
food, (ii) processed food, (iii) housing, (iv) clothing, (v) health, (vi) education, 
and (vii) transportation. Since a close relationship between BI and CBS is 
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maintained, the CBS provides BI with raw data that consists of all commodities 
(659 items in total) and 35 sub-groups or categories. With this highly 
disaggregated data BI is able to measure core inflation based on a trimmed-
mean method2 and an exclusion method3. Even though since January 2005 the 
CBS has calculated the core inflation based on the exclusion method, the CBS 
still provides the disaggregated data to BI.     
 
In this chapter we use monthly data for the national CPI and aggregate CPI of 
45 cities from January 2002 to April 2008. The index is based on 2002 prices. We 
also use 35 categories of commodities in the price index within 45 cities. With 
this balanced panel data, i.e. no missing price observations, there are as many 
as 3,420 observations in each category.  
 
We use monthly instead of annual time series data to reduce the potential 
‘aggregation’ bias. The bias might occur when the dynamics of monthly or 
quarterly data are neglected so that the result from using annual data can be 
different from that of using monthly or quarterly data. As Taylor (2001, p. 474) 
points out: “When the half-lives turn out to be low, surprise is expressed that we do 
not find markets adjusting in days and weeks, but rather in four to five years. I will 
show that this result is not a surprise. Sampling the data at low frequencies will never 
allow one to identify a high-frequency adjustment process. Instead, a large bias could be 
introduced towards the finding of a long half-life, and the bias grows larger the greater 
the degree of temporal aggregation”.      
                                                 
2 The trimmed-mean method is a method to calculate core inflation by trimming those 
commodities that have very high and very low inflation.   
3 The exclusion method is a method to calculate core inflation by excluding volatile food and 
administered prices from the CPI. 
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From Figure 2.1 we can see the movement of the year on year (yoy) inflation 
rate of the aggregate CPI and selected categories from January 2003 to April 
2008. Aggregate CPI inflation from January 2003 to September 2005 was in the 
range 5 percent to 9 percent, from October 2005 to October 2006 the range was 
15 percent to 18 percent, and from November 2006 to April 2008 the range was 
back to 5 percent to 9 percent. One can observe that the increase in inflation in 
the period October 2005 to October 2006 was mainly caused by the hike in fuel 
price4.  
 
It is not worth describing the price movements of 35 categories in one figure 
because there is too much detail and it is not easy to read. Therefore, we select  
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Figure 2.2: Inflation (yoy) by category - selected 
                                                 
4 The government increased the fuel price by more than 100% in October 2005. 
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Figure 2.3: Inflation (yoy) by city - selected 
 
the categories that have the biggest weight in each group (Figure 2.1). For 
example, ‘housing rent’ is the biggest weight in the housing group and ‘rice 
and wheat’ is the biggest weight in the raw food group. From the figure, we 
can see that, in October 2005, inflation of the transportation category reached 
68%. From this figure also, we can see that the inflation of educational services 
seems always above the national CPI, except in the period of October 2005 to 
October 2006. On the other side, inflation of ‘rice and wheat’ tends to fluctuate.       
 
Figure 2.2 shows the movement of the year-on-year inflation of the aggregate 
CPI in six cities. Among 45 cities, we choose Jakarta, Medan, Banjarmasin, 
Ujung Pandang, and Jayapura since they have the highest weights in the major 
islands, i.e. Jawa, Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua, respectively. 
From the figure, we can see that inflation in Jayapura, the most remote city 
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from Jakarta, usually lies above the national inflation rate over the period of 
observation, except in the period of the fuel price hike (October 2005 to October 
2006). On the other hand, inflation in Ujung Pandang is usually below the 
national inflation rate.  
 
We approximate the distance by measuring a straight line from Jakarta to each 
city. We obtain the data for distance from http://www.geodistance.com. The 
figure is relatively the same when we use the data from 
http://www.mapcrow.info.  
 
We obtain the number of people living in the 45 cities from the website 
http://www.mongabay.com/igapo/2005_world_city_populations/Indonesia.htm
l.   The figures are an estimation of the number of people living in each city in 
2005. We use this data since the CBS conducts a census only every 10 years,  
 
Table 2.1: Data 
 
No Data Frequency Period Source 
1 National CPI and CPI of 
45 cities 
Monthly 2002:1 
- 
2008:4 
CBS and BI 
2 35 categories of 
commodity price index 
in 45 cities 
Monthly 2002:1 
- 
2008:4 
CBS and BI 
3 Distance of 44 cities to 
Jakarta (km) 
-  http://www.geodistanc
e.com 
4 Population of 45 cities - 2005 http://www.mongabay.
com/igapo/2005_world
_city_populations/Indo
nesia.html 
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with the latest census being conducted in 2000, and the census covers the 
number of people living in provinces, not in cities. The summary of the data 
can be seen in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.2 shows the statistical properties, i.e. mean and standard deviation, of 
monthly inflation of 35 categories and the national CPI. Rice and wheat, 
vegetables, beans, cooking flavour, fat and oil, utilities, other clothing, 
educational service, and transportation are the categories that have means and 
standard deviations higher than the headline CPI. Among other categories, the 
raw foods group (code of category begins with 1) is categorized as a volatile 
item since its standard deviation is high. Even though utilities, educational 
service, transportation, and communication have high standard deviations, 
they are not categorized as volatile items. A high standard deviation is mainly 
due to an increase in the price of school fees and administered prices, such as 
fuel price, electricity, and phone calls, at specific times. Among categories, 
housing rent, transportation, and processed food have the biggest weights in 
the CPI, i.e. 13.8%, 11.3%, and 10.0%5, respectively.  
 
The ten most highly weighted commodities in the CPI basket are uncooked 
rice, housing rent for long term, intra-city transportation cost, gasoline, housing 
rent for short term, electricity, kerosene, filtered cigarettes, cooked rice, and 
telephone pulse or fee (see Table 2.3). These commodities contribute as much as 
35% to total CPI.  
 
                                                 
5 The weight is calculated based on February 2008 inflation. The weight is not fixed, but varies 
over time.   
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Table 2.2: CPI Inflation – National (mtm - %) 
No Code Product Category Mean Std Dev Weight
1 10100 Rice and Wheat 0.82 2.59 7.00
2 10200 Meats 0.53 3.10 3.14
3 10300 Fresh Fish 0.60 2.00 3.48
4 10400 Frozen Fish 0.53 0.88 0.68
5 10500 Egg and Milk 0.58 2.36 1.98
6 10600 Vegetables 0.82 3.48 2.24
7 10700 Beans 1.09 2.90 1.55
8 10800 Fruits 0.56 1.29 2.00
9 10900 Cooking Flavor 1.12 8.37 2.22
10 11000 Fat and Oil 1.06 2.13 2.19
11 11100 Other Raw Foods 0.40 1.24 0.24
12 20100 Processed Food 0.68 0.72 10.02
13 20200 Non Alcohol Beverage 0.53 1.09 3.00
14 20300 Cigars and Alcohols 0.60 0.73 4.16
15 30100 Housing Rent 0.63 0.34 13.82
16 30200 Utilities 1.17 2.79 7.18
17 30300 Housing Appliances 0.25 0.32 1.55
18 30400 Housing Management 0.49 0.33 2.80
19 40100 Men's Clothing 0.35 0.38 1.49
20 40200 Women' s C lothing 0.28 0.32 1.61
21 40300 Children' s C lothing 0.33 0.34 0.89
22 40400 Other Clothing 1.14 1.85 1.86
23 50100 Health Service 0.69 0.82 1.15
24 50200 Medicines 0.37 0.34 0.50
25 50300 Body  Cares Service 0.54 0.62 0.27
26 50400 Body  Cares and Cosmetics 0.36 0.31 1.72
27 60100 Educational Service 1.08 2.20 3.94
28 60200 Courses 0.27 0.44 0.24
29 60300 Educational Equipments 0.31 0.50 0.64
30 60400 Recreation 0.10 0.40 1.14
31 60500 Sport 0.24 0.35 0.13
32 70100 Transportation 1.07 5.08 11.26
33 70200 Communication and Postage 0.39 3.08 2.71
34 70300 Media and Transportation Support 0.56 0.78 0.92
35 70400 Financial Service 0.66 2.85 0.27
36 00000 CPI 0.69 1 .05 100
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Table 2.3: Ten biggest weights of commodities (%)  
No Code Commodity Weight
1 10101 Rice - uncooked 6.29
2 30129 Housing rent - long term 5.81
3 70103 Transportation - Intra city 4.58
4 10108 Gasoline 3.40
5 30154 Housing rent - short term 3.32
6 30221 Electricity 2.66
7 30216 Kerosene 2.43
8 20311 Cigarete - filtered 2.39
9 20138 Rice - cooked 2.36
10 70208 Telephone - pulse 1.79  
 
The statistical properties of the monthly inflation of 45 cities are described in 
Table 2.4. Banda Aceh, Palembang, Kendari, and Jayapura are recorded as high 
inflation cities with a mean of more than 0.8% per month. While Banda Aceh, 
Sibolga, Bengkulu, Bandar Lampung, Kendari, Ambon, and Ternate are the 
cities that have high volatility in inflation. Jakarta is the biggest weighted city 
in the CPI (27.7%), while Sibolga is the smallest weighted city (0.24%)6. 
 
From Table 2.4, we can also see that Jakarta is the most populated city with 8.4 
million people, whereas Sampit is the least populated city with 52.5 thousand 
people7. Jayapura, which is the capital of Papua province, is the farthest city 
from Jakarta (3,780 km), while Serang, the capital of Banten province, is the 
closest city to Jakarta (98 km).  
 
                                                 
6 The weight is based on 2002 prices and is fixed.   
7
 This is an estimated figure for 2005. 
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Table 2.4: CPI Inflation – Cities (%), Population, and Distance (km) 
Mean Std Dev Weight
1 Lhokseumawe 0.69 1.54 0.25 135,143 1,668.91        
2 Banda Aceh 1.01 2.11 0.66 160,358 1,823.35        
3 Padang Sidempuan 0.77 1.41 0.31 112,428 1,192.35        
4 Sibolga 0.72 1.67 0.24 88,261 1,258.04        
5 Pematang Siantar 0.68 1.46 0.68 261,362 1,336.90        
6 Medan 0.74 1.51 5.98 2,064,719 1,418.77        
7 Padang 0.74 1.54 2.07 860,131 921.93          
8 Pakanbaru 0.76 1.21 1.95 752,994 954.03          
9 Batam 0.50 1.13 1.72 952,550 867.03          
10 Jambi 0.77 1.54 1.31 485,875 618.81          
11 Palembang 0.84 1.55 3.98 1,662,011 412.50          
12 Bengkulu 0.74 1.71 0.76 378,285 567.90          
13 Bandar Lampung 0.72 1.62 2.25 930,723 189.36          
14 Pangkal Pinang 0.71 1.41 0.44 134,082 493.31          
15 Jakarta 0.66 0.98 27.66 8,407,479 0.00
16 Tasikmalaya 0.76 1.30 0.70 221,724 196.55          
17 Bandung 0.69 1.06 6.76 2,189,759 117.78          
18 C irebon 0.63 1.25 0.87 286,032 199.16          
19 Purwokerto 0.63 1.02 0.69 249,705 295.98          
20 Surakarta 0.53 1.05 1.58 484,054 468.42          
21 Semarang 0.74 1.05 4.36 1,547,888 409.19          
22 Tegal 0.68 1.05 0.83 242,397 265.71          
23 Yogyakarta 0.75 0.84 1.22 389,781 437.29          
24 Jember 0.67 1.04 0.92 269,534 789.45          
25 Kediri 0.65 1.45 0.86 248,961 601.88          
26 Malang 0.68 0.99 2.05 812,794 670.27          
27 Surabaya 0.66 0.97 8.90 2,692,503 668.00          
28 Serang / Cilegon 0.70 1.01 2.18 151,004 97.73            
29 Denpasar 0.61 0.98 1.94 651,592 971.13          
30 Mataram 0.62 1.44 1.07 336,616 1,064.52        
31 Kupang 0.77 1.30 0.61 314,929 1,900.35        
32 Pontianak 0.68 0.93 1.36 505,461 744.01          
33 Sampit 0.59 1.21 0.26 52,506 808.09          
34 Palangkaraya 0.68 1.22 0.52 197,250 983.32          
35 Banjarmasin 0.74 1.21 1.93 572,106 924.56          
36 Balikpapan 0.77 1.01 1.31 465,915 1,236.90        
37 Samarinda 0.73 1.00 1.55 641,383 1,311.79        
38 Manado 0.64 1.26 1.27 429,613 2,184.98        
39 Palu 0.78 1.29 0.68 351,214 1,565.30        
40 U Pandang / Makassar 0.65 1.33 3.06 1,200,116 1,399.37        
41 Kendari 0.81 1.63 0.50 284,244 1,767.77        
42 Gorontalo 0.66 1.57 0.46 159,645 1,954.74        
43 Ambon 0.58 1.67 0.58 178,954 2,385.26        
44 Ternate 0.71 1.80 0.32 201,109 2,412.94        
45 Jayapura 0.89 1.12 0.40 194,997 3,781.10        
National 0.69 1 .05 100
Distance
Inflation (mtm)
No City Population
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2.4. Does the relative LOOP hold? 
 
There are two sources of variability in prices, i.e. the variability in each 
individual price across cities and the variability of prices in all products in each 
individual city. Engel and Rogers (2001) argue that if the variability in each 
individual price across cities is less than the variability of prices for all products 
in each individual city, then relative LOOP holds. In other words, relative 
LOOP holds when the ratio between the variation in prices for all products in 
the same city and the variation in prices of the same product across cities 
exceeds one.  
 
Consider two goods i and j, and two cities A and B. Since the number of people 
and the consumption preferences in city A are different from those in city B, the 
weights for goods (i and j) in each city are different.  Let capital letters denote 
the price indices and small letters the prices of specific goods. Then         
A
j
A
i
A ppP )1( αα −+=  (2.4)  
B
j
B
i
B ppP )1( γγ −+=  (2.5)  
and their difference is 
B
j
B
i
A
j
A
i
BA ppppPP )1()1( γγαα −−−−+=− . (2.6) 
This can be rewritten as 
))(())(1()( Bj
B
i
B
j
A
j
B
i
A
i
BA ppppppPP −−+−−+−=− γααα  (2.7) 
or 
))(())(1()( Aj
A
i
B
j
A
j
B
i
A
i
BA ppppppPP −−+−−+−=− γαγγ . (2.8)
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Equations (2.7) and (2.8) contain two types of expression. The first type 
compares the price of the same good (i or j) in two different locations (A and B). 
These are the first two expressions on the right hand side of equations (2.7) and 
(2.8). The second type, the last expressions, compares the prices of different 
goods (i and j) in the same location (A or B).  
 
Assuming that the law of one price holds, or there is a tendency for it to hold, 
then prices of similar goods converge across different districts, i.e. there is a 
tendency for Bi
A
i pp =  and 
B
j
A
j pp = . Then, if V represents volatility, one can 
expect )( Bi
A
i ppV −  to be low and )()(
B
i
A
i
A
j
A
i ppVppV −>− . In other words, the 
volatility of relative prices in the same district is higher than the volatility of 
prices of the same good across districts. However, this result may be obtained 
also if one assumes the same (similar) degree of price stickiness of an 
individual good across districts; then again )()( Bi
A
i
A
j
A
i ppVppV −>− . 
 
Thus )( Aj
A
i ppV −  is a measure of the volatility of relative prices in the same 
location and )( Bi
A
i ppV −  a measure of volatility of the price of the same good in 
different locations. Following Engel and Rogers (2001), we define the ratio kir  as 
∑
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where (.)sd  denotes standard deviation, l  the number of products in the data 
set, and h  the number of districts. ktip ,  is log of the price of good i , at time t , at 
location k . Also, 
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The kir  coefficient is the ratio of sums of the standard deviations. 
 
The numerator in (2.9) represents the average of the standard deviations of the 
first log difference of the price of good i  relative to the price of each other good 
at location k . It represents the volatility of relative prices of different goods in 
the same location. 
 
The denominator in (2.9) represents the average of the standard deviations of 
the first log difference of good i  at different locations, k  and m . It measures 
the deviation from the LOOP. If the relative LOOP holds, then the denominator 
is expected to be small. Engel and Rogers (2001) mention that there are actually 
three cases where one can expect the denominator to be small. First, when the 
‘law of one price holds’, so that the differences between the prices of good j  in 
two locations are small. Second, if the price of good j  at location A is 
proportional to the price of good j  at location B, the difference is almost 
constant. Third is the case where the price of good j  at both locations hardly 
changes. 
 
As mentioned above, kir  represents the ratio of relative price variability across 
districts and cross-district variability of the relative law of one price deviations. 
As shown in Table 2.5, we can see from month-to-month data that the  
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Table 2.5: The ratio of relative price variability across districts and cross-district  
variability of the relative law of one price deviations 
 
No Product Category Average Std Dev r < 1 Average Std Dev r < 1
1 Rice and Wheat 1.28 0.13 1 1.51 0.23 0
2 Meats 0.98 0.10 24 1.20 0.11 2
3 Fresh Fish 0.77 0.13 45 0.88 0.09 43
4 Frozen Fish 0.87 0.10 44 0.94 0.09 34
5 Egg and Milk 1.35 0.17 1 2.03 0.31 0
6 Vegetables 0.80 0.11 45 0.88 0.08 42
7 Beans 1.09 0.17 16 1.12 0.18 12
8 Fruits 0.94 0.09 33 1.04 0.08 13
9 Cooking Flavor 0.98 0.19 22 1.09 0.20 17
10 Fat and Oil 1.20 0.09 1 1.65 0.32 3
11 Other Raw Foods 1.20 0.10 1 1.27 0.11 0
12 Processed Food 1.69 0.16 0 1.48 0.17 0
13 Non Alcohol Beverage 1.59 0.17 0 1.91 0.27 0
14 Cigars and Alcohols 1.65 0.17 0 1.61 0.22 0
15 Housing Rent 1.90 0.24 0 1.61 0.17 0
16 Utilities 1.67 0.33 0 1.94 0.38 0
17 Housing Appliances 2.66 0.35 0 2.12 0.33 0
18 Housing Management 2.32 0.30 0 1.91 0.21 0
19 Men's Clothing 2.71 0.46 0 2.18 0.42 0
20 Women's Clothing 2.71 0.42 0 2.31 0.39 0
21 Children's Clothing 2.29 0.32 0 1.83 0.26 0
22 Other Clothing 1.55 0.22 0 1.57 0.26 0
23 Health Service 0.98 0.10 27 0.90 0.10 40
24 Medicines 1.80 0.25 0 1.53 0.22 0
25 Body Cares Service 1.10 0.10 4 1.05 0.11 12
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics 2.84 0.39 0 2.60 0.43 0
27 Educational Service 1.08 0.11 12 1.03 0.15 21
28 Courses 1.47 0.19 0 1.26 0.13 0
29 Educational Equipments 1.74 0.24 0 1.53 0.20 0
30 Recreation 2.30 0.35 0 1.90 0.26 0
31 Sport 1.99 0.30 0 1.74 0.27 0
32 Transportation 3.17 0.60 0 3.57 0.72 0
33 Communication and Postage 5.25 1.39 0 6.82 1.76 0
34 Media and Transportation Support 1.51 0.19 0 1.32 0.14 0
35 Financial Service 2.25 0.71 3 2.12 0.77 6
Unweighted Average 1.76 279 1.76 245
Weighted Average 1.87 1.93
Monthly Yearly
 
Note: The ratio is calculated using the formula: 
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k
ir coefficient is above one in about 80 percent of the cases. In the remaining 
cases, it is smaller than one, i.e. for meats, fresh fish, frozen fish, vegetables, 
fruits, cooking flavours, and health service, the smallest value is 0.77. Among 
1,575 (45 cities x 35 categories) values of kir , only 18 percent (279) have a value 
of below one. The un-weighted average of kir  is found to be 1.76. When we 
include the weights of products, the average of kir  increases slightly to 1.87.  
 
Table 2.5 also shows the kir  using year-on-year data. The data is calculated by 
comparing the current price with last year’s price, that is k ti
k
ti
k
ti ppp 12,,, lnln −−=∆ . 
The results of the year-on-year data paint the same story as that of month-to-
month data. However, it gives slightly better results than when using month-
to-month data. About 89 percent of the kir  coefficients are above one. Only four 
categories have a kir  less than one, i.e. fresh fish, frozen fish, vegetables, and 
health service. Among 1,575 values for kir , only 16 percent (245) have a value 
below one. The un-weighted average of kir  using the year-on-year data is found 
to be the same as that when using month-to-month data, i.e. 1.76. While the 
weighted average of kir  using year-on-year data is slightly higher than that 
when using month-to-month data, i.e. 1.93.   
 
This finding shows that the variability of price in the same products across 
cities is less than the variability of different products in the same city. In other 
words, the variability of relative prices in the same district is higher than the 
variability of the price of the same good across different districts. It implies that 
relative LOOP holds for Indonesia prices.  
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One may expect convergence to the relative LOOP to hold more as time passes, 
and a corresponding increase in the value of the kir  coefficient. Comparing 
monthly differences and twelve-month differences, the data show the same 
value for the un-weighted average of the kir  coefficient and a slight increase in 
the weighted value, from 1.87 to 1.93. This result to a certain extent differs from 
that of Engel and Rogers (2001) who reported that the twenty-four-month 
ratios “actually are slightly lower, which is the opposite of what one would expect.” 
(page 6). They find that the weighted average for first differenced data is 2.03, 
while the weighted average for twenty-four month differenced data is 1.75. Our 
findings is consistent with that of Horvath and Vidovic (2004), where they find 
a significant increase in the weighted value, from 1.88 (one-month differenced) 
to 2.59 (twelve-month differenced).  
 
Next, we analyze the denominator of the kir  coefficient (see Table 2.6). The 
denominator measures the average standard deviation of the difference in the 
price of the same good across cities, what Engel and Rogers (2001) call the 
relative law of one price. In their study, the weighted average of the 
denominator of the kir  coefficient equals 2.87, whereas in our study it is 2.90. 
This finding suggests that the deviation from LOOP in our sample is roughly 
the same as theirs.   
 
The lowest denominator values in Engel and Rogers (2001) are for ‘used car’ 
(0.53) and ‘food away from home’ (0.85). In this study, as we can see in Table 
2.6, the lowest variability in price is for ‘communication and postage’ (0.89) and  
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Table 2.6:  LOOP Deviation and Nominal Price Variability (NPV)  
No Product LOOP Dev NPV LOOP Dev NPV
1 Rice and Wheat 3.45 3.30 8.72 11.09
2 Meats 5.55 4.64 9.29 8.47
3 Fresh Fish 7.72 5.44 14.12 10.36
4 Frozen Fish 5.29 3.63 11.64 8.38
5 Egg and Milk 3.00 2.82 4.86 6.52
6 Vegetables 9.77 7.49 16.62 12.91
7 Beans 4.49 3.91 11.91 10.94
8 Fruits 4.73 3.43 10.04 7.42
9 Cooking Flavor 10.66 10.13 18.55 19.24
10 Fat and Oil 3.58 3.13 9.30 12.43
11 Other Raw Foods 3.02 2.13 7.34 5.57
12 Processed Food 1.82 1.35 5.79 4.69
13 Non Alcohol Beverage 2.16 1.86 5.10 5.99
14 Cigars and Alcohols 1.95 1.45 5.62 4.68
15 Housing Rent 1.60 1.13 5.25 3.73
16 Utilities 2.63 3.25 6.95 10.82
17 Housing Appliances 1.09 0.77 3.75 2.91
18 Housing Management 1.27 0.91 4.17 3.12
19 Men's Clothing 1.08 0.77 3.75 2.52
20 Women's Clothing 1.08 0.77 3.48 2.36
21 Children's Clothing 1.30 0.91 4.56 3.06
22 Other Clothing 2.41 2.30 6.77 7.77
23 Health Service 4.23 2.71 13.18 8.48
24 Medicines 1.74 1.18 5.76 3.91
25 Body Cares Service 3.42 2.36 9.92 7.16
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics 1.02 0.73 3.06 2.38
27 Educational Service 4.33 3.49 11.39 8.17
28 Courses 2.30 1.50 7.33 4.86
29 Educational Equipments 1.86 1.28 5.71 4.11
30 Recreation 1.29 0.91 4.25 3.52
31 Sport 1.56 1.03 4.94 3.33
32 Transportation 1.71 4.51 5.05 16.61
33 Communication and Postage 0.89 2.88 1.71 7.04
34 Media and Transportation Support 2.16 1.49 6.97 5.04
35 Financial Service 2.16 3.25 7.92 12.85
Unweighted Average 3.09 2.65 7.56 7.21
Weighted Average 2.90 2.82 7.12 8.15
YearlyMonthly
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‘body cares and cosmetics’ (1.02). It is found that the highest volatility 
categories are ‘cooking flavour’ (10.66), ‘vegetables’ (9.77), ‘fresh fish (7.72), 
‘meats’ (5.55), and ‘frozen fish’ (5.29). Raw food seems to be a high volatility 
category, by nature.     
 
Engel and Rogers (2001) argued that their results might be explained by the 
stickiness of prices. In Figure 2.4, we plot the relationship between the standard 
deviation of )( mjt
k
jt pp ∆−∆  and the stickiness of prices, as measured by the sum 
of the standard deviations of kjtp∆  and 
m
jtp∆ . There are 1,575 observations (45 
cities x 35 categories). The positive relationship is clearly seen in the figure with 
the correlation between these two series being 0.91. As in Engel and Rogers 
(2001), the graph shows the predictions of the sticky-price explanation for 
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Figure 2.4: LOOP deviation versus volatility of nominal price 
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‘proportional’ LOOP deviation. The smaller the standard deviation of the 
nominal price, the smaller the denominator of the kir  coefficient is. 
 
Another way to interpret Figure 2.4 is to note that 
),cov(2)var()var()var( ,,,,,,
m
ti
k
ti
m
ti
k
ti
m
ti
k
ti pppppp ∆∆−∆+∆=∆−∆ . (2.12) 
 
The variance of the relative price could be low, if the variance of each price is 
small or if the covariance is large. Figure 2.4 shows that the variance of the 
relative price is to some extent explained by the variance of each city’s prices.  
 
2.5. Do transportation costs and the level of 
 development matter to price differences?  
 
The failure of prices of similar goods to equalize between regions is a sign that 
the markets are not integrated. One possible explanation for the price 
variability is the distance between regions. Countries are more likely to trade 
with neighbours because transportation costs are lower. Transportation costs 
should depend positively on the distance between locations.  
 
Following Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001), Parsley and Wei (1996), and Rogers 
and Smith (2001), we investigate whether price variability can be explained by 
transportation costs. We also investigate whether the level of development also 
matters to price variability. We follow Ratfai (2003) by including the number of 
people living in the city.  
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To measure the size of the price variability between two cities, one can use 
standard deviation, mean absolute deviation, or the absolute deviation. For this 
analysis, we use absolute deviation of price difference as a dependent variable. 
For each product, the regression takes the form: 
      itititjztjit mdpp εγφα +++=− , (2.13) 
where jitp  is the log of the price index of product j in city i at time t, jztp  is the 
log of the price index of product j in Jakarta (as a benchmark city), itd  is the 
distance between city i and Jakarta, and itm  is size of population in city i. We 
assume that the population in city i does not change through time, so that it has 
the same value for all observations. The distance between city i and Jakarta is 
also constant over time, so that it has also the same value for all observations.   
 
The φ  is expected to be positive. The greater the distance between two cities, 
the more the divergence in the price is. On the other hand, the γ  is expected to 
be negative. The number of people living in the city reflects urbanization or 
development. The more people living in the city, the less the divergence in the 
price compared with Jakarta (a benchmark city that is most heavily populated) 
is.  
 
From Table 2.7 we can learn about the importance of transportation costs as 
proxied by the distance between geographical locations. The results from the 
table overwhelmingly support the implication of these models that 
transportation costs cause price differences between cities, and the size of such 
differences increases with the transportation cost. As expected, for the 
aggregate price level a farther distance from Jakarta increases the absolute price  
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Table 2.7: Coefficients of distance and population 
No Product Category Coef Std Error Prob Coef Std Error Prob
1 Rice and Wheat 0.17 0.22 0.4265 -1.07 0.13 0.0000
2 Meats 3.97 0.17 0.0000 -0.55 0.10 0.0000
3 Fresh Fish 4.35 0.30 0.0000 -1.18 0.18 0.0000
4 Frozen Fish 4.46 0.24 0.0000 -0.89 0.14 0.0000
5 Egg and Milk 0.50 0.06 0.0000 -0.30 0.04 0.0000
6 Vegetables 3.94 0.24 0.0000 -1.23 0.14 0.0000
7 Beans -0.13 0.26 0.6021 -1.36 0.15 0.0000
8 Fruits 4.62 0.20 0.0000 -0.89 0.12 0.0000
9 Cooking Flavor 3.41 0.19 0.0000 -0.82 0.11 0.0000
10 Fat and Oil -0.01 0.24 0.9680 -1.23 0.14 0.0000
11 Other Raw Foods 1.77 0.19 0.0000 -0.45 0.11 0.0001
12 Processed Food 1.42 0.14 0.0000 -0.32 0.08 0.0001
13 Non Alcohol Beverage 0.03 0.10 0.7373 -0.70 0.06 0.0000
14 Cigars and Alcohols -0.21 0.15 0.1674 -0.78 0.09 0.0000
15 Housing Rent 1.28 0.15 0.0000 -0.38 0.09 0.0000
16 Utilities 0.67 0.15 0.0000 -0.30 0.09 0.0006
17 Housing Appliances 1.40 0.12 0.0000 -0.43 0.07 0.0000
18 Housing Management 1.52 0.09 0.0000 -0.31 0.05 0.0000
19 Men's Clothing -0.39 0.13 0.0017 -0.66 0.07 0.0000
20 Women's Clothing 1.69 0.16 0.0000 -0.45 0.09 0.0000
21 Children's Clothing 0.53 0.17 0.0022 -1.02 0.10 0.0000
22 Other Clothing 0.76 0.19 0.0000 -0.26 0.11 0.0150
23 Health Service -1.41 0.44 0.0015 -1.09 0.26 0.0000
24 Medicines 0.70 0.15 0.0000 -0.53 0.09 0.0000
25 Body Cares Service 2.33 0.28 0.0000 -1.17 0.16 0.0000
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics 0.37 0.11 0.0010 -0.32 0.06 0.0000
27 Educational Service 1.07 0.29 0.0002 -0.91 0.17 0.0000
28 Courses 0.85 0.28 0.0019 -0.21 0.16 0.1913
29 Educational Equipments 1.34 0.25 0.0000 -0.56 0.15 0.0001
30 Recreation -0.56 0.10 0.0000 -0.43 0.06 0.0000
31 Sport 0.07 0.14 0.5990 -0.25 0.08 0.0016
32 Transportation 0.02 0.12 0.8417 -0.50 0.07 0.0000
33 Communication and Postage 0.70 0.05 0.0000 -0.28 0.03 0.0000
34 Media and Transportation Support 0.92 0.19 0.0000 -1.02 0.11 0.0000
35 Financial Service 3.77 0.27 0.0000 -1.36 0.16 0.0000
36 CPI 0.88 0.07 0.0000 -0.19 0.04 0.0000
Distance Population
 
 Note :  The coefficients are based on the following estimation: 
itjtjtztjt mdpp εγφα +++=−  
for each product. The coefficients for distance are multiplied by 105 and for population 
by 108. 
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differential. For product category price indices, only ten categories (29 percent) 
have non-significant positive coefficients (i.e. rice and wheat, non-alcohol 
beverage, sport, and transportation), non-significant negative coefficients (i.e. 
beans and cigars and alcohols), and significant negative coefficients (i.e. men’s 
clothing, health service, and recreation). This finding supports the results in 
Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001), Parsley and Wei (1996), and Rogers and Smith 
(2001) where transportation costs matter for price variability.  
 
From the same table, we can see that, for both the aggregate price index and 
category price indices, the level of development as proxied by the population 
size of the city has a statistically significant negative impact on the absolute 
price differential. Only one category, i.e. courses, is not significant. This result 
indicates that the price differential tends to shrink as the difference in the level 
of development becomes smaller. This finding also supports the study 
conducted by Ratfai (2003) where the level of development is shown to matter 
in determining price variability.        
  
As a robustness check, we regress the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the 
price difference of each category on distance and population using cross 
sectional analysis. We also regress the variance of price difference of each 
category on distance and population. The number of observation in these 
regressions is 1,575 (45 cities x 35 products). As shown on Table 2.8, both 
results confirm the previous panel regression that distance positively affects 
price variability, whereas population negatively affects price variability.     
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Table 2.8: Coefficients of distance and population – robustness check 
Constant 0.068 *** 0.005 ***
(0.003) (0.001)
Distance 1.310 *** 0.218 ***
(0.184) (0.038)
Population -6.920 *** -0.564 **
(1.07) (0.22)
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.17
S.E. of regression 0.05 0.01
Durbin-Watson stat 1.96 1.98
F-statistic 17.16 10.19
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00
MAD VAR
 
 Note:  Column MAD is based on the regression: 
itjj
t
jztjit mdpp εγφα +++=−∑
=
76
176
1 . 
Column VAR is based on the regression: 
itjjji md εγφασ +++=2 . 
The coefficients and the standard error for distance are multiplied by 105 and for 
population by 109. 
Number in the bracket is the standard error. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
2.6.   Do city prices converge to national prices? 
 
A common way to examine price convergence is to apply this basic regression 
specification:  
it
k
h
hithitiit ppp εγβα +∆++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1 , (2.14) 
where i is city, 





=
it
it
it
P
P
p ln  are defined as the price differential, itP  is the price 
index in city i, itP  is the national price index, ∆  is a first difference operator, itε  
is an identically-independently distributed (i.i.d) error term, and k  is the 
maximum number of lags. Including fixed effects is important to capture 
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income levels and tax differences across cities. We use fixed effects instead of 
random effects because we do not pick the sample randomly from the 
population; instead we use all available data from 45 major cities that are 
spread around all regions.    
 
Central to the test of convergence is the estimated value of β . If 0≥β , the price 
differential, itp , is non-stationary, implying persistent or explosive price 
divergence. A negative and statistically significant value of β  implies price 
convergence, and its magnitude determines the speed of convergence.  
 
Given the estimated autoregressive coefficients, the implied half-life of 
deviations from the law of one price are calculated under the assumption that 
the price differential process is AR(1). The reason for neglecting higher order 
terms in the impulse response is that higher order persistence is rarely 
significant in the present application. Moreover, higher order lags differ across 
regions which, in turn, makes it difficult to account for them in characterizing 
persistence at the product level. Overall, for each category, the half-life of 
deviations is computed as θ , that is  
)1ln(
)5.0ln(
βθ += . (2.15) 
 
Since the analysis includes 35 price indices of products and one price index for 
the city CPI, there are 36 estimations. Each panel estimation includes 45 cities 
and a national price (as a benchmark) from January 2002 to April 2008.   
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We apply Equation (2.15) to measure the speed of convergence. To select the 
appropriate lag, we include lag one to lag six in each equation. From Table 2.9 
we can see that the minimum Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) in each 
category equation varies from lag one to lag six. The minimum SBC for the 
aggregate CPI equation (number 36) is at lag 2.       
 
Table 2.9: Value of Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC)  
No Product 1 2 3 4 5 6 Min at 
1 Rice and Wheat -4.534 -4.571 -4.563 -4.554 -4.547 -4.536 2
2 Meats -3.526 -3.559 -3.564 -3.569 -3.570 -3.560 5
3 Fresh Fish -2.774 -2.790 -2.788 -2.787 -2.784 -2.783 2
4 Frozen Fish -3.545 -3.555 -3.552 -3.550 -3.558 -3.560 6
5 Egg and Milk -4.794 -4.804 -4.800 -4.795 -4.797 -4.786 2
6 Vegetables -2.485 -2.487 -2.501 -2.495 -2.488 -2.480 3
7 Beans -3.897 -3.891 -3.877 -3.872 -3.858 -3.845 1
8 Fruits -3.838 -3.845 -3.847 -3.845 -3.836 -3.827 3
9 Cooking Flavor -2.303 -2.302 -2.319 -2.313 -2.307 -2.298 3
10 Fat and Oil -4.342 -4.330 -4.355 -4.349 -4.346 -4.334 3
11 Other Raw Foods -4.523 -4.520 -4.512 -4.519 -4.512 -4.531 6
12 Processed Food -5.683 -5.671 -5.661 -5.647 -5.633 -5.631 1
13 Non Alcohol Beverage -5.332 -5.327 -5.322 -5.326 -5.322 -5.314 1
14 Cigars and Alcohols -5.601 -5.595 -5.596 -5.583 -5.573 -5.559 1
15 Housing Rent -5.980 -5.973 -5.967 -5.965 -5.953 -5.955 1
16 Utilities -4.846 -4.842 -4.826 -4.835 -4.819 -4.803 1
17 Housing Appliances -6.720 -6.723 -6.726 -6.740 -6.760 -6.757 5
18 Housing Management -6.378 -6.368 -6.397 -6.409 -6.404 -6.455 6
19 Men's Clothing -6.692 -6.685 -6.682 -6.673 -6.662 -6.660 1
20 Women's Clothing -6.644 -6.629 -6.621 -6.613 -6.612 -6.623 1
21 Children's Clothing -6.327 -6.315 -6.306 -6.300 -6.294 -6.334 6
22 Other Clothing -5.089 -5.084 -5.072 -5.059 -5.061 -5.048 1
23 Health Service -3.712 -3.711 -3.699 -3.707 -3.696 -3.690 1
24 Medicines -5.739 -5.731 -5.723 -5.730 -5.713 -5.704 1
25 Body Cares Service -4.465 -4.461 -4.463 -4.464 -4.449 -4.444 1
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics -6.867 -6.872 -6.906 -6.904 -6.896 -6.893 3
27 Educational Service -3.952 -3.942 -3.936 -3.921 -3.905 -3.962 6
28 Courses -5.121 -5.104 -5.091 -5.077 -5.072 -5.111 1
29 Educational Equipments -5.465 -5.470 -5.460 -5.445 -5.435 -5.446 2
30 Recreation -6.368 -6.357 -6.362 -6.355 -6.369 -6.386 1
31 Sport -5.875 -5.863 -5.881 -5.871 -5.859 -5.852 3
32 Transportation -5.735 -5.737 -5.767 -5.775 -5.798 -5.808 6
33 Communication and Postage -6.938 -7.656 -7.639 -7.622 -7.608 -7.615 2
34 Media and Transportation Support -5.288 -5.276 -5.266 -5.249 -5.247 -5.254 1
35 Financial Service -5.111 -5.096 -5.081 -5.119 -5.103 -5.087 4
36 CPI -6.824 -6.839 -6.835 -6.833 -6.827 -6.818 2  
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Based on the minimum SBC, the Table 2.10 displays the results of the fixed 
effects panel model on price differences (between the city product price index 
and the national product price index). From the table we can see that the beta 
coefficients on the CPI and all categories are negative and significant. The 
negative and significant coefficients imply that there exists price convergence 
in Indonesia. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to look at the speed of price convergence in 
Indonesia that is measured in terms of the half-life. From Table 2.10, we note 
that the calculated half-life for the aggregate CPI is about 20 months. However, 
there is a pretty wide range for the speed of convergence among categories. 
The range is from about 2 months (cooking flavour) to about 76 months 
(women’s clothing). This means that the speed of price adjustment across 
geographical locations varies according to the type of product categories. Price 
differentials for women’s clothing appear particularly persistent, while 
adjustment in cooking flavours takes place very fast. 
 
If we group the categories into 7 groups, based on the code of category (the 
same number for the first digit), the speed of convergence of raw food is about 
7 months (the fastest), processed food 17 months, housing 20 months, clothing 
51 months (the slowest), while health, education, and transportation are about 
the same, i.e. 23 months. However, the median of the speed of convergence 
among 35 categories is about 17 months. This figure is 3 months faster than the 
speed of convergence for the aggregate CPI. Thus, we have obtained a fairly 
robust finding that the half-life for price index convergence in Indonesia is 
about 17 to 20 months. 
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Table 2.10: Coefficients of beta and speed of convergence 
No Code Product Category Type Lag Coef Std Error Prob Half-Life
1 10100 Rice and Wheat P 2 -0.0724 0.0069 0.000 9.2
2 10200 Meats P 5 -0.1013 0.0118 0.000 6.5
3 10300 Fresh Fish P 2 -0.1309 0.0100 0.000 4.9
4 10400 Frozen Fish P 6 -0.0809 0.0095 0.000 8.2
5 10500 Egg and Milk P 2 -0.1873 0.0134 0.000 3.3
6 10600 Vegetables P 3 -0.2275 0.0144 0.000 2.7
7 10700 Beans P 1 -0.0475 0.0062 0.000 14.2
8 10800 Fruits P 3 -0.0727 0.0079 0.000 9.2
9 10900 Cooking Flavor P 3 -0.3292 0.0150 0.000 1.7
10 11000 Fat and Oil P 3 -0.0597 0.0078 0.000 11.3
11 11100 Other Raw Foods P 6 -0.0789 0.0082 0.000 8.4
12 20100 Processed Food P 1 -0.0290 0.0044 0.000 23.6
13 20200 Non Alcohol Beverage P 1 -0.0764 0.0070 0.000 8.7
14 20300 Cigars and Alcohols P 1 -0.0392 0.0055 0.000 17.3
15 30100 Housing Rent S 1 -0.0323 0.0039 0.000 21.1
16 30200 Utilities S 1 -0.0729 0.0074 0.000 9.2
17 30300 Housing Appliances NP 5 -0.0192 0.0041 0.000 35.8
18 30400 Housing Management NP 6 -0.0525 0.0052 0.000 12.8
19 40100 Men's Clothing NP 1 -0.0176 0.0037 0.000 39.1
20 40200 Women's Clothing NP 1 -0.0091 0.0030 0.002 75.6
21 40300 Children's Clothing NP 6 -0.0175 0.0033 0.000 39.3
22 40400 Other Clothing NP 1 -0.0128 0.0046 0.005 53.7
23 50100 Health Service S 1 -0.0378 0.0048 0.000 18.0
24 50200 Medicines NP 1 -0.0315 0.0045 0.000 21.6
25 50300 Body Cares Service S 1 -0.0463 0.0052 0.000 14.6
26 50400 Body Cares and Cosmetics NP 3 -0.0192 0.0045 0.000 35.8
27 60100 Educational Service S 6 -0.0600 0.0065 0.000 11.2
28 60200 Courses S 1 -0.0198 0.0040 0.000 34.7
29 60300 Educational Equipments NP 2 -0.0329 0.0044 0.000 20.7
30 60400 Recreation S 1 -0.0284 0.0044 0.000 24.1
31 60500 Sport S 3 -0.0312 0.0048 0.000 21.9
32 70100 Transportation S 6 -0.0336 0.0049 0.000 20.3
33 70200 Communication and Postage NP 2 -0.0194 0.0066 0.003 35.4
34 70300 Media and Transportation Support NP 1 -0.0298 0.0042 0.000 22.9
35 70400 Financial Service S 4 -0.0471 0.0042 0.000 14.4
36 00000 CPI 2 -0.0336 0.0053 0.000 20.3  
Note : Based on regression 
it
jK
h
hithitiit ppp εγβα +∆++=∆ ∑
=
−−
)(
1
1
. Half-life time is  
)1ln(
)5.0ln(
βθ +=
. 
Type of product: P = Perishable Goods, NP = Non Perishable Goods, and S = Services.  
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If we group the products into three, based on the type of good, i.e. perishable 
goods, non-perishable goods, and services, it is found that the speed of 
convergence of perishable goods is about 9 months, non-perishable goods 36 
months, and services 19 months. All of the perishable goods are goods in the 
‘raw food’ categories and ‘processed food’ categories.  
 
The price difference in perishable goods seems to be small because the goods 
are mostly homogenous across cities. For example, the rice price in Jakarta is 
not very different from the rice price in Surabaya. While for non-perishable 
goods, their price differences across cities might be big because the products 
are so diverse. For example, the price of clothing for women in Jakarta is higher 
than that in Jayapura. The price differences for non-perishable goods tends to 
be persistent. Our finding that non-perishable goods have longer price 
convergence than perishable goods is consistent with the literature (see, for 
example, Parsley and Wei,1996; Horvath and Vidovic, 2004).     
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Figure 2.5: Speed of convergence versus volatility of nominal price 
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From the previous analysis, we find that perishable goods have large nominal 
price variability (large volatility) and from this analysis we find that the speed 
of convergence for perishable goods is the fastest. Therefore, the highly volatile 
products tend to have a fast speed of convergence, while the products that have 
low volatility, such as ‘communication and postage’, ‘women’s clothing’, and 
‘men’s clothing’, tend to have a slow speed of convergence. The negative 
relationship between nominal price variability and the speed of convergence is 
shown in Figure 2.5.         
 
This finding is different from the existing literature. In cross-country studies, it 
is normally found that the half-life of PPP deviations is about 3 to 5 years (Froot 
and Rogoff, 1995). Imb et al. (2005) find that when the heterogeneity of different 
components in constructing the price index is take into account, the half-life of 
the real exchange rate among several OECD countries falls dramatically, and 
may fall to as low as 12 months. The estimated half-life is 39 months for the 
aggregated data, while the figure is 27 months for disaggregated, sector-level 
data.    
 
In within-country studies, Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2002) find that the half-
life of price index convergence in the U.S. is 6.2 years, based on the LLC test, 
and 5.6 years, based on the IPS test. Their finding is the opposite to that they 
expected. They expected to find evidence that there is more rapid price 
convergence across regions within a single country than across-countries. Thus, 
our empirical results shed a light on the puzzle and significantly complement 
the work of Cecchetti et al. (2002) and hence the existing literature.   
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This finding can be interpreted as the data employed in our study having 
higher frequency than that used in the existing literature. Taylor (2001) argues 
that the estimated speed of price convergence can be seriously biased upwards 
if low frequency data are used. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the half-life 
of convergence is longer in Cecchetti et al. (2002) despite the fact that they 
examine price convergence within a single country. 
 
In this study, since we employ monthly data, we have obtained the estimate of 
half-lives that are shorter than those obtained by Cecchetti et al. (2002). 
However, our finding is much longer than the recent finding by Ratfai (2006), 
who finds that the median half-life of conditional convergence in Hungary is 4 
months. However, when Ratfai (2006) uses price differentials not purged from 
time invariant components, the median half-life is 11.6 months. Fan and Wei 
(2006) also find that the speed of convergence in China is only about 3 to 4 
months.  
 
Imbs et al. (2005) show that, under some technical conditions, the speed of 
convergence will become much faster if the heterogeneity of the dynamics of 
the component of an aggregated time series is taken into account. The 
persistence of disaggregated data is on average smaller than that of the 
aggregate data. Their empirical study does confirm their theoretical prediction. 
Specifically, when they divide commodities of Eurostat data into nineteen 
categories, they find that the estimated half-life of the real exchange rate 
decreases dramatically. Our empirical finding supports their theory and 
finding that the half-life of the aggregate CPI is longer than that of the product 
price indices.   
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Figure 2.6: Structural break in October 2005 due to fuel price increase 
 
Seong, Morshed and Ahn (2006) argue that half-life estimations could be biased 
due to structural breaks in time series. As we can see from Figure 2.6, due to a 
more than 100% increase in fuel price on October 2005, there is a structural 
break in the CPI series. Most prices increased as the government lifted the 
subsidy on fuel. To see the impact of structural breaks on price convergence, 
we add a dummy variable for a structural break to Equation (2.14): 
  it
k
h
hithitiit sbppp εδγβα ++∆++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1 , (2.16) 
where sb is a dummy variable for the structural break with sb = 0 for 2002:1 to 
2005:9 and sb = 1 for 2005:10 to 2008:4.  
   
Choi, Mark and Sul (2004) address bias estimations of the half-life induced by 
inappropriate cross-sectional aggregation of heterogeneous coefficients, the 
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bias induced by small-samples, and the bias induced by time aggregation. We 
apply their formula to calculate the unbiased estimation of an AR(1) coefficient 
for the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator: 
21
2
21 )1(ˆ
BB
TAA
−
−−
=
−
β , (2.17) 
where Mφβ = ,  M  is the size of the aggregation (i.e. M is equal to 12 when 
monthly data are averaged to form annual data, and M is equal to 365 when 
daily data are averaged to form annual data), T is the number of observations, 
and φ  is the coefficient of AR(1), 
  ,)1()1( 21
MTA φφ −−=  
,2])1(2[)1)(2( 12)1(22
+−
−−++−−= MMTMTMA φφφφφφ  
),1)(2( 21 φ−−= TMB  and 




−
−
−−−=
− )1(
1
1
)1)(1(2 )1(1
TMM
T
TB φφφ . 
 
Seong et al. (2006) also mention that the bias in half-life estimation is due to 
incorrect approximation. Instead of AR(1), one can use an ARMA (1,1) process  
11 −− ++= tttt pp γεεφ . (2.18) 
The impulse response jψ is obtained by  
 1)( −−= jj φγφψ ,  (2.19) 
where j is the period and the exact half-life is  
1
log
)log(
log
2log
+
−
−−= φ
γφ
φθ . (2.20) 
 
The above formula is obtained by solving 2/1)( 1 =− −θφγφ ,  provided γφ > and 
0>φ . In order to calculate the exact half-life of the product, we estimate 
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ARMA(1,1) in every city, then we take an average of the exact half-life. 
Therefore, for each product, there is an average of the half-life in 45 cities.  
 
Table 2.11 compares the estimation of the biased half-life (HL), the adjusted HL 
when considering the structural break, the unbiased HL, and the HL from the 
impulse response functions (IRF). From the table we can see that including the 
structural break in the model gives a lower estimation of the half-life in most 
products. The difference between the median of the half-life with a structural 
break and that without structural breaks is 0.08 months. Only ‘fresh fish’, 
‘cooking flavour’, and ‘non-alcohol beverage’ have the same half-life. It means 
that only these products are not affected by a structural break.  
 
With the application of the unbiased half-life formula, all products’ half-lives 
fall, even though the falls are not big. We find that the median of the unbiased 
half-life is 16.95 months, while that of the biased half-life considering the 
structural break is 17.23. As a comparison, our calculation shows that the 
median half-life of IRF is one month lower than the half-life of the unbiased 
estimation. Moreover, the average half-life of the IRF is much lower than that of 
the unbiased estimation. This is mainly because the half-life estimations for the 
clothing group in the IRF method are much lower than that in the unbiased 
one. For example, the half-life for ‘women’s clothing’ is 14.10 months in the IRF 
method, while it is 73.33 months in the unbiased method.  
 
For different measurements of the half-lives above, we find no big differences, 
except for the half-life for the clothing group. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the median half-life is about 16-17 months. The average speed of convergence  
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Table 2.11: Half-life estimations - comparison 
No SB With SB With SB IRF
Bias Bias Unbias Average
1 Rice and Wheat P 9.22 8.49 8.37 6.19
2 Meats P 6.49 6.37 6.28 5.11
3 Fresh Fish P 4.94 4.94 4.88 6.13
4 Frozen Fish P 8.21 7.42 7.32 5.97
5 Egg and Milk P 3.34 3.31 3.27 8.64
6 Vegetables P 2.68 2.62 2.59 2.73
7 Beans P 14.24 13.08 12.87 15.87
8 Fruits P 9.18 8.99 8.86 9.90
9 Cooking Flavor P 1.74 1.74 1.72 2.47
10 Fat and Oil P 11.27 10.97 10.81 7.41
11 Other Raw Foods P 8.43 7.39 7.29 12.44
12 Processed Food P 23.56 23.56 23.10 15.91
13 Non Alcohol Beverage P 8.73 8.73 8.61 11.35
14 Cigars and Alcohols P 17.31 17.23 16.95 12.40
15 Housing Rent S 21.14 18.79 18.47 25.74
16 Utilities S 9.16 9.18 9.05 13.18
17 Housing Appliances NP 35.81 35.64 34.77 19.43
18 Housing Management NP 12.84 12.82 12.62 12.74
19 Men's Clothing NP 39.12 39.30 38.34 17.77
20 Women's Clothing NP 75.62 76.12 73.33 14.10
21 Children's Clothing NP 39.26 36.92 36.08 24.90
22 Other Clothing NP 53.67 45.43 44.41 20.08
23 Health Service S 17.99 17.99 17.67 18.29
24 Medicines NP 21.64 21.09 20.72 16.14
25 Body Cares Service S 14.63 13.54 13.32 17.84
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics NP 35.79 28.19 27.60 20.75
27 Educational Service S 11.20 11.18 11.01 16.71
28 Courses S 34.71 30.91 30.22 24.15
29 Educational Equipments NP 20.72 20.41 20.03 20.52
30 Recreation S 24.06 23.92 23.43 16.75
31 Sport S 21.86 20.96 20.59 19.82
32 Transportation S 20.29 20.20 19.85 17.06
33 Communication and Postage NP 41.49 30.40 29.82 12.06
34 Media and Transportation Support NP 22.95 18.31 18.01 16.46
35 Financial Service S 14.38 14.35 14.10 21.76
36 CPI 20.28 18.63 18.31 13.15
Median 17.31 17.23 16.95 15.91
Average 20.50 19.16 18.75 14.54
No Product Type
 
Note:  
• “No SB Bias” is a half-life calculated from Equation (2.14) which is without considering 
a structural break and bias adjustment. 
• “With SB Bias” is a half-life calculated from Equation (2.16) which considers structural 
breaks, but no bias adjustment. 
• “With SB Unbias” is a half-life calculated from Equation (2.16) which considers 
structural breaks and bias adjustment.  
• “IRF Average” is the average of the half-lives in 45 cities using Equation (2.18).  
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for perishable goods is about 9 months, for non-perishable goods 32-36 months, 
and for services 18-19 months. 
 
2.7.   Is the price convergence non-linear? 
 
Following Parsley and Wei (1996), to examine formally whether there is a non-
linear pattern in the rate of convergence, we add a term of the initial deviation 
squared to the regression. To be precise, the specification for each category is  
it
k
h
hithititiit pppp εγγβα +∆+++=∆ ∑
=
−−−
1
2
11 . (2.21) 
The monthly decay rate now becomes 12 −+ itpγβ .  
 
Table 2.12 shows that the gamma coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant for the aggregate CPI. However, for the disaggregated data, 18 
products (51 percent) show non-linearity with the sign of the gamma 
coefficients mixed. On the one hand, nine categories have positive gammas, i.e. 
fresh fish, frozen fish, women’s clothing, health service, medicines, body cares 
service, body care and cosmetics, courses, and sports. In particular, one group 
appears to have non-linearity in price convergence, i.e. the health group. On 
the other hand, another nine categories have negative gammas, i.e. rice and 
wheat, egg and milk, processed food, non-alcohol beverage, housing 
appliances, other clothing, educational service, media and transportation 
support, and financial service. The negative gammas for some perishable 
goods, such as rice and wheat, egg and milk, processed food, and non-alcohol 
beverage can be explained as follows. Because of the homogeneity of perishable 
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goods when the prices of those products differ largely across cities, there is a 
tendency for the prices to converge faster.   
 
Table 2.12: Coefficients of beta and gamma 
No Product Category Coef Std Error Prob Coef Std Error Prob
1 Rice and Wheat -0.0758 0.0071 0.0000 -0.0642 0.0335 0.0555
2 Meats -0.1012 0.0118 0.0000 -0.0056 0.0334 0.8671
3 Fresh Fish -0.1720 0.0116 0.0000 0.1708 0.0249 0.0000
4 Frozen Fish -0.0946 0.0124 0.0000 0.0508 0.0295 0.0847
5 Egg and Milk -0.1854 0.0134 0.0000 -0.4960 0.1487 0.0009
6 Vegetables -0.2294 0.0153 0.0000 0.0175 0.0479 0.7155
7 Beans -0.0471 0.0062 0.0000 0.0150 0.0202 0.4578
8 Fruits -0.0794 0.0099 0.0000 0.0339 0.0306 0.2667
9 Cooking Flavor -0.3291 0.0152 0.0000 -0.0022 0.0522 0.9661
10 Fat and Oil -0.0572 0.0087 0.0000 -0.0215 0.0344 0.5313
11 Other Raw Foods -0.0823 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0607 0.0409 0.1372
12 Processed Food -0.0283 0.0044 0.0000 -0.0503 0.0218 0.0212
13 Non Alcohol Beverage -0.0703 0.0076 0.0000 -0.0981 0.0457 0.0319
14 Cigars and Alcohols -0.0400 0.0057 0.0000 0.0146 0.0345 0.6717
15 Housing Rent -0.0319 0.0040 0.0000 -0.0089 0.0221 0.6863
16 Utilities -0.0707 0.0075 0.0000 -0.1333 0.0460 0.0037
17 Housing Appliances -0.0229 0.0049 0.0000 0.0276 0.0204 0.1757
18 Housing Management -0.0572 0.0061 0.0000 -0.0725 0.0505 0.1510
19 Men's Clothing -0.0172 0.0037 0.0000 0.0124 0.0258 0.6310
20 Women's Clothing -0.0187 0.0044 0.0000 0.0234 0.0081 0.0038
21 Children's Clothing -0.0177 0.0043 0.0000 0.0010 0.0142 0.9447
22 Other Clothing -0.0270 0.0053 0.0000 -0.0885 0.0162 0.0000
23 Health Service -0.0462 0.0067 0.0000 0.0202 0.0112 0.0725
24 Medicines -0.0428 0.0057 0.0000 0.0614 0.0197 0.0018
25 Body Cares Service -0.0598 0.0071 0.0000 0.0639 0.0229 0.0053
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics -0.0199 0.0045 0.0000 0.0492 0.0302 0.1034
27 Educational Service -0.0612 0.0066 0.0000 -0.0360 0.0172 0.0365
28 Courses -0.0267 0.0052 0.0000 0.0341 0.0162 0.0354
29 Educational Equipments -0.0350 0.0062 0.0000 0.0068 0.0143 0.6332
30 Recreation -0.0284 0.0044 0.0000 0.0511 0.0322 0.1131
31 Sport -0.0357 0.0051 0.0000 0.0679 0.0273 0.0129
32 Transportation -0.0337 0.0049 0.0000 0.0199 0.0279 0.4757
33 Communication and Postage -0.0241 0.0097 0.0127 0.1975 0.1636 0.2274
34 Media and Transportation Support -0.0336 0.0044 0.0000 -0.0522 0.0189 0.0057
35 Financial Service -0.0456 0.0043 0.0000 -0.0296 0.0171 0.0846
36 CPI -0.0465 0.0066 0.0000 0.1375 0.0414 0.0009
Beta Gamma
 
Note: The coefficients are based on estimations of 
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Our results are different from those of Parsley and Wei (1996), where the sign 
of interaction between price differences and the absolute price difference is 
negative, while ours is mixed. In their study, non-linearities are present for 
perishable goods and non-perishable goods, while it is not present for services. 
Our evidence indicates that some products converge more slowly for larger 
price differences, while some other products converge faster for larger price 
differences. For aggregate price, the prices converge more slowly when the 
initial price differences are large. 
 
2.8.   Do transportation costs affect price convergence? 
 
Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 summarize the evidence that transportation costs do 
matter for price variability. We now ask whether an effect exists for the rate of 
convergence. As in Parsley and Wei (1996), we augment the basic specification 
with one term, which is the interaction between distance and the initial price 
differential:   
it
k
h
hithitititiit pdppp εγθβα +∆+++=∆ ∑
=
−−−
1
11  (2.22) 
where itd  represents the distance between two cities, that is city i and Jakarta 
(as a benchmark city). If θ  is significant, then it may be said that transportation 
costs do matter to price convergence.  
 
Looking especially at the theta coefficient in Table 2.13, we can see that the 
coefficients on the aggregate CPI and in most products are not statistically 
significant. Only six products (17 percent) have positive sign and are 
statistically significant, i.e. rice and wheat, meats, vegetables, women’s 
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clothing, other clothing, body care service, and body cares and cosmetics. 
Therefore, our finding shows that distance does not matter for price 
 
Table 2.13: Coefficients of beta and theta 
No Product Category Coef Std Error Prob Coef Std Error Prob
1 Rice and Wheat -0.0957 0.0107 0.0000 1.7600 0.6200 0.0046
2 Meats -0.1632 0.0227 0.0000 4.4600 1.4000 0.0015
3 Fresh Fish -0.1173 0.0210 0.0000 -0.8970 1.2200 0.4636
4 Frozen Fish -0.0815 0.0096 0.0000 0.1900 0.4690 0.6862
5 Egg and Milk -0.1585 0.0231 0.0000 -2.3700 1.5500 0.1257
6 Vegetables -0.2582 0.0230 0.0000 2.3100 1.3600 0.0884
7 Beans -0.0526 0.0105 0.0000 0.4570 0.7600 0.5478
8 Fruits -0.0803 0.0155 0.0000 0.5340 0.9400 0.5699
9 Cooking Flavor -0.3418 0.0264 0.0000 0.9010 1.5600 0.5627
10 Fat and Oil -0.0375 0.0130 0.0041 -2.0600 0.9720 0.0340
11 Other Raw Foods -0.0459 0.0139 0.0010 -2.8600 0.9720 0.0033
12 Processed Food -0.0329 0.0074 0.0000 0.3030 0.4660 0.5154
13 Non Alcohol Beverage -0.0593 0.0136 0.0000 -1.4400 0.9880 0.1441
14 Cigars and Alcohols -0.0343 0.0096 0.0004 -0.4660 0.7450 0.5317
15 Housing Rent -0.0308 0.0073 0.0000 -0.1220 0.5030 0.8081
16 Utilities -0.0558 0.0145 0.0001 -1.5000 1.1000 0.1715
17 Housing Appliances -0.0305 0.0081 0.0002 0.8200 0.5070 0.1058
18 Housing Management -0.0598 0.0092 0.0000 0.5340 0.5570 0.3375
19 Men's Clothing -0.0146 0.0069 0.0347 -0.2620 0.5150 0.6109
20 Women's Clothing -0.0262 0.0079 0.0009 1.1300 0.4800 0.0191
21 Children's Clothing -0.0255 0.0071 0.0003 0.6680 0.5200 0.1992
22 Other Clothing -0.0268 0.0075 0.0003 1.1400 0.4840 0.0180
23 Health Service -0.0228 0.0097 0.0188 -1.3500 0.7550 0.0748
24 Medicines -0.0293 0.0090 0.0011 -0.1830 0.6430 0.7767
25 Body Cares Service -0.0570 0.0083 0.0000 0.7490 0.4450 0.0926
26 Body Cares and Cosmetics -0.0348 0.0074 0.0000 1.2000 0.4580 0.0086
27 Educational Service -0.0495 0.0108 0.0000 -0.8090 0.6590 0.2201
28 Courses -0.0045 0.0062 0.4685 -1.5200 0.4680 0.0012
29 Educational Equipments -0.0417 0.0086 0.0000 0.7940 0.6630 0.2315
30 Recreation -0.0340 0.0082 0.0000 0.5300 0.6590 0.4209
31 Sport -0.0421 0.0090 0.0000 0.9200 0.6480 0.1557
32 Transportation -0.0303 0.0089 0.0006 -0.3170 0.7070 0.6534
33 Communication and Postage -0.0331 0.0125 0.0079 0.9590 0.7400 0.1952
34 Media and Transportation Support -0.0339 0.0072 0.0000 0.3530 0.5080 0.4870
35 Financial Service -0.0460 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0894 0.5070 0.8600
36 CPI -0.0426 0.0112 0.0001 0.6130 0.6650 0.3565
Beta Tetha
 
Note: The coefficients are based on estimations of 
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.  
The values of theta are multiplied by 105. 
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convergence in Indonesia; or we can say that the implied half-life does not 
depend on the distance between the cities.  
 
This finding is different from that of Parsley and Wei (1996), who find that the 
convergence rate in the U.S. is slower for cities farther apart. In their study, the 
sign of theta is positive in all categories (perishable goods, non-perishable 
goods, and services).  
 
2.9.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyses intra-country price variability and price convergence in 
Indonesia. The advantage of using disaggregated data from the same country is 
that it mitigates the roles of exchange rate fluctuations, factor and goods 
separation, and barriers to trade. Using balanced panel data of the monthly 
aggregate consumer price index and 35 categories of products across 45 major 
cities from January 2002 to April 2008, our econometric analysis shows that 
there is strong evidence in support of convergence towards the law of one price 
in Indonesian domestic markets.   
 
The evidence that the price variability of the same product across cities is 
smaller than the price variability of different products in the same city proves 
that the relative law of one price (LOOP) holds. The weighted average of the 
LOOP deviation in this study is relatively the same as in Engel and Rogers 
(2001).  
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As hypothesized, it is found that the farther the distance apart, the more 
dispersed the price is; and the more populated the city, the less dispersed of the 
price is. The finding that distance is important in explaining price differences 
between locations lends support to this literature and the associated work on 
geography and trade.   
 
Employing panel regressions to test for price convergence, these estimations 
show negative and significant coefficients for all product categories and the 
aggregate CPI. Using aggregated data (city CPI), the half-life of price 
convergence in Indonesia is shown to be about 20 months; while using 
disaggregated data (35 products), the median half-life is about 16-17 months. 
Based on the type of the products, it is found that the speed of convergence for 
perishable goods is about 9 months, for non-perishable goods 32-36 months, 
and for services 18-19 months. The speed of convergence is quite fast for the 
raw food group, but very slow for the clothing group.  
 
This finding is in sharp contrast not only with cross country studies of PPP, 
which find that the half-life of price convergence is normally about 4 to 5 years 
(Taylor, 2001), but also with the half-life of within-country studies in the U.S., 
i.e. 6 years (Cecchetti et al., 2002). Clearly, such a finding does not necessarily 
mean that the Indonesian market is more efficient than the U.S. market, which 
would be hard to believe. Rather, this finding likely indicates that the half-life 
estimated by Cecchetti et al. (2002) may be biased due to their use of low 
frequency data. This study sheds light on the puzzle that most studies of PPP 
find a rather long half-life, as most previous studies use annual or quarterly 
time series data, which may suffer from Taylor’s “aggregation bias”. However, 
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comparing with China, as studied by Fan and Wei (2006) and Hungary by 
Ratfai (2006), this finding is longer than that found for China and Hungary, 
which is only 3 to 4 months.  
 
This study also reveals that there is a non-linearity in price convergence. A non-
linearity is found significant for the aggregate CPI and 18 categories (51 
percent). In particular, one group is indicated as being non-linear in price 
convergence, i.e. the health group. This result shows that the impact of non-
linearity is mixed. For aggregate CPI and some products the rate of 
convergence is slower when price differences are larger, whereas for other 
products the rate of convergence is faster when price differences are larger.   
 
Contrasting with Parsley and Wei (1996), this study finds that distance does not 
matter for the rate of price convergence in Indonesia. Comparing the prices 
between 44 cities and Jakarta (as a benchmark city), only six products (17 
percent) are significantly affected by the distance.  
 
These findings show that the economic system within the regions in Indonesia 
in the period of study is integrated. This market integration provides 
policymakers (central bank and government) with a relatively easier task to 
handle compared with a non-integrated economy8. Therefore, their attention 
can be focused on aggregate price (national) inflation, i.e. identifying inflation’s 
determinants and controlling national inflation.  
 
                                                 
8 For Russia, Gluschenko (2004) finds that only 50% to 60% of regions are shown to be market 
integrated due to relatively high barriers to inter-regional trade.    
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3 Heading 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
The Determinants of Inflation and the Shape 
of the Phillips Curve 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concluded that, during 2002-2008, prices within 45 cities 
in Indonesia had converged toward national prices. Therefore, in conducting 
monetary policy, it is not necessary for the central bank to pay special attention 
to particular regions or particular commodities. Their attention can be shifted 
to national inflation. In this chapter, we proceed with an examination of 
national inflation.     
 
Since Bank Indonesia adopted inflation targeting in 1999, the focus of monetary 
policy has shifted mainly to the control of inflation. Understanding the 
behaviour as well as the causes of inflation is of obvious importance for the 
conduct of monetary policy when the prime objective of that policy is to 
achieve low and stable inflation.  
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Figure 3.1: CPI inflation and exchange rate depreciation 
 
The factors explaining inflation are usually described in the price equation or 
the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve is an important equation in a 
macroeconomic policy model which describes inflation’s evolution. The 
Phillips curve also plays a central role in understanding business cycles and the 
management of monetary policy. The basic equation of the Phillips curve 
comprises inflation expectations (backward, forward, or both), the output gap, 
and other important factors. 
 
As we can see from Figure 3.1, movement in the exchange rate depreciation 
(negative value means depreciation) is closely related, with negative 
correlation, to the movement of inflation in Indonesia. The clear view of the 
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relationship can be seen during the financial crisis where the Rupiah 
depreciated as much as 83.5% against the US Dollar in June 1998, while CPI 
inflation rose to 80.4% in October 1998.  
 
Exchange rate pass through seems to be an important factor determining 
Indonesia’s inflation. Even though the exchange rate does not influence directly 
domestic inflation, but only through import prices and the output gap, this 
figure tells us that there is a negative co-movement between the exchange rate 
and CPI inflation. For the policy maker, it is quite useful to ask ”if the exchange 
rate depreciates by x percent this month, what would be the impact on our 
current or future inflation?”.  
 
Since adopting an explicit inflation targeting framework in July 2005, Bank 
Indonesia has not paid much attention to money growth, but only to inflation 
itself, especially to inflation forecasts, as many inflation-targeting countries do. 
While, according to the quantity theory of money, high growth of money will 
lead to high inflation, it is interesting to question whether money growth is still 
an appropriate determinant of inflation in Indonesia.   
 
Understanding the shape of the Phillips curve is also important, especially for 
the monetary authority, to see the impact of a positive or negative output gap 
on inflation. The response of monetary policy could be different if the 
relationship between inflation and output is asymmetrical. 
 
This chapter aims to investigate the dynamics of inflation in Indonesia. In 
particular, this chapter addresses the following questions: (1) Which type of 
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inflation expectations give a better explanation of current inflation: backward-
looking, forward-looking, or both? (2) Is the output gap a good indicator of 
inflation? (3) Does the depreciation of the exchange rate really matter for 
inflation? How big is the exchange rate pass-through? (4) Does the growth of 
money also matter for inflation? Which monetary aggregate is the best 
indicator for inflation: M0, M1, or M2? (5) Is the relationship between inflation 
and the output gap linear?  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
theory of inflation and some studies on Phillips curve. Section three describes 
the data. Section four empirically studies Indonesian inflation’s determinants. 
Section five provides an analysis of the shape of the Phillips curve. Finally, 
section six offers some conclusions.           
 
3.2. Literature Review 
 
a. The original Phillips curve 
 
The analysis of inflation’s determinants is closely related to the Phillips curve. 
The curve describes the relationship between prices and real activity. It was A. 
W. Philips in 1958 who first estimated the relationship between nominal wage 
growth and the unemployment rate. When he plotted the relationship of the 
two in the U.K. from 1861 to 1957, he found that the relationship was non-
linear. He argued that when unemployment is high, wages increase slowly; 
when unemployment is low, wages rise rapidly. In his analysis, at a lower rate 
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of unemployment the labour market is tight and employers have to offer higher 
wages to attract scarce labour; while, at a higher rate of unemployment, there is 
less pressure to increase wages.  
 
This relationship can be described in the following equation:   
δβα uw =+  (3.1a) 
or 
uw loglog)log( δβα +=+ , (3.1b) 
where w is the change in wage rates and u is the percentage of unemployment. 
β  and δ  are constants estimated by least squares, while α  is a constant chosen 
by trial and error. He found that δ  is negative implying that the growth of 
money wages falls with the unemployment rate.  
 
In addition, Phillips (1958) reveals a substantially different perspective on the 
possible effects of consumer price changes on wage changes as both variables 
influence each other. Changes in the wage rate are influenced by earlier 
changes in consumer prices, but changes in consumer prices are largely 
determined by earlier changes in wage rates.  
 
Desai (1984) conducts a survey on subsequent development of the Phillips 
curve. In his survey, he reviews several studies on the Phillips curve. For 
example, Gilbert (1976) adds cyclical pressure using the change in the 
unemployment rate )/( tt UU∆  and Lipsey (1960), who was the first to linearize 
the Phillips curve, extends it by adding the inflation rate )( tp∆ . In Lipsey’s 
(1960) study, the Phillips curve is modelled as: 
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 tttt pUUfw εαααα +∆+∆++=∆ 3210 )( . (3.2) 
 
b. The expectations-augmented Phillips curve  
 
Until the late 1960s, most economists modelled the Phillips curve as a linear 
function with a time-invariant slope. After that, the general Phillips curve was 
revised with a new formula for the Phillips curve where inflation varies relative 
to its expected level in response to changes in activity. It was Phelps (1967) and 
Friedman (1968) who first stressed the role of expectations. Whereas Phelps 
focused on the influence of expectations with respect to the wages of other 
firms, Friedman (1968) considers the endogeneity of expectations of consumer 
prices. Since then, the Phillips curve equation has been changed to introduce 
the role of inflationary expectations since workers try to keep up with inflation, 
and was redefined into the so-called ’expectations-augmented’ Phillips curve: 
eT ufww κpi+−= )( , (3.3) 
where w is the change in wage rates, Tw  is the trend in wage rates, and  epi  is 
inflation expectations. The parameter κ  represents the degree to which 
employees can gain money wage increases to keep up with expected inflation, 
preventing a fall in expected real wages.    
 
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) argue that well-informed, rational 
employers and workers would pay attention only to real wages; that is, the 
inflation-adjusted purchasing power of money wages. In their view, real wages 
would adjust in the long run to make the supply of labour equal to the demand 
for labour, and the unemployment rate would then stand at a level uniquely 
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associated with that real wage. This level of unemployment they called the 
“natural” rate of unemployment.  
 
Most economists accept the Friedman-Phelps analysis: there is some rate of 
unemployment that, if maintained, would be compatible with a constant rate of 
inflation. Thus, the function f(u) was modified to introduce the idea of “a non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) or the “natural” rate of 
unemployment or the inflation-threshold unemployment rate: 
eT uufww λpi+−−= )( * ,   (3.4)   
where  u*  is NAIRU. If u < u*, wage inflation tends to accelerate. Similarly, if u 
> u*, wage inflation tends to slow.  
 
Figure 3.2 describes both the long run Philips curve (LRPC) and the short run 
Phillips curve (SRPC). Assume initially the economy is operating at point A on 
SRPC1. An unanticipated inflation, the difference between 1pi  and 2pi , due, for 
example, to an unanticipated increase in the money supply, creates money 
 
A
CB
u*
pi1
pi2
LRPC
SRPC1
SRPC2
u
pi
 
Figure 3.2: The Phillips curve 
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illusion leading the economy to move from point A to point B. Once the 
economic agents anticipate the true inflation rate, the economy shifts to point C 
on a higher SRPC. At that point, the economy comes back to a “natural” 
employment rate at LRPC, due to some workers opting for unemployment. 
Central to the existence of the SRPC is the fact that the workers do not 
immediately realize a decrease in their real wage in comparison to government 
benefits for the unemployed or cannot do anything about it in the short run 
(e.g. due to annual wage bargaining).    
 
The Phillips curve equation can be derived from the (short-run) Lucas 
aggregate supply function. Start with the aggregate supply function: 
)( ePPYY −+= α ,  (3.5) 
where Y is the actual output, Y  is the "natural" level of output, α  is a positive 
constant, P is the actual price level, and eP  is the expected price level. In the 
Lucas aggregate supply curve, the only reason why actual real GDP should 
deviate from potential is because of incorrect expectations of what is going to 
happen with prices in the future. 
 
Re-arrange the above equation into: 
α
YY
PP e
−
+= . (3.6) 
Subtracting last year's price levels P-1 will give us inflation rates, because 
pi≈−
−1PP   and  
ee PP pi≈−
−1 , (3.7) 
where pi  and epi  are the inflation and expected inflation respectively. There is 
also a negative relationship between output and unemployment (Okun’s law):  
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)( *UU
YY
−−=
− β
α
, (3.8) 
where β  is a positive constant, U is the unemployment rate, and U* is the 
natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU.  
 
c. The new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) 
 
Mankiew and Reis (2002) review the standard derivation of NKPC based on 
Calvo’s (1983) model. In this model, a fraction λ  of firms adjust prices 
randomly. It is assumed that the probability of firms to adjust the price follows 
a geometric distribution. Each firm has the same probability of being one of the 
adjusting firms. The firm’s desired price *tp , which is the price that would 
maximize their profit, depends on the overall price level tp  and output gap ty , 
e.g. ttt ypp α+=
* . 
 
In this model, since price adjustment is infrequent, firms rarely change their 
desired prices. When a firm changes its price, it sets it equal to the average 
desired price until the next price adjustment. The adjustment price tx  equals a 
weighted average of the current and all future desired prices, i.e.:     
∑
∞
=
+−=
0
*)1(
j
jtt
j
t pEx λλ . (3.9) 
 
The model includes the equation of the price level which is an average of all 
prices in the economy and, therefore, a weighted average of all the prices firms 
have set in the past, i.e.:  
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−
−=
0
)1(
j
jt
j
t xp λλ .   (3.10) 
 
We can solve the above model (see Appendix 1) and obtain  
1
2 )]1/([ ++−= tttt Ey piλαλpi ,   (3.11) 
where 1−−= ttt pppi  is the inflation rate. Therefore, according to Equation (3.11), 
the NKPC stipulates that current inflation is a function of expected future 
inflation and the current output gap.  
 
Several of the new Keynesian models of inflation dynamics, including the 
model of staggered contracts of Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983), and the 
quadratic price adjustment costs model of Rotemberg (1982), have a common 
formulation which is similar to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve of 
Friedman and Phelps (Robert, 1995). In the sticky-price models of Calvo (1983) 
and Rotemberg (1982), the Phillips curve is derived from optimizing behaviour, 
and is entirely forward-looking. 
 
d. The hybrid version of the NKPC 
 
Much of the recent theoretical macroeconomics literature has been based on the 
‘hybrid’ version of the NKPC. The idea is to let inflation depend on a 
combination of expected future inflation and lagged inflation. The addition of 
the lag term is designed to capture inflation persistence. This theory assumes 
that there is some link between past and future inflation beyond effects 
operating through expectations.  
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Gali and Gertler (1999) combine backward and forward looking expectations in 
estimating a model of U.S. inflation. They assume that some firms use 
information of past prices to set the current prices, while some other firms use 
future price expectations. Thus, the model is written as:  
111 −+ ++= tbttftt Es piγpiγλpi ,    (3.12) 
where ts  is real marginal cost, fγ  is a forward-looking component of inflation, 
and bγ  is its backward-looking part. Gali and Gertler (1999) measure the real 
marginal cost derived from a production function. To approximate the real 
marginal cost they use labour income share (equivalently, real unit labour cost). 
They find that the weight on inflation lagged one quarter, while statistically 
significant, is not quantitatively important (small) compared with expected 
inflation. Thus, they conclude that the NKPC provides a good first 
approximation to the dynamics of inflation.  
 
Contrary to Gali and Gertler’s finding, Rudd and Whelan (2005) find that 
forward-looking terms play a very limited role in explaining inflation 
dynamics. They argue that the role of backward-looking inflation expectations 
is dominant and significant. Their conclusion is based on the new-Keynesian 
model’s projection that inflation is a function of an expected discounted sum of 
some “driving variables” tx  (output gap or labour income share) that measure 
demand or cost pressures.    
 
Based on Taylor’s (1979) staggered contract model, Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) 
put forward a more balanced model, which is able to replicate the observed 
inflation persistence. They assume that employees care about relative real 
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wages rather than relative nominal wages. Fuhrer (1997b) shows however that 
the forward-looking component of the Phillips curve is rather ’unimportant’ for 
US data. He finds that the part played by the backward-looking component is 
systematically larger than 0.75.  
 
Using Gali and Gertler’s (1999) specification, Dufour, Khalaf and Kichian (2006) 
assess a NKPC equation for the U.S. and Canada with two variants of the 
model, one based on rational expectations and another using survey-based data 
on inflation expectations. The results provide some support for a hybrid NKPC 
for the U.S. with rational expectations, whereas neither model is suited to 
Canada.  
 
Three different measures of inflation expectations (i.e. from the Livingston 
survey, the Michigan survey, and actual future values of inflation) are used by 
Roberts (1995) in estimating the NKPC for the U.S. from 1949 to 1990. He finds 
that the coefficient of the output gap is in the range 0.2 to 0.4 and of the 
unemployment rate is from -0.2 to -0.4. This finding is consistent with the new 
Keynesian model of Ball and Romer (1990), in which a flat supply schedules 
plays an important role in creating aggregate nominal rigidities, as does a 
reluctance of firms to change their prices.   
 
Fanelli (2008) uses a VAR system to test the hybrid NKPC. He finds that, over 
the period 1971-1998, the NKPC is far from providing a good first 
approximation of inflation in the Euro area as it contains highly persistent 
variables. However, this result does not necessarily imply that forward-looking 
behaviour is unimportant in modelling Euro area inflation.  
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In most recurrent specifications, the driving variables are proxied by the output 
gap, capacity utilization, the unemployment rate, or a measure of a firm’s real 
marginal cost.  As in Gali and Gertler (1999), the real marginal cost is derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas production function. Let output be  
 βα tttt LKAY = , (3.13) 
where tA  denotes technology, tK  capital, and tL  labour. Real marginal cost is 
then given by the ratio of the real wage rate to the marginal product: 
 
)/(
)/(
tt
tt
t
LY
PW
s
∂∂
= . (3.14)
  
Given Equation (3.13) we have 
 β
t
t
LS
s = , (3.15) 
where ttttt YPLWLS /≡  is the labour income share or real unit labour costs.  
 
In the NKPC, under certain assumptions, there is an approximate log-linear 
relationship between marginal cost and the output gap (see, for example, 
Chapter 3 of Woodford, 2003): 
)ln(ln ttt YYs −= κ , (3.16) 
where κ  is the output elasticity of marginal cost.  
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e. The supply factors  
 
To capture other factors that cause inflation, some researchers simply add 
supply factors in the price equation. Thus, the Phillips curve equation is 
modified to 
s
tttt
e
ttt zYY εβλφpiδpipi ++−++= − )ln(ln1 , (3.17) 
 where tz  represents the role of supply factors, such as material costs, import 
prices, and exchange rates.  
 
The above specification is consistent with Gordon and Hall (1985), who argue 
that there are three major types of inflation, the so-called ‘triangle model’. First, 
a ‘demand-pull’ inflation where inflation is caused by an increase in aggregate 
demand, such as an increase in private or government spending or a higher 
employment rate. This is captured by the output gap. Second, a ‘cost-push’ 
inflation, where inflation is caused by a drop in aggregate supply that triggers 
increases in the prices of inputs. This is represented by the tz  variable. Third, a 
‘built-in’ inflation, where inflation is caused by an increase in inflation 
expectations. The last-mentioned is often linked to the ‘price-wage spiral’ as 
workers try to keep their nominal wages in line with prices, and the employers 
pass on the higher costs to consumers as part of a ‘vicious circle’. This is 
captured by the backward-looking expectations and forward-looking 
expectations terms.   
 
Researchers often use different types of supply factors to describe the Phillips 
curve in a certain country. For example, Graafland (1992) uses labour 
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productivity in the Dutch economy. Chadha, Masson and Meredith (1992) 
employ the log of the absorption deflator9 as an addition variable in modelling 
inflation for G-7 countries. Roberts (1995) modifies the NKPC equation for the 
U.S. with the addition of a real oil price variable. De Veirman (2005) also uses 
import prices of oil when estimating the Phillips curve for Japan. Batini, 
Jackson and Nickell (2005) estimate the NKPC for the U.K. over the period 
1972Q3 to 1999Q2 by including foreign competition10, the share of labour, real 
import prices, the real oil price, and the employment rate. Fortin (1991) re-
estimates the Canadian Phillips curve for 1957-1990 by including import price 
inflation and indirect tax. 
 
Another explanatory variable sometimes used is the real interest rate, as in 
Gentle, Paudel and Upadhyaya (2005). They argue that the inclusion of the real 
interest rate is necessary since changes in the interest rate will affect the labour-
capital input mix leading to a change in the level of employment. Real interest 
rates also affect the labour-leisure decision from the supply side. To test the 
argument, they use U.S. annual data from 1948 to 1996 and estimate using an 
error correction model. They show that the Phillips curve model with the real 
interest rate as an additional variable performs better than the conventional 
one. However, their conclusion could be misleading since what they estimate is 
not a price equation, but the inverted Phillips curve, with unemployment as a 
function of wages, inflation, and the real interest rate.  
 
                                                 
9 The absorption deflator is proxied by the real wage. 
10 Foreign competition is proxied by the ratio of export prices to the gross value added deflator.   
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Some researchers also add money as an important variable explaining inflation 
dynamics. For example, De Grauwe and Polan (2005) show that there is a 
strong positive relationship between long-run inflation and the money growth 
rate in 160 countries over the last 30 years. The relationship is not proportional, 
however. The strong link between inflation and money growth is almost 
wholly due to the presence of high inflation countries, while the relationship 
for low-inflation countries is weak. In forecasting European inflation, Gerlach 
and Svenson (2003) show that the real money gap, the difference between the 
real money stock and the long run equilibrium real money stock, plays a 
significant role. Laxton, Meridith and Rose (1994) also include lagged money 
growth in estimating an auxiliary equation for expected inflation for Canada.  
 
The inclusion of money growth on the right hand side of the Phillips curve is 
based on the argument that money is one of the factors that causes inflation. 
While, in the monetarists’ view, inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon. 
Their view is based on the quantitative theory of money that follows the 
relationship:  
MV = YP, (3.18)  
where M is money supply, V is the income velocity of money, Y is real output, 
and P is the price level. In growth rate terms, this can be expressed as11   
pi+∆=∆+∆ yvm .  (3.19) 
 
Thus, inflation can be expressed as  
vym ∆+∆−∆=pi , (3.20) 
                                                 
11 This is an approximation. For a low growth rate, this should not be a problem.  
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where pi  is inflation, m∆  is growth of money, y∆  is growth of real GDP, and 
v∆  is the rate of velocity of money. It is usually assumed that v∆  is zero since 
the velocity is constant (at least in the short run).  
 
It is assumed that output growth and the velocity of money are not affected by 
the growth rate of money stock. This refers to the (super) neutrality of money 
which states that a permanent increase in money growth leaves output growth 
and velocity growth unchanged. If there is an impact, it only holds in the short 
run. Therefore, the above identity yields a proposition that in the long-run 
there is a proportional relationship between money and inflation.  
 
3.3 Data  
 
In this chapter, we use data for the CPI, exchange rates, GDP, monetary 
aggregates, and interest rates. The data are mainly collected from Bank 
Indonesia (BI) and the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic (CBS). For the 
analysis, we use monthly data from 1980 to 2008. To estimate potential output, 
we collect real GDP, consumption, and interest rates, on a yearly basis, from  
 
Table 3.1: Data 
No Data Frequency Period Source 
1 CPI  Monthly 1980:01 to 2008:12 CBS  
2 Real GDP, 
Consumption  
Yearly 1970 to 2008 CBS 
3 Exchange rate 
(USD/Rp) 
Monthly 1980:01 to 2008:12 BI 
4 M0, M1, M2 Monthly 1980:01 to 2008:12 BI 
5 3-month deposit rate Yearly 1970 to 2008 BI 
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Table 3.2:  Descriptive statistics of data (year-on-year)  
Data
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Monthly
CPI Inflation 9.01 3.37 57.59 23.28 10.52 9.52
Exchange Rate Depreciation -6.63 10.67 -67.97 13.04 1.32 18.91
M0 Growth 16.23 10.12 78.88 22.58 18.09 8.70
M1 Growth 19.49 11.52 49.23 9.02 16.42 6.39
M2 Growth 26.75 8.42 61.92 10.05 12.87 6.14
Yearly
GDP Growth 7.04 1.72 -13.13 - 5.21 2.02
Consumption Growth 5.12 3.05 3.60 - 4.01 1.78
3-month Deposit Rate 14.94 5.31 39.07 - 12.16 5.73
1980 - 1997 1998 1999 - 2008
 
 
1970 to 2008 (see Table 3.1). The statistical description of the data can be seen 
on Table 3.2. 
 
From the above table, comparing the before-crisis period (1980 – 1997) with the 
after-crisis period (1999 - 2008), we can see that the mean of the inflation rate in 
the after-crises period is higher than that in the before-crises period. However, 
real GDP growth during the after-crisis period is less than that during the 
before-crisis period. The indication of lower GDP growth coupled with 
relatively higher inflation shows that Indonesia has not fully recovered yet 
from the crisis in 1997-1998.  
 
A structural change exists between the period before the crisis and the period 
after the crisis. Some changes occurred in economic policy, in politics, as well 
as in the legal system, such as: (i) the exchange rate system has been changed 
from managed-floating to free-floating; (ii) regulation of the banking and 
financial systems are more prudent; (iii) the private sector is now run by more 
diverse businessmen (groups or individual); (iv) subsidies to some 
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administered commodity price, such as fuel and electricity, have been reduced; 
(v) democracy is better, i.e. more political parties, people and journalists are 
freer to talk; and (vi) law enforcement, human rights and anti-corruption 
movements are enhanced.  
 
From the same table we can see that even though the rate of depreciation of the 
currency after the crisis is less than that before the crisis, the exchange rate has 
become more volatile. This is because Indonesia abandoned the managed 
floating regime and adopted a free-floating exchange rate regime in the mid- 
1997.  
 
3.4  The Determinants of Indonesian Inflation 
3.4.1  Methodology  
a.  Output gap measurement  
Since there is uncertainty about the true level of potential output, we apply 
three measures of potential output, i.e. the adjusted Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter, the adjusted SVAR model, and peak-to-peak methodology. This acts as a 
check for the robustness of the results. In estimating potential output, we use 
annual data instead of quarterly or monthly data to capture the business cycle 
of the economy where the cycle is assumed to last more than one year. 
 
a.1   Adjusted HP filter 
 
Output can be decomposed into a permanent trend component (supply) and a 
temporary cyclical component (demand). The trend of output is interpreted as 
   102 
potential output, while the cyclical component is interpreted as an output gap.  
 
A method that is widely used to estimate potential output is the HP filter. The 
HP filter is basically a simple smoothing procedure that works based on the 
assumption that the growth component varies “smoothly” over time (Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997).  The method operates on a framework that a given time 
series, say ty  (or output), may be expressed as the sum of a trend 
*
ty  (or 
potential output) and a cyclical component or output gap tc , that is   
  ttt cyy +=
* .  (3.21) 
 
The measure of smoothness of *ty  is the sum of the squares of its second 
difference. The average of the deviations of tc  from 
*
ty  is assumed to be near 
zero over a long period of time. These assumptions lead to a programming 
problem of finding *ty  by minimizing the following expression:  
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2* )()( λ . (3.22) 
 
The parameter λ  is a positive number, which penalizes variability in *ty . The 
larger the value of λ , the smoother is *ty . As λ  approaches infinity, the limit of 
the solution for Equation (3.22) is the least squares estimate of a linear time 
trend model. On the other hand, as the smoothing factor approaches zero, the 
function is minimised by the difference between actual and potential output, 
that is making the potential output equal to actual output.  
   103 
In most empirical works, the value of λ  is set at 1,600 when using quarterly 
data, λ  = 100 when using annual data, and λ  = 14,400 when using monthly 
data. The higher the frequency of the data, the larger the value of λ  is. This is 
because higher frequency data is usually more volatile than lower frequency 
data, therefore a higher penalty of smoothing is needed.    
 
The advantage of the HP filter is that it renders the output gap stationary over 
a wide range of smoothing values and it allows the trend to change over time. 
Another advantage is that it does not need any additional variables to construct 
potential output. However, this methodology has weaknesses. The first 
weakness is that it is difficult to choose the smoothing parameter ( λ ) since λ  
affects on how responsive potential output is to the movement of actual output. 
When λ  is small, potential output tends to follow the movement of actual 
output. Contrary, when λ  is big, potential output tends to be like a straight 
line.  Another weakness is the end-sample bias. The bias could be large when 
the end of the sample is an extreme point of the business cycle. Furthermore, 
the end-point estimate could be different when new observations are available.   
 
To overcome the end-sample bias most researchers extend the sample for some 
periods ahead by forecasting the series. Others adjust their results from 
applying the HP filter using judgement, for example, Laxton, Rose and Tetlow 
(1993b) adjust the Canadian output gap from 1982 to 1991. The existence of 
structural break in GDP series is also taken into account when estimating the 
potential output. For example, Rodriguez (2008) applies the HP filter to 
calculate potential output of the Canadian economy for 1961:1 to 2002:3 with 
two breaks identified at March 1980 and February 1994. Jondeau and Le Bihan 
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(2000) estimate potential GDP for the U.S. and Germany using a deterministic 
trend with a break in 1974.  
 
For the case of Indonesia, because of a deep fall in real GDP during the 
financial crisis in 1998, we split the sample into two parts. The first part is the 
before-crisis period (1980-1997) and the second part is the after-crisis period 
(1998-2008). The main reason why we split the sample into two and adjust the 
potential output during the period of the crisis and some years after that is that 
the results of the pure HP filter using a full sample (1980-2008) are not 
satisfactory. Applying the pure HP filter in a full sample will give us a result of 
big positive output gaps for some years before the crisis, but small output gaps 
during the crisis. This result is implausible and is difficult to explain.  
 
To get the trend of GDP or potential output we apply the HP filter on each sub 
period. To overcome the end-sample bias we extend the end-point of 
observation until 2011. We forecast Indonesia’s GDP growth in 2009, 2010, and 
2011, i.e. 4.2%, 5.0%, and 5.5%, respectively. A smoothing factor ( λ ) of 100 is 
used here, following Kydland and Prescott’s (1989) suggestion that this value is 
appropriate for annual data. Most studies use the same value of λ  when 
employing the annual data.       
 
Because there are two different trends which are discontinuous between two 
time periods, we adjust the result during the financial crisis period and some 
years after the crisis. We assume that during that period, capacity utilization is 
low and there was no capital addition. Therefore, during that period potential 
output did not grow or, in another words, the level of potential output stays 
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the same as that in 1997. When the real output surpasses the pre-crisis level, we 
assume that capital starts growing. This causes potential output to start 
growing at a positive rate.        
 
a.2   Adjusted SVAR model 
 
As a comparison, we estimate Indonesian potential output by using the 
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methodology with long-run 
restrictions, as proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).  
 
Suppose that output, consumption, and the interest rate are affected by the 
same shocks. In the moving-average representation, they can be expressed as a 
linear combination of current and past structural shocks:  
  tttt LSLSLSy 313212111 )()()( υυυ ++=∆   (3.23a) 
 tttt LSLSLSc 323222121 )()()( υυυ ++=∆   (3.23b) 
 tttt LSLSLSi 333232131 )()()( υυυ ++=   (3.23c) 
or, in matrix form, as  
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where t1υ , t2υ , and t3υ  are uncorrelated white noise disturbances and ijS  are 
polynomials in the lag operator.  
 
Equation (3.24) can be written as tt LSx υ)(= , where ]'[ tttt icyx ∆∆=  and 
]'[ 321 tttt υυυυ = . Since these three disturbances are assumed to be 
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uncorrelated, their variance covariance matrix is diagonal; the assumption that 
the covariance matrix is the identity is then simply a convenient normalization. 
Therefore, the structural innovations, tυ , are assumed to be orthonormal, i.e. its 
covariance matrix is an identity matrix, such that == )var()var( 21 tt υυ  
1)var( 3 =tυ :  
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The shocks t1υ  are aggregate supply shocks, while t2υ  and t3υ  are aggregate 
demand shocks. The coefficients )(11 LS , for instance, represent the impulse 
response of an aggregate supply shock on ty∆ .  
 
The structural shocks cannot be observed and must be recovered from the 
reduced-form shocks. To identify the structural model, the VAR is first 
estimated in its unrestricted form: 
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or ttt xLx εϕ += −1)( .  
After including the optimal number of lags, the above system is estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Since tx  is stationary, it has a Wold moving-
average representation: 
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or  tt LCx ε)(= , where 
1))(()( −−= LLILC ϕ .  
 
The variance-covariance matrix of the vector of reduced form innovation, Σ , is 
given by 
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Under the assumption that the innovation in 
t
ε  are a linear combination of 
structural disturbances in 
t
υ , the structural shock can be related to the 
disturbance of the reduced-form model as follows: 
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or  tt S υε )0(= , with Σ== )0(')()0()(
,, SESE tttt υυεε .  
 
Equations (3.24), (3.27), and (3.29) imply:  
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or )0()()( SLCLS = . 
 
Knowledge of S(0), the matrix of the contemporaneous effects of structural 
disturbance tυ  on tx , allows one to recover the structural shocks from the 
reduced-form innovation tε . S(0) can be identified by imposing the following 
restriction. We need at least 3 restrictions. In accordance with the natural rate 
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hypothesis, demand shocks do not affect output in the long run whereas 
supply shocks do. Imposing the restriction that demand shocks only have 
temporary effects on output, i.e. the cumulated effects of demand shocks on 
output are equal to zero, makes S(L) a lower triangular matrix.   
 
From Equation (3.23a) it is straightforward to decompose ty∆  into potential 
output and output gap components. The potential output or permanent trends 
component, pty∆ , is calculated by cumulating the permanent supply shocks to 
ty∆ : 
 t
p
t LSy 111 )( υ=∆ , (3.31)    
while the output gap component, gapty∆ , is given by 
 tt
gap
t LSLSy 313212 )()( υυ +=∆ . (3.32)    
   
The unadjusted potential output from the SVAR model tends to follow the real 
GDP series. As a result, during the crisis the potential output also drops. Again, 
this is difficult to explain. Therefore, we adjust the potential output series 
mainly during the financial crisis period and for some years after the crisis. 
Under the assumption that potential output is neither increasing nor 
decreasing during the crisis period and some years after that, the adjustment is 
made by letting the potential output stay at the before-crisis level until it 
reaches a higher value than the before-crisis level. 
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a.3  Peak-to-peak methodology 
 
Peak-to-peak methodology is different from the above methodologies. This 
methodology, which was proposed by De Long and Summer (1999), is simple 
and there is no need for adjustment, especially in the period of crisis and at the 
end of sample. Their approach is motivated by four assumptions:  
1. Potential productivity does not decline over time. Workers and 
managers do not forget the production process.  
2. Actual output is never above its potential, except perhaps during war 
time. 
3. Potential output grows smoothly. New technologies, techniques, and 
organizations diffuse slowly throughout the economy, as do changes in 
natural resources, machines, workers, and tastes for work and leisure.  
4. Actual output does attain potential output on a semi-regular basis. 
Shocks that reduce output below potential are likely to be damped out in 
a few years.  
   
Let y* denote potential output and y denote actual output, a potential output 
series can be calculated using the following recursive procedure:  
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The growth rate of potential output between year t and t+k lies along the 
straight line with the steepest slope that connects the estimates of potential 
output in year t with actual output in any years t+1 through t+k. The second 
assumption requires that the potential output between t and t+k grows at least 
   110 
rapidly enough to keep potential at or above actual output. The third 
assumption implies that the rate of growth from year t to t+1 will be close to the 
rate of growth from t to t+k. The fourth assumption implies that, for some year 
between t and t+k, actual output is quite close to potential output. The value of 
parameter k corresponds to the smoothness of potential growth and the 
frequency with which actual output draws near to potential.      
 
b.  The determinants of inflation  
 
To analyze the factors determining inflation in Indonesia, we employ a hybrid 
version of the NKPC, as in Buiter and Miller (1985) and Gali and Gertler (1999). 
Through this hybrid version, we can assess the importance of lagged inflation 
relative to future inflation. To capture the business cycle, we use the output 
gap.  
 
Furthermore, to capture openness as well as to measure the exchange rate pass 
through to the CPI we extend the hybrid NKPC by adding the rate of change of 
the nominal exchange rate (Rp/USD). The inclusion of exchange rate change in 
the above specification is important the see the impact of exchange rate 
depreciation on domestic CPI inflation. When exchange rate depreciates, the 
import price will go up and for some extent the domestic price will also go up 
because some domestic goods contain imported raw materials. 
   
We also wish to know the role of money in influencing inflation in Indonesia. 
From quantitative theory and P-star model we know that money matters for 
inflation. Gerlach and Svensson (2003) combine the P-star model with classic 
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Phillips curve where the output gap and the real money gap are put together in 
the right hand side of their price equation. We follow Gerlach and Svensson 
(2003) by adding money growth to the Phillips curve equation in order to 
compare the information content of the money growth relative to the output 
gap and exchange rate depreciation.  
 
Therefore, we use the modified hybrid Phillips curve specification as follows: 
 ttttt
e
ttt fitrifuelcrisismergap εδδδηγβδpiωpipi ++++++++= +− 32111  (3.34) 
where 1−tpi  is backward-looking inflation expectations, 
e
t 1+pi  is forward-looking 
inflation expectations, tgap   is the output gap, ter   is the rate of change of the 
nominal exchange rate (Rp/USD), tm   is money growth, crisis  is a dummy 
variable to capture the 1997-1998 financial crisis, fuel is a dummy variable to 
capture the domestic fuel price hike in January 2005 and October 2005, and fitri 
is a dummy variable to capture ‘Idul Firi’ day, the Moslem festive at the end of 
the fasting month. The determination of Idul Fitri day is based on the lunar 
calendar, therefore the Idul Fitri day moves in every year (based on the solar 
calendar).   
 
Since there is no data on forward-looking inflation expectations, we use the 
actual value of future inflation, as suggested by McCallum (1976). To 
approximate the forward-looking term as a model-consistent inflation forecast 
we estimate the model using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). GMM 
can remedy parameter inconsistency and produce more efficient estimators 
(Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox, 1996; and Hall, 1993).  
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The most common test in GMM is J-statistic, which is introduced by Hansen 
(1982). The J-statistic is used to test whether the instrumental variables are 
appropriately chosen in the model. A test of the over-identifying restrictions 
imposed by the M − k equations can be tested under 0H  that the restrictions are 
true. Taking the linear model as an example:  
 )]ˆ('
1
[ˆ)]'ˆ('
1
[ 1 ββ XyZ
n
VXyZ
n
J −−= − , (3.35)  
where n is number of observations, Z is instrumental variables, y is dependent 
variables, X is independent variables, V is the variance.    
 
Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are satisfied, 
the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is asymptotically 2χ  
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. 
The over-identification test considered above is a test of whether all the 
restrictions of the model are satisfied. If J is large, either the orthogonality 
conditions or the other assumptions (or both) are likely to be false. 
 
Although we include a contemporaneous output gap, exchange rate 
depreciation, and money growth in Equation (3.34), we experiment with 
various specifications of the timing effects on inflation. The estimated equations 
also always include a freely estimated constant to control for level 
measurement errors and for the mean effect of omitted variables.  
 
We consider three kinds of monetary aggregates, i.e. M0 (base money), M1, and 
M2. We also consider three types of inflation expectations, i.e. backward-
looking expectations, forward-looking expectations, and both backward-
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looking expectations and forward-looking expectations. The model chosen is 
based on the significance of the variables (p-value), the value of the adjusted R2, 
and the value of the log likelihood function (LLF).    
 
3.4.2  Empirical Results  
a.  Output gap  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the potential output resulting from a pure HP filter and an 
adjusted HP filter. Potential output derived using the pure HP filter tends to 
resemble a linear line. As a result, the output gap, the difference between actual 
and potential output, grows positively from 1993 to 1997. This is not reasonable 
since the inflation in the same period was not increasing, but rather decreasing. 
Furthermore, the maximum positive output gap occurs in 1997, while a deep 
financial crisis in 1998 leaves just a small negative output gap. The absolute 
value of the output gap in 1999 is much smaller than the absolute value of the 
output gap in 1997. Again, this is difficult to justify since a big positive output 
gap in 1997 was not related to economic heating as growth was only 4.7%.      
 
On the other hand, with an adjustment made for the crisis period, the adjusted 
HP filter results in a moderate positive output gap before the crisis and big 
negative output gap in 1998 and 1999. This is because of zero growth in 
potential output and negative growth in output during the crisis. We believe 
that during the crisis, potential output stayed at the level before the crisis, 
while capacity utilization fell as demand shrank. The figure is more consistent 
with the reality which occurred, especially in the period 1998 - 1999.      
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Figure 3.3: Potential output using HP filter and adjusted HP filter  
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Figure 3.4: Potential output using SVAR and adjusted SVAR  
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Figure 3.4 shows the potential output resulting from use of the pure SVAR 
model and the adjusted SVAR model. Potential output from the SVAR method 
tends to follow the movement of real output. Potential output using the pure 
SVAR fell during the crisis period following the trend in real output. Detailed 
steps on how to estimate potential output from this methodology can be found 
at Appendix 2. As we assume that during the crisis output potential did not 
drop, but stayed at zero growth, we adjust the potential output from 1998 to 
2000. Therefore, the difference between potential output resulting from the 
unadjusted SVAR and that from the adjusted SVAR is in the period 1998 to 
2000.  
 
By setting the parameter k equal to 4, from Figure 3.5 we can see that potential 
output resulting from use of peak-to-peak methodology moves smoothly. 
Without making any adjustments, potential output during the crisis (1998-1999) 
stays at the level before the crisis (1997), then increases gradually and 
smoothly. The peaks, where the output gap is zero, occur in 1980, 1981, 1996, 
and 1997. Sudden drops of output gap occur in 1998 and 1999 and then the 
output gaps are approaching zero gradually after that. In 2008 real output is 
nearly the same as its potential.   
 
Even though this methodology never results in a positive output gap, we can 
still infer that the output gap’s pressure on inflation is bigger when the output 
gap is near zero than when the output gap is far from zero. We prefer to use 
this methodology to measure potential output and output gaps due to its 
smoothness, simplicity, and freedom from judgement.     
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Figure 3.5: Potential output using peak-to-peak method  
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Figure 3.6: Output gap – comparison  
   117 
Figure 3.6 compares the three output gaps resulting from the use of the 
adjusted HP filter, the adjusted SVAR model, and the peak-to-peak 
methodology. From the figure we can see that the movement of the output gap 
of the adjusted HP filter has a similar shape as that of the peak-to-peak 
methodology. Nevertheless, they have different magnitudes, with more 
negative output gaps occurring when using the peak-to-peak methodology.  
 
In contrast, the output gap resulting from the use of the adjusted SVAR model 
is different from the others, both in terms of value and shape. The output gap 
resulting from the use of the adjusted SVAR model is averagely positive in the 
period before crisis, but negative after the crisis period. Since potential output 
moves relatively the same with real output, the magnitude of the output gap 
from the use of the adjusted SVAR model is relatively smaller than that of the 
adjusted HP filter and the peak-to-peak methodology. 
 
b.  The determinants of inflation  
 
To convert the frequency of output gap from yearly to monthly, we interpolate 
the data by applying a quadratic-match-average method. Using an 
interpolation method that matches the average means that the average of the 
interpolated points for each period is equal to the source data point for that 
period.   
 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the GMM estimation for inflation equation using 
output gap as calculated from the adjusted HP filter. Since we want to know 
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which monetary aggregate, whether M0, M1, or M2, is the best indicator of 
inflation, we compare the three variables. Furthermore, we want to know 
which types of inflation expectations is most useful for inflation indicators, 
whether backward-looking expectations, forward-looking expectations, or 
both.  
 
From Table 3.3 we can see that five models have p-value of J-statistic more than 
10% indicating that the instrumental variables are appropriately chosen. Using 
M0 as a monetary aggregate indicator, M0 growth is not significant for model 
using backward-looking inflation expectations (Model B) and for model using 
forward-looking inflation expectations (Model F). In Model F, output gap and 
exchange rate have wrong signs. The best model is when including backward-
looking inflation expectations and forward-looking inflation expectations 
(Model B+F). Using M1 as a monetary aggregate indicator, Model F gives 
wrong signs of parameter of output gap, exchange rate depreciation, and 
money growth. Using M2 as a monetary aggregate indicator, Model B and 
Model B+F give the wrong sign for money growth, while Model F gives wrong 
signs for the output gap and exchange rate depreciation.   
  
Overall, comparing Model B, Model F, and Model B+F, we can see that, on the 
one hand, Model B+F is the best because Model B+F has the highest value of 
adjusted R-squared and LLF. On the other hand, Model F appears to be the 
worst since it has the lowest value of adjusted R-squared and LLF. Moreover, 
in Model F the parameters of output gap and exchange rate depreciation 
appear to have wrong signs. 
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Table 3.3: Inflation’s determinants – using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap  
 
Variable
Constant 0.466 ** -1.423 *** -0.122 0.362 -0.934 ** -0.048 1.261 *** -1.867 *** 0.512
(0.181) (0.442) (0.168) (0.23) (0.383) (0.228) (0.258) (0.374) (0.378)
Inflation(-1) 0.885 *** 0.659 *** 0.843 *** 0.706 *** 0.860 *** 0.711 ***
(0.021) (0.042) (0.019) (0.05) (0.018) (0.059)
Inflation(1) 1.185 *** 0.319 *** 1.210 *** 0.226 *** 1.193 *** 0.226 **
(0.036) (0.058) (0.04) (0.081) (0.036) (0.088)
Output gap(-9) 0.122 *** -0.161 *** 0.038 * 0.132 *** -0.150 *** 0.066 ** 0.168 *** -0.193 *** 0.089 **
(0.025) (0.048) (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.033) (0.03) (0.045) (0.042)
Exchange rate(-1) -0.076 *** 0.082 *** -0.029 *** -0.086 *** 0.087 *** -0.049 *** -0.086 *** 0.086 *** -0.049 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.01) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018)
Money(-2) 0.011 0.001 0.007 * 0.033 *** -0.036 *** 0.021 *** -0.019 ** 0.018 * -0.010
(0.007) (0.015) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.008)
Crisis 2.741 *** -4.961 *** 0.539 3.216 *** -5.738 *** 1.439 3.261 *** -5.945 *** 1.611
(0.774) (1.755) (0.651) (0.771) (1.762) (0.898) (0.828) (1.657) (0.978)
Fuel 3.730 ** -0.607 2.482 ** 3.875 ** -0.847 2.932 ** 3.571 ** -0.519 2.745 **
(1.851) (0.9) (1.174) (1.75) (0.95) (1.334) (1.783) (0.935) (1.339)
Fitri 0.521 ** 0.694 * 0.546 *** 0.560 ** 0.714 * 0.550 *** 0.566 ** 0.719 * 0.569 ***
(0.236) (0.373) (0.171) (0.283) (0.404) (0.204) (0.275) (0.392) (0.205)
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.963 0.993 0.982 0.962 0.991 0.980 0.963 0.991
LLF -634.277 -747.773 -471.501 -628.583 -750.010 -505.754 -642.271 -748.608 -515.037
J-Statistic 0.022 0.023 0.009 0.013 0.019 0.004 0.013 0.021 0.009
p-value 0.060 0.054 0.202 0.211 0.088 0.521 0.216 0.068 0.210
M0
B+F
M1 M2
B F B+F B F B+F B F
 
Note:  
• Based on GMM estimation for the following model: 
ttttttt fitrifuelcrisismergap εδδδηγβδpiωpipi ++++++++= +− 11111  
• B is backward-looking, F is forward-looking, B+F is backward-looking and forward-looking.  
• Number in the bracket is the standard error. 
• ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
• Instrument variables: c cpi_y(-1) gap(-8) gap(-9) er_y er_y(-1) m(-3) m(-2) Crisis Fuel Fitri 
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Comparing Model B+F for M0, M1, and M2, we can see from the table that M2 
has wrong sign and it is not significant. Therefore, we can conclude that M2 is 
not good indicator for inflation. If we compare Model B+F for M0 and Model 
B+F for M1, the first has higher adjusted R-squared and LLF than the latter. 
However, if we look at the coefficient of money growth, the parameter of M1 
(0.021) is higher than the parameter of M0 (0.007). This indicates that M1 
growth has higher impact on inflation than M0 growth. Therefore, we prefer 
Model B+F with M1 as a monetary aggregate variable.  
 
Looking at Model B+F, we can see from the table that backward-looking 
inflation expectations are generally shown to be more dominant than forward-
looking inflation expectations. For M1 as a monetary aggregate variable, the 
backward-looking coefficient is 0.71 and the forward-looking coefficient is 0.23. 
Our results support the findings of Fuhrer (1997b), Laxton, Meredith and Rose 
(1994), and Rudd and Whelan (2005), where the backward-looking component 
is bigger than the forward-looking component and both components are 
significant.      
 
When using the M1 indicator, the impact of the output gap on inflation is 
positive at lag 9 with the value of its coefficient being 0.07. The exchange rate 
pass-through is found to be -0.05. It means that 1% currency depreciation this 
month will have an impact on inflation next month of 0.05%. The impact of a 
1% increase in M1 growth on the next two months inflation is 0.02%. All 
variables above are significant. The dummy variable for the price fuel hike in 
January 2005 and October 2005 and dummy variable for ‘Idul Fitri’ day are 
positive and significant. However, using backward-looking and forward-
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looking components of expectations, the dummy for the financial crisis turns 
out to be insignificant.  
 
As a comparison, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 present the results of GMM 
estimation using output gaps calculated using the adjusted SVAR model and 
the peak-to-peak method. As we can see from the tables, p-values of J-statistics 
in most models are higher than 10% meaning that the models are well specified 
for all the restrictions of the model (the orthogonality conditions) are satisfied.  
 
Generally, these results paint the same story as Table 3.3. First, models using 
both backward-looking and forward-looking components are the best. Both 
components are significant with the backward-looking part dominating the 
forward-looking part. Second, an output gap with lag 9, exchange rate 
depreciation at lag 1, and growth of M1 at lag 2 are significant; M0 is also 
significant, but M2 is not significant. The coefficient of M1 is higher than 
coefficient of M0. Third, dummy variables for the fuel price hike and ‘Idul Fitri’ 
day are positive and significant, but the dummy variable for the financial crisis 
is not significant.  
 
The coefficients of inflation expectations are approximately the same among 
the three different measurements of output gap. So are the coefficients of the 
exchange rate change and money growth. However, the coefficient of the 
output gap from application of the adjusted SVAR model (0.088) is found to be 
higher than that resulting from the use of the peak-to-peak method (0.072) and 
the adjusted HP filter (0.066). 
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Table 3.4: Inflation’s determinants –using the ‘adjusted SVAR’ output gap 
 
Variable
Constant 0.212 -1.076 *** -0.172 -0.055 -0.521 -0.238 0.907 *** -1.337 *** 0.320
(0.18) (0.383) (0.143) (0.213) (0.333) (0.173) (0.251) (0.346) (0.311)
Inflation(-1) 0.883 *** 0.669 *** 0.849 *** 0.723 *** 0.869 *** 0.718 ***
(0.021) (0.041) (0.019) (0.053) (0.018) (0.057)
Inflation(1) 1.178 *** 0.304 *** 1.189 *** 0.206 ** 1.171 *** 0.223 ***
(0.036) (0.058) (0.041) (0.086) (0.034) (0.085)
Output gap(-9) 0.150 *** -0.159 ** 0.053 * 0.160 *** -0.158 ** 0.088 ** 0.146 *** -0.164 *** 0.073 *
(0.042) (0.063) (0.031) (0.039) (0.062) (0.042) (0.044) (0.063) (0.044)
Exchange rate(-1) -0.071 *** 0.072 *** -0.029 *** -0.081 *** 0.071 *** -0.049 *** -0.082 *** 0.073 *** -0.047 ***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.01) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
Money(-2) 0.025 *** -0.013 0.012 ** 0.051 *** -0.047 *** 0.031 *** -0.009 0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.007)
Crisis 2.607 *** -4.465 ** 0.581 3.185 *** -4.743 *** 1.551 * 2.820 *** -4.879 *** 1.274
(0.776) (1.739) (0.669) (0.754) (1.745) (0.931) (0.861) (1.59) (0.927)
Fuel 3.590 * -0.438 2.499 ** 3.881 ** -0.746 3.029 ** 3.493 * -0.401 2.722 **
(1.89) (0.92) (1.213) (1.738) (0.897) (1.373) (1.776) (0.867) (1.336)
Fitri 0.502 ** 0.790 ** 0.548 *** 0.545 * 0.754 * 0.554 *** 0.543 ** 0.776 ** 0.566 ***
(0.236) (0.395) (0.17) (0.28) (0.399) (0.207) (0.27) (0.391) (0.201)
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.962 0.992 0.982 0.964 0.990 0.979 0.962 0.990
LLF -639.481 -753.269 -478.872 -628.859 -744.614 -517.749 -651.883 -750.600 -524.052
J-Statistic 0.019 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.024 0.003 0.013 0.021 0.009
p-value 0.092 0.064 0.258 0.260 0.047 0.593 0.208 0.066 0.215
B F
M0
B+F
M1 M2
B F B+F B F B+F
 
Note:  
• Based on GMM estimation for the following model: 
ttttttt fitrifuelcrisismergap εδδδηγβδpiωpipi ++++++++= +− 11111  
• B is backward-looking, F is forward-looking, B+F is backward-looking and forward-looking.  
• Number in the bracket is the standard error. 
• ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
• Instrument variables: c cpi_y(-1) gap(-8) gap(-9) er_y er_y(-1) m(-3) m(-2) Crisis Fuel Fitri 
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Table 3.5: Inflation’s determinants – using the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap 
 
PEAK - CPI
Variable
Constant 0.360 -0.904 -0.231 0.624 ** -1.442 *** 0.090 1.196 *** -1.435 *** 0.289
(0.249) (0.598) (0.195) (0.25) (0.426) (0.292) (0.371) (0.474) (0.424)
Inflation(-1) 0.893 *** 0.653 *** 0.847 *** 0.711 *** 0.867 *** 0.703 ***
(0.022) (0.039) (0.019) (0.051) (0.019) (0.053)
Inflation(1) 1.153 *** 0.336 *** 1.216 *** 0.223 *** 1.157 *** 0.250 ***
(0.038) (0.054) (0.035) (0.083) (0.043) (0.081)
Output gap(-9) 0.034 -0.032 0.003 0.144 *** -0.181 *** 0.072 * 0.087 ** -0.070 0.035
(0.029) (0.047) (0.02) (0.033) (0.056) (0.038) (0.037) (0.045) (0.033)
Exchange rate(-1) -0.077 *** 0.086 *** -0.027 *** -0.082 *** 0.082 *** -0.047 *** -0.086 *** 0.085 *** -0.046 ***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.01) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.01) (0.013) (0.017)
Money(-2) 0.015 ** -0.014 0.008 ** 0.040 *** -0.042 *** 0.024 *** -0.010 0.006 -0.002
(0.007) (0.017) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.01) (0.011) (0.007)
Crisis 1.759 ** -3.831 ** -0.036 2.996 *** -5.846 *** 1.312 2.327 *** -4.743 *** 0.750
(0.858) (1.693) (0.631) (0.753) (1.672) (0.883) (0.829) (1.536) (0.841)
Fuel 3.519 * -0.115 2.346 ** 3.857 ** -0.883 2.935 ** 3.466 * -0.182 2.617 **
(1.879) (0.934) (1.14) (1.754) (0.951) (1.343) (1.79) (0.892) (1.287)
Fitri 0.511 ** 0.853 ** 0.555 *** 0.557 ** 0.702 * 0.556 *** 0.551 ** 0.819 ** 0.555 ***
(0.239) (0.421) (0.168) (0.28) (0.412) (0.203) (0.271) (0.413) (0.194)
Adjusted R-squared 0.980 0.961 0.993 0.982 0.961 0.991 0.979 0.962 0.991
LLF -648.507 -754.843 -470.020 -631.027 -754.453 -509.433 -650.443 -750.847 -506.271
J-Statistic 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.020 0.004 0.014 0.015 0.006
p-value 0.074 0.257 0.360 0.240 0.085 0.527 0.201 0.171 0.365
F B+F B F
M0
B+F
M1 M2
B F B+F B
 
Note:  
• Based on GMM estimation for the following model: 
ttttttt fitrifuelcrisismergap εδδδηγβδpiωpipi ++++++++= +− 11111  
• B is backward-looking, F is forward-looking, B+F is backward-looking and forward-looking.  
• Number in the bracket is the standard error. 
• ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
• Instrument variables: c cpi_y(-1) gap(-8) gap(-9) er_y er_y(-1) m(-3) m(-2) Crisis Fuel Fitri 
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3.5  Is the Indonesian Phillips curve linear? 
 
Recently, many researchers have focused their attention on the shape of the 
Phillips curve, questioning whether non-linearity exists in the relationship 
between output and inflation. There are many papers that identify and test the 
Phillips curve, but most of them focus on developed countries, such as the U.S., 
the U.K., Canada, Japan, and New Zealand.  
 
In G-7 countries, Chadha, Masson and Meredith (1992) model inflation for the 
period 1966-1988. They find that a model of inflation with both forward and 
backward elements seems to characterize reality. The historical data provides 
some evidence for a non-linear trade-off between output and prices. They find 
that the short run aggregate supply curve becomes vertical when output 
reaches 108 percent of long run potential. Similar results are found in Laxton, 
Meredith, and Rose (1994) who conclude that excess demands impact in raising 
inflation is much stronger than excess supply in reducing it.   
 
The non-linearity is also found in studies for Canada. Using annual data from 
1975 to 1991, Laxton, Rose, and Tetlow (1993b) estimate the Phillips curve and 
test for non-linearity. The econometric evidence suggests that the curve is non-
linear. The non-linearity has two important characteristics. First, the non-
linearity is such that the excess demand has a bigger effect on inflation than 
excess supply. Second, there are significantly shorter lags from excess demand 
gaps to inflation than from excess supply gaps to inflation.   
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Inflation in Japan is also found to be non-linear. De Vierman (2005) analyses 
Japan’s large negative output gap during 1998-2002. With oil price imports as 
an additional exogenous variable, he compares the linear with the non-linear 
shape of the Phillips curve during the period 1971Q2 to 1997Q4. Three types of 
non-linear model are examined, i.e. a capacity-constrained model and models 
using an absolute trend of inflation and variance of inflation. He concludes that 
the last two non-linear models with time variation are more robust that the first 
one and the linear model. A declining trend of inflation causes prices to become 
stickier, which in turn causes the Phillips curve to flatten.  
 
Razzak (1997) finds that the relationship between inflation and output in New 
Zealand during 1982Q3 to 1996Q1 is asymmetric. He models the Phillips curve 
as a kinked function with two linear segments estimated by GMM. This model 
implies that positive demand shocks increase inflation by more than negative 
demand shocks reduce it.  
 
To test for non-linearity of the Phillips curve, researchers often use a flexible 
approximation to a general non-linear function. There are some alternative 
forms of non-linearity.  
 
First, the output gap function consists of a linear and quadratic term: 
2)( tt gapgapgapf βα += . (3.36) 
As illustrated in the upper left hand panel of Figure 3.7, this approximation 
implies a convex function, with the effect on inflation tapering off as the gap 
becomes negative.  
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a. Linear and Quadratic Function b. Cubic Function 
pi−pie
y-y*
E[y]-y*<0
 
y-y*
pi−pie
E[y]-y*=0  
  
c.  L-Shape Function d. Kinked Function 
Maximum
Capacity
Constraint
w y-y*
E[y]-y*<0
pi−pie
 
y-y*
pi−pie
E[y]-y*<0
 
Source: Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1994) 
 
Figure 3.7: Alternative non-linear functional forms 
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Second, it simply raises the output gap to an odd integer, for example a cubic 
function: 
3)( tgapgapf α= . (3.37) 
This specification will cause the effect on inflation to increase rapidly as the 
output gap rises in size, while the slope of the function approaches zero when 
the output gap is small. If the output gap is negative, downward pressure on 
inflation becomes large. As illustrated in the upper right hand panel of Figure 
3.7, it is a symmetrical effect where positive and negative gaps have the same 
effect on inflation. Therefore, it cannot explain asymmetries in the inflation-
output relationship.  
 
Third, as in Chadha, Masson, and Meredith (1992) (henceforth CMM), the size 
of the output-inflation trade off becomes steeper as the output gap approaches 
the capacity constraint. To test the empirical validity of this hypothesis, the 
equation is specified so that the degree of inflation pressure depends non- 
linearly on the output gap. The functional form used is the (modified) 
hyperbola: 






−
−
= ω
ω
ωβ
)(
)(
2
t
t
gap
gapf . (3.38) 
where ω  governs the degree of non-linearity in the Phillips curve. The smaller 
the point estimate for ω  is, the smaller the distance between the zero output 
gap and the capacity constraint will be.  
 
As illustrated in the lower left hand panel of Figure 3.7, the shape of the curve 
is convex or a ‘reverse L’. The slope of the curve can be calculated by taking the 
first derivative of the function:  
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2
2
'
)(
)(
gap
gapf
−
=
ω
βω
. (3.39) 
The limit value for some specific value of ω  and the gap are: 
,)('lim β
ω
=
∞→
gapf  (3.40) 
∞=∞=
→
)(,)('lim gapfgapf
gap ω
 (3.41) 
βω−==
−∞→
)(,0)('lim gapfgapf
gap
 (3.42) 
0)0(,)0(' == ff β . (3.43) 
 
Equation (3.40) shows that, as the parameter ω  become large, the function 
approaches a linear function. Equation (3.41) indicates that the effect on 
inflation rises without bounds as the output gap approaches ω . Equation (3.42) 
shows there is a lower bound to the effect on inflation (i.e., βω− ) as the gap 
becomes highly negative. The expression is parameterized so that β  has the 
same interpretation as for the linear relationship when the output gap equals 0, 
specifically, inflationary pressure is zero at this point, and the slope of the 
price-output trade-off is equal to β  (Equation (3.43)). 
 
One can also check the second derivative of the function:  
3
22
)(
2)(
gapgap
gapf
−
=
ω
βω
δ
δ
. (3.44) 
 
It is apparent that this expression goes to zero as ω  becomes large regardless of 
the value of the output gap. Because Equation (3.38) is a non-linear function of 
ω , a grid search needs to be performed to identify the value that maximizes the 
likelihood function.    
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The fourth alternative form of non-linearity is a kinked function with a 
discontinuity in its slope as the output gap changes sign (see lower right hand 
panel of Figure 3.7):  



>
≤
=
0
0
)(
2
1
tt
tt
t gapifgap
gapifgap
gapf
α
α
 (3.45) 
 
In Laxton et al. (1993b), the non-linearity of the output gap is described as a 
kink at zero excess demand, but the model remains locally linear elsewhere:   
tt posgapgapgapf βα +=)(  (3.46a) 
with 



 >
=
otherwise
gapifgap
posgap
0
0
. (3.46b) 
where posgap is positive output gap. If β  is significant, then the curve is non-
linear where the impact of a positive output gap is more than for a negative 
output gap.   
 
Fifth, in Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) as well as in Dotsey, King, and 
Wolman  (1999), the trend of inflation is a factor determining the slope of the 
Phillips curve. Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (BMR) focus on the length of time 
between price changes, while Dotsey, King, and Wolman (DKW) focus on the 
probabilities of price adjustment. In BMR, under high inflation, any firm 
expects its relative price to change rapidly over time, which in turn leads to a 
rapid change in its nominal price. In DKW, higher steady-state inflation leads 
to higher steady-state probabilities of price adjustment. Price adjustment is 
made based on a firm’s optimizing decision that depends on the average of 
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inflation. Therefore, the Phillips curve is flatter at a lower trend rate of inflation 
and steeper at a higher trend rate of inflation: 
 ttt gapgapf )()( piβα += . (3.47) 
 
Sixth, in Lucas (1973), the slope of the Phillips curve depends upon the 
volatility of demand shocks and supply shocks. Firms set quantities produced 
based on their perceived relative price. If the volatility decreases, changes in 
prices are misperceived by firms as a change in relative price, so that there are 
smaller effects on inflation. A low level of aggregate volatility implies a flatter 
Phillips curve, while a high level of aggregate volatility implies a steeper 
Phillips curve:  
ttt gapgapf )](var[)( piβα += . (3.48) 
 
One variant of the linear relationship is to allow for time-variation in the 
output gap coefficients (see De Vierman, 2005). This is an atheoretical model.  
 
The time-varying-parameter model can be described as follows: 
),0(...~,... 22211 σβββ Ndiieexxxy ttktktttttt ++++= ,  (3.49) 
),0(...~)()( 21 iititiitiiit Ndii συυδβφδβ +−=− − ,  (3.50) 
where 0)( =isteE υ  for all t and s, i = 1, 2, …, k, and itx  are predetermined or 
exogenous variables.  Equations (3.49) and (3.50) can be written in state-space 
model. The model consists of two equations: first, a measurement equation, 
which is an equation that describes the relation between observed variables 
and unobserved state variables; second, a transition or state equation, which is 
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an equation that describes the dynamics of the state variables. The transition 
equation has the form of a first-order difference equation in the state vector.  
The measurement equation is  
t
kt
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t
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while transition equations are  
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where )1(* iii φδδ −= , i = 1, 2, …, k.  
 
One commonly used to estimate itβ  is Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is a 
recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimate of the unobserved-
state vector itβ , i = 1, 2, …, T, based on the appropriate information set. The 
filter consists of following two steps: 
1. Prediction: At the beginning of time t, an optimal predictor of ty  is formed 
based on all available information up to time t-1, i.e. 1| −tty . This needs to 
calculate 1| −ttβ . Assuming that µ~ , F, R, and Q are known, then 
1|11|
~
−−−
+= tttt Fβµβ ,  (3.53) 
QFFPP tttt += −−− '1|11| , (3.54) 
1|1|1| −−− −=−= ttttttttt xyyy βη , (3.55) 
RxPxf tttttt += −−− '1|11| .  (3.56) 
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2. Updating: After observing ty , a more accurate inference can be made of tβ , 
i.e. tt|β , an inference of tβ  based on information up to time t.       
 1|1|| −− += ttttttt K ηββ , (3.57) 
1|1|| −− −= tttttttt PxKPP , (3.58) 
where 1 1|
'
1|
−
−−
= tttttt fxPK  is the Kalman gain, which determined the weight 
assigned to new information about tβ  contained in the prediction error, 1| −ttP  is 
covariance matrix of tβ  conditional on information up to t-1, and 1| −ttf  is 
conditional variance of the prediction error.   
 
The above prediction and updating steps of Kalman filter may be understood 
more intuitively with the help of Figure 3.8.  
 
y
xxt
yt
yt-|t-1
(Prediction)
(Updating)
1|1| −− −= ttttt yyη
1|11| −−− += tttt Fβµβ
1|1|| −−
+=
ttttttt
Kηββ
Model: 
),0(...~ 2ettttt Ndiieexy σβ +=
),0(...~ 21 vtttt NdiivF συβµβ ++= −
 
Figure 3.8: The Kalman filter: Time-Varying-Parameter (TVP) model 
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In De Veirman (2005) Japan’s Phillips curve is specified as: 
tttttttt impoilygapygapL εδγγpiβpi ++++= −− 2,21,1)(  (3.59a) 
with transition equations: 
ttt ,11,1,1 υγγ += −   (3.59b) 
ttt ,21,2,2 υγγ += − . (3.59c)  
 
3.5.1   Methodology  
 
In order to evaluate whether the Phillips curve in Indonesia is linear or non-
linear in the output-inflation relationship, we first set up a linear model as a 
benchmark (see Equation 3.34). The tests of non-linearity involve modifying the 
benchmark model with various types of output gap function:   
 
1. Quadratic: ttttt
e
ttt mergapgap εδγββpiαpiαpi ++++++= +− 2211211 . (3.60) 
2. Cubic: tttt
e
ttt mergap εδγβpiαpiαpi +++++= +− 31211  . (3.61) 
3. Kink 1: ttttt
e
ttt mergapgap εδγββpiαpiαpi ++++++= +−+− 111211 , (3.62) 
where tt gapgap =
−  when tgap  is zero or negative, and tt gapgap =
+  when 
tgap  is positive.   
4. Kink 2: ttt
tt
t
e
ttt mer
gapgap
gap εδγββpiαpiαpi +++




 +
+++= +−
2
211211 . (3.63) 
5. L-Shape: ttt
t
te
ttt mer
gap
gap
εδγ
ω
ωβpiαpiαpi +++





−
++= +− 1211 , (3.64) 
where ω  is searched from 0.01 to 0.10 with increment 0.001. We choose the 
model which gives the maximum value for LLF.  
6. Trend: ttttt
e
ttt mergap εδγpiβpiαpiαpi +++++= +− 1211 , (3.65) 
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where ∑
=
−
=
J
j
jtt
J 1
1
pipi .  
7. Variance: ttttt
e
ttt mergap εδγpiβpiαpiαpi +++++= +− )(var1211 , (3.66) 
where ∑
=
−
−
−
=
J
j
tjtt
J 1
2)(
1
1
)(var pipipi . 
 
We also apply a linear time-varying model by employing a Kalman filter to 
model unobserved components (state variables):  
 ttttt
e
ttt mergap εδγβpiαpiαpi +++++= +− 1211 , (3.67a) 
 with state equation recursive coefficient 1−= tt ββ . (3.67b) 
 
As in Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1994), Razzak (1997), and De Vierman 
(2007), we choose the model based on the significance of parameters (p-value), 
adjusted R-squared, and the log likelihood function (LLF). The LLF is defined 
as  
 











++
−
=
T
eeT
l
ˆ'ˆ
log)2log(1
2
pi , (3.68) 
where T is the number of observations and eˆ  is the standard error of 
regression. Small standard error implies a large LLF (less negative value).  
 
We expect that β  (
1
β  and 
2
β ) will be positive and significant. If the alternative 
model has a positive and significant β , a higher adjusted R-squared, and a 
greater value for LLF than the benchmark model (linear), then the alternative 
model is preferred to the benchmark.  
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3.5.2   Empirical Results  
 
Based on the analysis in the previous section, in this section we use backward-
looking expectations (inflation lag 1), forward-looking expectations (inflation 
lead 1), output gap with lag 9, exchange rate depreciation lag 1, and M1 growth 
lag 2. To take into account the financial crisis, the fuel price hike, and Idul Fitri 
day, we also add dummy variables.      
 
The results of GMM estimation using the adjusted HP filter are reported in 
Table 3.6. There are 7 forms of non-linear model, i.e. quadratic, cubic, kink-1, 
kink-2, L-shape, trend, and variance. As a comparison, we also model inflation 
with time-varying parameter of output gap. From Table 3.6 we can see that all 
variables, except a constant and some of the output gaps, are significant. The 
choice of instruments is appropriate since all p-values of J-statistic are not 
significant at 10%. The focus of the analysis is the coefficient of the output gap. 
We expect this to be positive and significant.  
 
In the quadratic function, the coefficient of the output gap is positive, but 
insignificant; the coefficient of the output gap squared is, however, negative 
and significant. Even though this model has higher adjusted R-squared and 
LLF than the base model, the sign of the latter term is negative which is not 
expected, this model does not represent well inflation dynamics in Indonesia. 
The quadratic model is not better than the linear model.  
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Table 3.6: The shape of the Phillips curve – using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap   
Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Kink-1 Kink-2 L-Shape Trend Variance Time-Vary
Constant -0.0478 -0.0876 0.0478 0.0330 0.1105 -0.2721 0.1361 0.0299 0.0853
(0.2279) (0.2113) (0.2687) (0.2433) (0.2632) (0.168) (0.2803) (0.2499) (0.1699)
Inflation(-1) 0.7059 *** 0.6240 *** 0.7278 *** 0.7108 *** 0.7212 *** 0.6978 *** 0.8072 *** 0.7476 *** 0.8694 ***
(0.0496) (0.0473) (0.0575) (0.0531) (0.0547) (0.0441) (0.0889) (0.0686) (0.0089)
Inflation(1) 0.2265 *** 0.3408 *** 0.1902 ** 0.2179 ** 0.1969 ** 0.2432 *** 0.1224 0.1672
(0.0806) (0.0706) (0.0956) (0.0866) (0.0909) (0.0732) (0.1245) (0.1085)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.0489 *** -0.0261 ** -0.0478 *** -0.0446 *** -0.0483 *** -0.0484 *** -0.0470 *** -0.0408 *** -0.0845 ***
(0.0153) (0.0113) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.014) (0.0043)
M1 Dep(-2) 0.0206 *** 0.0152 ** 0.0205 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0330 *** 0.0265 *** 0.0109 * 0.0241 *** 0.0362 ***
(0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0108) (0.011) (0.0089) (0.0064) (0.0093) (0.0088)
Dummy for Crisis 1.4386 1.3176 2.8065 * 2.0414 * 2.3077 ** 0.6768 4.5372 ** 4.4534 ** 2.8980 ***
(0.8981) (1.071) (1.4805) (1.1255) (1.1094) (0.6755) (2.0469) (2.1119) (0.403)
Dummy for Fuel 2.9322 ** 2.4984 ** 3.0084 ** 3.0048 ** 3.0926 ** 2.7861 ** 3.2617 ** 3.0917 ** 3.8068 ***
(1.3341) (1.0773) (1.4216) (1.3558) (1.3989) (1.2876) (1.603) (1.4416) (0.4979)
Dummy for Fitri 0.5500 *** 0.5990 *** 0.5366 *** 0.5611 *** 0.5622 *** 0.5562 *** 0.6221 *** 0.7205 *** 0.5069
(0.2041) (0.1819) (0.2) (0.1994) (0.2071) (0.2003) (0.2055) (0.2155) (0.3718)
Gap(-9) 0.0660 ** 0.0287 0.2725 **
(0.0334) (0.0271) (0.1085)
Gap(-9)^2 -0.0055 *
(0.0033)
Gap(-9)^3 0.0012 **
(0.0006)
Positive Gap(-9) -0.0559
(0.0364)
Negative Gap(-9) 0.1529 **
(0.0662)
0.5 * [Gap(-9) + Absolute Gap(-9)] -0.2148 **
    (0.086)
8.5*Gap(-9) / (8.5-Gap(-9)) 0.0004 ***
(0.0001)
Trend of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0086 **
(0.0036)
Variance of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0007 **
(0.0003)
Average TVP of Gap(-9) 0.0845 ***
(0.0299)
Adjusted R-squared 0.9911 0.9934 0.9905 0.9912 0.9907 0.9913 0.9901 0.9904
LLF -505.75 -454.35 -516.58 -503.16 -513.46 -501.80 -523.73 -518.20 -634.47
J-Statistic 0.0039 0.0177 0.0001 0.0063 0.0042 0.0015 0.0053 0.0039
p-value 0.5213 0.1129 0.8941 0.5463 0.6994 0.7755 0.4090 0.5156
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In the cubic function, the coefficient of the output gap is found to be positive 
and significant, but very small (0.0012). However, the adjusted R-squared and 
the LLF value in the cubic function are lower than those in the linear model. It 
implies that the cubic function is not better than the linear one either.  
 
In the first kinked function, the coefficient of the negative output gap is positive 
and significant, but the coefficient of the positive output gap is negative and 
not significant. Furthermore, in the second type of kinked function, even 
though the coefficient of the output gap is positive and significant, the 
coefficient on the second part, which represents the positive output gap, is 
negative and significant. Both the LLF value of the first type and second type of 
kinked function are lower than that of the linear model. This evidence shows 
that neither type of kinked function is able to describe Indonesia’s inflation. 
 
In the L-shaped function we find that the coefficient of the output gap is 
positive and significant. The ‘wall’ parameter, ω , that gives the maximum 
impact of the output gap on inflation, is found to be 8.5%. This number which 
is searched over the region 1% to 10% of positive output gap with increment 
0.01% gives a maximum value for the LLF, i.e. -497.752 (see Figure 3.9). It 
means that the effect on inflation becomes unbounded as the output gap 
approaches 8.5% of GDP. This LLF value is bigger than the LLF value in the 
linear model (-505.708).   
 
In the model that uses the interaction between the trend of inflation and the 
output gap, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and  
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Figure 3.9: LLF value of L-shape function - using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap 
 
significant. However, its adjusted R-squared and LLF value are lower than that 
in the linear model. The same result occurs when we evaluate the model with 
the interaction between the variance of inflation and the output gap. In the 
time-varying model, the coefficient of the output gap is positive and significant. 
However, its adjusted R-squared and LLF value are also smaller than that in 
the linear model.   
 
Table 3.7 shows the results using the output gap estimated from the adjusted 
SVAR model. p-values of J-statistic of most models are higher than 10% 
meaning that we accept the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
appropriately chosen. From the table we can see that some of the coefficients of 
the output gap in the quadratic function and kinked function (kink-1 and kink-
2) are negative, which are not expected. Therefore, the quadratic function and 
the kinked function are not better than the linear model.  
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In the cubic function model, the trend-output gap interaction model, the 
variance-output gap interaction, and the time-varying model we find the 
coefficients to be positive and significant. However, their adjusted R-squared 
and LLF values are lower than that in the benchmark model, i.e. the time-
invariant linear model.  
 
For the L-shape function, it is found that the ‘wall’ parameter, ω , is 3%; this 
number gives a maximum value of LLF, i.e. -483.030 (see Figure 3.10). It implies 
that the Phillips curve is nearly vertical as the output gap approaches 3% of 
GDP.  
 
Comparing to the ‘wall’ parameter from the adjusted HP filter, this ‘wall’ 
parameter is lower. The coefficient of the output gap is found to be positive and 
significant. Moreover, the LLF value of this model is higher than that in the  
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Figure 3.10: LLF value of L-shape function - using the ‘adjusted SVAR’ output gap  
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Table 3.7: The shape of the Phillips curve – using the ‘adjusted SVAR’ output gap 
Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Kink-1 Kink-2 L-Shape Trend Variance Time-Vary
Constant -0.2382 -0.1329 0.0132 0.0481 0.0481 -0.2944 * -0.1677 0.0139 -0.4192
(0.1726) (0.1884) (0.2567) (0.2088) (0.2088) (0.152) (0.2199) (0.2436) (0.1699)
Inflation(-1) 0.7230 *** 0.5749 *** 0.7427 *** 0.7169 *** 0.7169 *** 0.7133 *** 0.9267 *** 0.7495 *** 0.8829 ***
(0.0529) (0.0478) (0.064) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0408) (0.1302) (0.0691) (0.0089)
Inflation(1) 0.2056 ** 0.4086 *** 0.1677 0.2022 ** 0.2022 ** 0.2273 *** -0.0084 0.1648
(0.0859) (0.0643) (0.1069) (0.083) (0.083) (0.0672) (0.1756) (0.1093)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.0487 *** -0.0172 * -0.0455 *** -0.0482 *** -0.0482 *** -0.0470 *** -0.0432 *** -0.0405 *** -0.0733 ***
(0.0153) (0.0089) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.014) (0.0043)
M1 Dep(-2) 0.0312 *** 0.0087 0.0292 *** 0.0321 *** 0.0321 *** 0.0283 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0248 *** 0.0575 ***
(0.0105) (0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0126) (0.0095) (0.0088)
Dummy for Crisis 1.5508 * 0.5192 3.2669 * 2.2171 * 2.2171 * 0.2966 7.4346 *** 4.4818 ** 2.6325 ***
(0.9305) (1.0394) (1.697) (1.1323) (1.1323) (0.4914) (2.8128) (2.1071) (0.403)
Dummy for Fuel 3.0295 ** 2.1732 ** 3.0976 ** 2.8990 ** 2.8990 ** 2.8559 ** 3.7989 * 3.1037 ** 3.8006 ***
(1.3734) (0.9125) (1.4795) (1.3451) (1.3451) (1.3122) (1.9472) (1.4466) (0.4979)
Dummy for Fitri 0.5540 *** 0.6496 *** 0.5372 *** 0.5738 *** 0.5738 *** 0.5876 *** 0.6460 *** 0.7228 *** 0.4985
(0.2067) (0.1768) (0.2024) (0.2004) (0.2004) (0.1962) (0.2337) (0.2165) (0.3718)
Gap(-9) 0.0876 ** -0.0450 0.3265 **
(0.0419) (0.037) (0.1322)
Gap(-9)^2 -0.0090
(0.0065)
Gap(-9)^3 0.0016 **
(0.0007)
Positive Gap(-9) -0.1944 **
(0.0899)
Negative Gap(-9) 0.1529 **
(0.0659)
0.5 * [Gap(-9) + Absolute Gap(-9)] -0.3473 **
    (0.1415)
8.5*Gap(-9) / (8.5-Gap(-9)) 0.0059 ***
(0.0008)
Trend of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0158 ***
(0.0056)
Variance of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0007 **
(0.0003)
Average TVP of Gap(-9) 0.0546 ***
(0.0688)
Adjusted R-squared 0.9905 0.9941 0.9900 0.9907 0.9907 0.9913 0.9867 0.9904
LLF -517.75 -437.26 -526.48 -513.61 -513.61 -501.57 -574.65 -519.05 -628.65
J-Statistic 0.0031 0.0186 0.0006 0.0032 0.0032 0.0035 0.0084 0.0039
p-value 0.5927 0.0978 0.6540 0.7824 0.7824 0.5496 0.2420 0.5142
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benchmark model. Therefore, using the ‘adjusted SVAR’ output gap we find 
that the best model in describing the inflation-output relationship is a non-
linear model with output gap as an L-shape function. 
 
Using another type of output gap, i.e. the peak-to-peak method, Table 3.8 
reports the results. Again, the probability of J-test of most models shows 
insignificant at 10%. Since the output gaps estimated by the peak-to-peak 
method are never positive, the kinked function is not appropriate. We find that 
the quadratic function is not suitable for describing the Indonesian Phillips 
curve since the coefficients of the output gap are negative. On the other hand, 
the cubic function, the trend function, the variance function, and the time-
varying model have positive and significant parameters of output gap. 
However, their values of adjusted R-squared and LLF are again lower than that 
in the linear model.  
 
In the L-shape function, with the wall parameter equal to -3.7% (see Figure 
3.11), we find that the coefficient of the output gap is positive and significant. 
The R-squared and the LLF values for this function are higher than those in the 
linear function. Using three different types of output gap, based on the sign of 
parameter, the significance, the adjusted R-squared, and the LLF value, we 
conclude that the L-shape function outperforms the linear function. Inflation in 
Indonesia thus seems best described by a non-linear model rather than a linear 
one. 
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Table 3.8: The shape of the Phillips curve – using the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap 
 
Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic L-Shape Trend Variance Time-Vary
Constant 0.0897 -0.3597 * -0.0090 -0.2642 0.3932 0.0109 0.3901 **
(0.2916) (0.2098) (0.2493) (0.1701) (0.4349) (0.2476) (0.195)
Inflation(-1) 0.7109 *** 0.6187 *** 0.7271 *** 0.7053 *** 0.8660 *** 0.7408 *** 0.8740 ***
(0.0511) (0.041) (0.0568) (0.0427) (0.134) (0.066) (0.0087)
Inflation(1) 0.2234 *** 0.3629 *** 0.1921 ** 0.2335 *** 0.0844 0.1775 *
(0.0833) (0.0577) (0.0955) (0.0711) (0.1747) (0.1049)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.0471 *** -0.0216 ** -0.0469 *** -0.0500 *** -0.0359 ** -0.0410 *** -0.0796 ***
(0.0151) (0.0094) (0.015) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0048)
M1 Growth(-2) 0.0240 *** 0.0132 ** 0.0281 *** 0.0274 *** 0.0148 * 0.0245 *** 0.0414 ***
(0.0084) (0.0059) (0.0097) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0103)
Dummy for Crisis 1.3123 0.8172 2.4440 * 0.6669 7.2891 ** 4.1654 ** 2.7155 ***
(0.8831) (0.9453) (1.3486) (0.666) (3.2478) (2.0532) (0.3885)
Dummy for Fuel 2.9351 ** 2.3384 ** 3.0070 ** 2.8315 ** 3.3178 * 3.0460 ** 3.7944 ***
(1.3433) (1.0269) (1.4134) (1.3241) (1.7689) (1.418) (0.4943)
Dummy for Fitri 0.5562 *** 0.5976 *** 0.5480 *** 0.4717 ** 0.6165 *** 0.7107 *** 0.5120
(0.2027) (0.1697) (0.2016) (0.1837) (0.1975) (0.2124) (0.3682)
Gap(-9) 0.0722 * -0.0724
(0.038) (0.0475)
Gap(-9)^2 -0.0086
(0.0052)
Gap(-9)^3 0.0008 **
(0.0004)
-3.7*Gap(-9) / (-3.7-Gap(-9)) 0.0015 ***
(0.0001)
Trend of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0139 **
(0.006)
Variance of Inflation * Gap(-9) 0.0005 **
(0.0002)
Average TVP of Gap(-9) 0.2088 ***
(0.0559)
Adjusted R-squared 0.9909 0.9936 0.9904 0.9916 0.9889 0.9905
LLF -509.43 -450.15 -519.26 -496.11 -543.67 -516.95 -635.60
J-Statistic 0.0038 0.0181 0.0004 0.0024 0.0164 0.0041
p-value 0.5271 0.1064 0.7086 0.6651 0.0622 0.4999
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Figure 3.11: LLF value of L-shape function - using the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap 
 
Our results support the findings in Chadha et al. (1991) and Laxton et al. (1994) 
in modelling inflation in G7 countries. Nevertheless, the non-linear relationship 
between inflation and output gap in Indonesia is different from that in New 
Zealand, which is best modelled with a kinked function (Razzak, 1997), that in 
Canada, which is also best modelled with a kinked function (Laxton et al., 
1993), and that in Japan, which is best modelled with the trend function and 
with a time-varying relationship (De Veirman, 2007). 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter evaluates the determinants of inflation and the shape of the 
Phillips curve in Indonesia. We employ a semi-reduced form of the hybrid 
NKPC with exchange rate depreciation and money growth as additional 
variables. By using monthly data from 1980:01 to 2008:12 and employing three 
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types of output gap, estimated by using the adjusted HP filter, the adjusted 
SVAR model, and the peak-to-peak method, we provide econometric evidence 
that suggests that CPI inflation in Indonesia is significantly determined by both 
backward-looking and forward-looking expectations, the output gap, exchange 
rate depreciation, and money (M1) growth. M0 growth is also found to be 
significant, but its coefficient is smaller than for the M1 coefficient. We find also 
M2 growth is not significant in determining inflation.     
 
Backward-looking expectations are found to be more important (about 0.72) 
than forward-looking expectations (about 0.22). With a lag of 9 months the 
output gap causes a positive impact on inflation (about 0.07). The exchange rate 
pass through is found higher (about 0.05) than the impact of money (M1) 
growth on inflation (about 0.02). All parameters above are statistically 
significant.   
 
We also compare a benchmark linear model with non-linear models. The 
evidence in favour of non-linear models is strong. We find that the L-shape 
function outperforms the linear model, while other types of non-linear 
functions and the time-varying parameter models perform poorly in 
comparison with the linear model. Therefore, in the case of Indonesia, the 
Phillips curve is best described by a non-linear model with an L-shape function. 
This specification provides a good fit for the Indonesian data.  
 
Even though estimation of the output gap remains open to debate, we suggest 
that Bank Indonesia uses the peak-to-peak method proposed by De Long and 
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Summer (1999), since this procedure is simple and free from judgement. 
However, this methodology has never been used by Bank Indonesia.  
 
In order to keep inflation low, we suggest that Bank Indonesia should not let 
the Rupiah depreciate too much. Under a free-floating exchange rate regime, 
allowing some volatility around the fundamental value of the currency is 
necessary. An investigation of the precise estimates of exchange rates that are 
consistent with the fundamental factors is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Our purpose is rather to caution the reader that the pass-through effect is of 
significance to inflation and needs to be taken into account.   
 
The role of money (M0 and M1) is also shown to be important in determining 
inflation. Even though Bank Indonesia operates its monetary policy under 
inflation targeting, we suggest that Bank Indonesia should not abandon 
monetary aggregates (M0 and M1) as indicators of inflation.  
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4 Heading 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Threshold Effects of Exchange Rate 
Depreciation and Money Growth on Inflation 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, exchange rate depreciation and M1 
growth explain well the inflation dynamics in Indonesia. So far, the Phillips 
curve found in chapter three is assumed to be linear in both exchange rate 
depreciation and money growth. For example, in 1997 when the Indonesian 
Rupiah depreciated by about 80% against the U.S. Dollar and M1 grew by 
about 50%, CPI inflation rose by 76%. While, in 2007 when the exchange rate 
depreciated by 5% and M1 grew by 10%, inflation was about 5%.   
 
One strand of the empirical literature focuses on the exchange rate pass-
through, while the other strand of the empirical literature has concentrated on 
the impact of money on inflation. Of particular interest is whether the 
relationship between exchange rate depreciation and inflation is linear or non-
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linear. Also, it is interesting to analyze whether the impact of money growth on 
inflation is symmetrical. In other words, we may ask whether their coefficients 
in the Phillips curve are the same at any points.  
 
This chapter aims to investigate whether there are threshold values of exchange 
rate depreciation as well as threshold values of money growth. Do they exist? If 
so, what are their values and how big is their impact on inflation?   
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews some 
relevant studies conducted by others. Section three explains the methodology 
that will be employed. The data are described in section four. Section five 
reports and analyzes the empirical findings. Finally, section six concludes.           
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1  Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 
One of the central issues in international macroeconomics is the exchange rate 
pass-through, which is defined as the impact of a one-percentage point 
exchange rate depreciation on domestic inflation. Exchange rate pass-through 
studies consider the extent to which movements in exchange rates are passed 
through into traded goods’ prices after considering producer profit margins 
and mark-ups.  
 
The common way to test for the exchange rate pass-through is to estimate γ  
based on the simple equation:  
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tttt xe εδγαpi +++= ,  (4.1) 
where tpi  is domestic inflation, te  the is nominal exchange rate change 
(depreciation), and tx  is a vector of control variables in growth rates.   
 
The study of exchange rate pass-through can be divided into three categories. 
The first category is the study of the impact of exchange rate pass-through on 
the import prices of specific industries; for example, Bernhofen and Xu (1999) 
and Goldberg (1995). The second category is the study of the impact of 
exchange rate pass-through on aggregate import prices; for example, Hooper 
and Mann (1989) and Campa and Goldberg (2005). The third category consists 
of studies of the impact of exchange rate pass-through on the consumer price 
index (CPI) or the wholesale price index (WPI); for example, Papell (1994) and 
McCarthy (2000).     
 
Although the literature on exchange rate pass-through is enormous, the 
empirical studies are mainly focused on industrialised countries. A survey 
conducted by Menon (1995) reports on 48 exchange rate pass-through studies 
mostly for the U.S. and Japan. This evidence is supported by Goldberg and 
Knetter (1997) who reported that the study on exchange rate pass-through 
during the 1980’s was dominated by U.S. analysis.   
 
Within OECD countries, exchange rate pass-through into import prices is 
studied by Campa and Goldberg (2005). They find that the exchange rate pass-
through is partial, with import prices reflecting 60 percent of the exchange rate 
movement in the short run and nearly 80 percent in the long run. They also 
  149 
find that a country that has low exchange rate volatility and low inflation has a 
lower exchange rate pass-through effect.  
 
Using data for 71 countries from 1979-2000 and based on new open-economy 
macroeconomic models, Choudhri and Hakura (2006) show that there is a 
strong positive correlation between the pass-through and the average inflation 
rate across countries. When inflation in a country is low, the exchange rate 
pass-through to domestic prices is also low. In contrast, the exchange rate pass-
through will be high if a country experiences high inflation.  
 
Employing a structural open economy model, Alba and Papell (1998) estimate 
the relationship between the exchange rate and inflation for Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Singapore. Within the period from 1979:Q1 to 1995:Q2 they 
find that, while effective exchange rate depreciation significantly affects 
inflation in the Philippines and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, Singapore's has the 
reverse effect. The estimates of the exchange rate pass-through into the 
consumer price index (CPI) in Malaysia, in the Philippines, and in Singapore 
are 0.090, 0.165 and -0.082, respectively. They argue that the initial downward 
pressure on the domestic price of imports caused by the appreciation of the 
Singapore dollar may be offset by the eventual increase in price due to the 
stronger demand for imports. 
 
To support the argument of “fear of floating”, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
estimate exchange rate pass-through into the CPI in a number of developed 
countries and developing countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Using 
Indonesian monthly data from August 1997 to November 1999, they find that 
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the exchange rate pass-through is 0.062; while, for Malaysia, within the period 
December 1992 to August 1998, the exchange rate pass trough is 0.02. The 
above estimated pass-through is statistically significant for the ten percent 
level.  
 
4.2.2   Money-Inflation Relationship 
 
The quantity theory and its equation of exchange provide a proven and useful 
framework to empirically analyze the relevance of money in the economy. The 
money-inflation relationship can be derived from demand for money 
equations. People want to hold money to buy goods and services. If the price of 
goods and services increases, people tend to hold more money. Let M be 
nominal money, P be the price level measured by the CPI or GDP deflator, and 
M/P be the real quantity of money. The most important factor determining the 
demand for money is income. When income increases, people tend to spend 
more. Spending more is associated with holding more money. Therefore, this 
relationship can be written as:  
kY
P
M
= , (4.2) 
where Y is income and k is the factor of proportionality. Equation (4.2) can be 
re-written as:  
 
Y
M
k
P
1
= . (4.3) 
Assuming causality runs from M to P, Equation (4.3) states that the quantity of 
money determines the price level, but money itself is not the only factor. 
Suppose that real income and other factors which are reflected in k are 
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constant, when the quantity of money increases, the price level should increase 
also.  
  
Milton Friedman (1968) argues that “Inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon”. Lucas (1980), Dwyer and Hafer (1988), Friedman 
(1992), Barro (1993), McCandless and Weber (1995), Dewald (1998), Rolnick and 
Weber (1997) and others have found that changes in the nominal quantity of 
money and the price level are closely related. 
 
Dwyer and Hafer (1999) show that the price level has a positive and 
proportional relationship with the nominal quantity of money (quasi money) in 
the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Brazil, and Chile over the twentieth century. They also 
show that, over a shorter period, i.e. 5 years, the money growth–inflation 
relationship across countries holds. For the period 1987–1992, the correlation 
between money growth and inflation is 0.92, while for the period 1992–1997 the 
correlation is 0.84. The evidence indicates that one should not ignore money 
growth when attempting to estimate future inflation.    
 
A recent empirical study on the relationship between money growth (M1 and 
M2) and inflation is conducted by De Grauwe and Polan (2005). They split the 
sample into four groups based on an ad hoc consideration and estimate the 
model for each group. They use panel data for 160 countries over the last 30 
years. They conclude that the money growth-inflation relationship still holds. 
However, after splitting the sample for high inflation countries and low 
inflation countries, they show that for the low inflation countries (below 10%) 
the relationship is weak. A strong relationship is found for high inflation 
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countries. Yet, the above study does not determine the level of money growth 
that gives a different impact on inflation.  
 
The money-inflation relationship can also be explained by P-star model. The 
model links between domestic money and the general level of prices, which 
emphasizes the long-run relationship as a determinant of short-run movements 
in the level of prices and inflation. It was Hallman, Porter and Small (1991) who 
proposed this approach. In their framework, deviations of the actual price level 
from equilibrium push current prices and inflation in the direction of 
equilibrium. 
 
Hallman et al. (1991) hypothesize the following long-run equilibrium 
relationship based on the identity in Equation (4.3): 
*
*
*
Y
V
MP = , (4.4) 
where P* denotes the equilibrium price level to which actual prices converge in 
the long run, Y* is potential real output, and V* is the equilibrium velocity of 
money. Following the quantity theory, they assume that V* and Y* are 
determined independently and both are independent of the money stock. Thus, 
the equilibrium price level moves proportionally with the stock of money.  
 
Let  
*lnln ttt PPpgap −=   (4.5) 
be the equilibrium price gap. Hallman et al. (1991) further hypothesize that 
tpgap  has a theoretical value of zero so that P adjusts to equal P*. This implies 
that the change in the actual price level should be negatively related to the 
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existing gap between P and P*. This relationship is formally indicated by the 
hypothesis that 1α  is negative in the following equation: 
t
T
j
jtjtt PpgapP εβαα +∆++=∆ ∑
=
−
1
10 lnln . (4.6) 
The inflation lags jtP −∆ ln  are added to the equation to account for short-run 
dynamics and tε  is the random error term.  
 
Equation (4.5) can be written as follow: 
)lnln(ln)lnln(ln ** ttttttt YVMYVMpgap −+−−+= , (4.7) 
)ln(ln)ln(ln ** ttttt YYVVpgap −−−= . (4.8) 
 
Hallman et al. (1991) applied the P-star model to the U.S. They use M2 as the 
money stock and assume that the equilibrium velocity is a constant. They 
conclude that the model is supported by the data.  
 
Hoeller and Poret (1991) apply the P-star model to 20 OECD countries. They 
use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract equilibrium time series for output and 
velocity from the data. The evidence is mixed. Most countries are satisfactory 
estimated by the P-star model, especially for large countries. However, small 
countries tend to reject the P-star model.  
 
Kool and Totem (1994) develop a generalized P-star model that accounts for the 
international effect by including cross-country price gaps. They modify P-star 
model for countries that adopt fixed exchange rates, which is their money 
supply are endogenous. They modify the price gap as:    
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)~lnln(lnln tt
f
tt
f
t eePPpgap −+−= , (4.9) 
where ftpgap  price gap between domestic price and foreign price, 
f
tP  is foreign 
price, e  is nominal exchange rate, e~  is equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Monetary authorities in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes do not 
determine their own long-run level of prices. Instead, their long-run 
equilibrium price level is imported from the countries whose currency is the 
basis of the peg.  
 
Kool and Totem (1994) test the above model using annual data from 1960 to 
1992 for five small European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The evidence shows that the open economy, 
fixed exchange rate P-star model is not rejected for the countries considered. 
Foreign country, i.e. German, significantly influences on equilibrium domestic 
price levels during fixed exchange rate periods. This indicates that the long-run 
equilibrium price level toward which domestic prices adjust is determined by 
foreign monetary policy. 
 
4.2.3  Threshold Models 
 
A threshold model is a special case of complex statistical frameworks, such as 
mixture models, switching models, Markov-switching models, and smooth 
transition threshold models (Hansen, 1997). In general, a threshold model can 
be described as follow: 
ttttttjt thIzthIzxy µλδλδβ +>+≤+= )()( 21' , (4.10) 
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where tx  refers to the vector of other explanatory variables in the model, tz  is 
the variable of interest, (.)I  is the indicator function, tth  is the threshold 
variable of interest, and λ  is the estimated breakpoint. Here, the observations 
are divided into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable is 
smaller or larger than the value of λ .         
 
To estimate the model, the threshold value λ  and the slope parameters are 
jointly estimated. Hansen (1997) recommends obtaining the least squares 
estimate of λ  as the value that minimizes the sum of squared errors. To ensure 
a sufficient number of observations in each regime, the model is estimated for 
all values of the threshold variable between the 10th and 90th percentile.  
 
Having found a threshold it is necessary to identify whether it is statistically 
significant. This involves testing the null hypothesis that 21 δδ = . One 
complication is that the threshold λ  is not identified under the null hypothesis, 
implying that classical tests do not have standard distributions and the critical 
values cannot be read off from standard distribution tables. Hansen (1997) 
argues that the asymptotic distribution of the log likelihood test statistic 
depends on the data structure, so that the p-value for the test of a significant 
threshold should be obtained by using the bootstrap procedure. A detailed 
procedure is described in the methodology section of this chapter. 
 
One variant of the threshold model is the threshold auto regressive (TAR) 
model. The TAR model was introduced by Tong (1978), who considered the 
possibility of a mean reverting time series only after hitting a certain threshold. 
Chan (1993) shows that the least square estimates of the threshold are super-
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consistent, while Hansen (1997) develops an alternative approximation to the 
asymptotic distribution of the threshold.  
 
In general, the TAR model can be described as:  
tttttt ZIxZIxy µλθλθ +>+≤=∆ −−−− )()( 11'211'1 ,  (4.11) 
where Tt ,...,1= ; '1101 ),...,,,( ktttt yyycx −−−− ∆∆= ; (.)I is the indicator function, and 
tµ  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error. The threshold 
variable 111 −−−− −= mttt yyZ  is predetermined and strictly stationary, and m is the 
delay order. 1−−−− −=∆ jtjtjt yyy  is the first order difference at lag j. The 
threshold λ  is unknown, and takes values in the interval ],[ 21 λλλ =∧∈  , 
where 1λ  and 2λ  are chosen so that 0)Pr( 11 >=≤− piλtZ  and 
1)Pr( 21 <=>− piλtZ .    
 
Threshold models can be applied in many cases. For example, Galbraith (1996) 
studies the relationship between money and output. He uses money as a proxy 
for credit conditions. Using Canadian data from 1953Q1 to 1994Q4 and U.S. 
data from 1947Q1 to 1994Q4, he finds that money has a more powerful effect 
on output if the growth of money is below the threshold value than above it. 
This result is consistent with the proposition that monetary policy has little or 
no effect when monetary growth is high.  
 
The existence of threshold effects in the relationship between inflation and 
growth is re-examined by Khan and Senhadji (2001). Using 140 countries for 
the period 1960-1998, they find that inflation has a significant negative impact 
on economic growth if inflation is above the threshold level. In contrast, 
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inflation gives a positive impact on growth if inflation is below the threshold 
level. The threshold for industrial countries is found to be 1-3 percent, while for 
developing countries the threshold is 11-12 percent.    
 
Papageorgiou (2002) evaluates the threshold effects of openness on economic 
growth. Openness is defined by the ratio of exports to GDP. The data used are 
cross-country (96 countries) from 1960 to 1993. He employs the data-sorting 
method developed by Hansen (2000) which allows data to endogenously select 
regimes. His results suggest that openness is a threshold variable that can 
cluster middle income countries into low and high income countries. For low 
and high income countries openness may not be crucial.  
 
In African economies, Foster (2006) investigates the relationship between 
exports and growth. He tests whether 43 African countries benefit more from 
exports when they reach a certain level of development or openness. The data 
are five year averages from 1960 to 1999. The threshold regression suggests that 
it is not necessary for a country to reach a certain level of development or to 
have an existing export base for the relationship to hold. It is found that the 
relationship is stronger for countries that experience a higher rate of export 
growth.   
 
In examining the threshold effects in the U.S. budget deficit Arestis, Cipollini 
and Fattouh (2004) employ the TAR model. The null hypothesis of linearity is 
tested against the alternative hypothesis of a specific non-linear process. The 
data set comprises quarterly observations over the period 1947Q2 to 2002Q1. 
By employing a threshold unit root estimation procedure, they find that mean 
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reverting dynamic behaviour for deficits is present only when the change in the 
deficit is above a certain threshold (i.e., -0.313).  
 
Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Esteve (2004) also use the TAR model to evaluate 
the Spanish budget deficit from 1964 to 2001. They test the null hypothesis of 
linearity in the autoregressive model. Following Hansen (1997, 2000), they 
conduct bootstrapping using 5,000 replications in each model to calculate 
asymptotic p-values. Their empirical results show that significant fiscal 
stabilization would occur when the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP is 
increased by more than 1.9% between the previous year and the sixth year 
before.  
 
To test the null hypothesis of linearity, Enders, Falk and Siklos (2007) use the 
TAR model to estimate real U.S. GDP growth from 1947Q1 to 2006Q1. They 
find that the threshold value for GDP growth is very low, i.e. -0.00167. A Monte 
Carlo experiment is performed to construct confidence intervals. It is found, 
however, that the confidence intervals are wide enough.  
 
Using asymmetric (threshold) error correction models (ECM) Cook (2003) 
analyzes the relationship between sales and production. He employs monthly 
data for 27 different industries and industrial aggregates in the U.S. for the 
period 1967:1 to 1987:4. With a Monte Carlo experimentation to generate p-
values, he shows a rejection of symmetry.    
 
Abdulai (2002) also uses an asymmetric ECM to examine the short-run 
relationship between producer and retail pork prices in Switzerland from 1988 
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to 1997. For long-run equilibrium he employs a threshold cointegrating test that 
allows for asymmetric adjustment. Both the threshold autoregressive (TAR) 
and momentum-threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models provide strong and 
clear evidence supporting asymmetric pricing behaviour. It is found that price 
transmission between the producer and retail level is asymmetric, in the sense 
that an increase in producer prices is passed on more quickly to retail prices 
than a decrease in producer prices.   
 
4.3  Methodology 
 
In this section we follow Hansen (1997, 2000) to search for multiple regimes in 
the data by using exchange rate depreciation and money growth as a possible 
threshold variable. The advantage of Hansen’s methodology is that it is based 
on an asymptotic distribution.  This method can test the statistical significance 
of regimes selected by data.  
 
Rather than looking at the long term relationship we are considering the impact 
of exchange rate depreciation on short term inflation. To test for the existence 
of a threshold effect of exchange rate depreciation on inflation, the following 
model is estimated: 
)]()[()]())[(1( *2
*
11211 ererIerdererIerdgapc ttttttt
e
ttt ≤+>−++++= +− γγβpiαpiαpi  
   tt fitrifuelcrisism εδδδθ +++++ 321 , (4.12) 
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t
, tpi  is the inflation rate, 1−tpi  is backward-looking 
inflation expectations, et 1+pi  is forward-looking inflation expectations, tgap  is the 
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output gap, ter  is exchange rate depreciation
12, *er  is a threshold value of 
exchange rate depreciation, tm  is money growth (M1), crisis  is a financial 
dummy variable for the financial crisis in 1997-1998, fuel  is a dummy variable 
for the domestic fuel increase in January 2005 and October 2005, and fitri is a 
dummy variable for ‘idul fitri’ day.  
 
The above model specification is the same as the model in the previous chapter, 
except for the indicator function for the threshold value. Instrumental variables 
(IV) estimators are used to estimate the model. The main reason we use two 
stage least squares (TSLS) is that it can account for potential endogeneity 
problems since the model contains future values of inflation.  
 
Estimation Method 
 
If the threshold were known, the model could be estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Since *ter  is unknown, it has to be estimated along with the 
other regression parameters. The appropriate estimation method in this case is 
non-linear least squares (NLLS). Furthermore, since *ter  enters the regression in 
a non-linear and non-differentiable manner, conventional gradient search 
techniques to implement NLLS are inappropriate. Instead, estimation has been 
carried out with a method called conditional least squares, which can be 
described as follows.  
 
                                                 
12 Note that the exchange rate is defined as domestic currency unit per foreign currency unit. In 
this case we use Rp/USD. Therefore, negative er means depreciation, while positive er means 
appreciation.   
  161 
For any *ter , the model is estimated by TSLS, yielding the sum of squared 
residuals as a function of *ter . As stated above, we employ TSLS since we want 
to estimate the coefficient of forward-looking inflation expectations in the 
model as in the previous chapter.  The least squares estimate of *ter  is found by 
selecting the value of *ter  which minimizes the sum of squared residuals. 
Stacking the observations in vectors yields the following compact notation for 
Equation (4.12): 
 εβ += erxy  , ererer ,...,=  ,                (4.13) 
where )'( 3212121 δδδθγγβααβ cer =  is the vector of parameters, y is 
the dependent variable, and x is the corresponding matrix of observations for 
the explanatory variables. Note that the coefficient vector β  is indexed by er  to 
show its dependence on the threshold level of inflation, the range of which is 
given by er  and er . Define )(1 erS  as the residual sum of squares with the 
threshold level of exchange rate fixed at er . The threshold estimated level *er  
is chosen so as to minimize )(1 erS , that is: 
 ],...,),(min[arg* 1 ererererSer == .       (4.14) 
 
Inference 
 
It is important to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically 
significant or not. In Equation (4.6), to test for no threshold effect amounts 
simply to testing the null hypothesis 210 : γγ =H . Under the null hypothesis, the 
threshold *er  is not identified, so classical tests, such as the t-test, have non-
standard distributions. Hansen (1997, 2000) suggests a bootstrap method to 
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simulate the asymptotic distribution of the following likelihood ratio test of 
0H : 
 
1
10
0
)(
S
SS
nLR
−
= ,  (4.15) 
where 0S  and 1S  are the residual sum of squares under 210 : γγ =H  and 
211 : γγ ≠H , respectively. In other words, 0S  and 1S  are the residual sum of 
squares for Equation (4.6) without and with threshold effects, respectively. The 
asymptotic distribution of 0LR  is non-standard and strictly dominates the 
2χ  
distribution. The distribution of 0LR  depends in general on the moments of the 
sample; thus, critical values cannot be tabulated.  
 
Since γ  is not identified, the asymptotic distribution of 0LR   is not 2χ . Hansen 
(1997) shows that it can be approximated by the following bootstrap procedure:  
1. Let ntt ,...,1,
*
=µ  be random number drawing from normal distribution 
with zero mean and unit variance, i.e. N(0,1). 
2. Set ** tty µ= .   
3. Using observation ntxt ,...,1, = , regress 
*
ty  on tx  and obtain the 
residual variance 2*~nσ  from linear model, where ∑
=
−=
n
t
ttn xy
n 1
2*2* )
~
(
1~ βσ .   
4. Using observation ntxt ,...,1, = , regress 
*
ty  on )(γtx  and obtain the 
residual variance )(ˆ 2* γσ n  from threshold model, where 
∑
=
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n
t
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6. Repeat step 4 to 5 for other values of γ .  
7. Find )(sup ** γ
γ
nn FF
Γ∈
= . 
8. Repeat step 1 to 7 many times.  
 
Hansen (1997) also shows that repeated draws from *nF  may be used to 
approximate the asymptotic null distribution of nF . The p-value of the test is 
formed by counting the percentage of the bootstrap sample for which *nF  
exceeds the observed 0LR  (see Equation (4.15)).          
 
Confidence Intervals  
 
Following Hansen (2000) we form a confidence region for er*. Confidence 
intervals for the threshold parameter itself are constructed by inversion of the 
asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic. In this case, we test the 
null hypothesis ererH =*:0  by computing the following likelihood test: 
 
*)(
*)()(
)(
1
11
erS
erSerS
nerLR
−
= ,  (4.16) 
where )(1 erS  and *)(1 erS  are the residual sum of squares from Equation (4.6) 
with threshold er and er*. Let  )(βξc  be the β-level critical value for ξ  from 
Table 1 of Hansen (2000). Set  
 )]()(:[ˆ βξcerLRer ≤=Γ .  (4.17) 
 
Hansen (2000) shows that Γˆ  is an asymptotically valid β-level confidence set 
for er. To find the confidence interval, we plot the likelihood ratio LR(er) against 
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the threshold value (er), draw a flat line at )(βξc , and mark off the values of the 
threshold with likelihood ratios that fall below the critical value. Note that 
LR(er) equals zero when er = er*.   
 
To test for the existence of a threshold effect of money growth on inflation, we 
use the same model, but we replace the exchange rate depreciation with money 
growth. The following model is estimated: 
)]())[(1( *11211 mmImdergapc ttttt
e
ttt >−+++++= +− θγβpiαpiαpi
tttt fitrifuelcrisismmImd εδδδθ ++++≤+ 321*2 )]()[(  (4.18) 
where 
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  .  
The estimation procedure and the inference for money growth thresholds are 
the same as the above procedure (when evaluating the exchange rate 
depreciation threshold).  
 
4.4  Data 
 
In this chapter, we use the same data as those in Chapter 3, i.e. CPI, output gap, 
exchange rate, and monetary aggregate. The data are mainly collected from 
Bank Indonesia (BI) and the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). For 
the analysis, we use monthly data from 1980 to 2008 (see Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1: Data 
No Data Frequency Period Source 
1 CPI 
inflation 
Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Central Bureau of Statistic 
and Bank Indonesia  
2 Output gap Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Author, calculated from 
Chapter 3 
3 Exchange 
rate  
Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Bank Indonesia 
4 M1 Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Bank Indonesia 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of data (year-on-year)  
Data
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
CPI Inflation 9.01 3.37 57.59 23.28 10.52 9.52
Exchange Rate Depreciation -6.63 10.67 -67.97 13.04 1.32 18.91
M1 Growth 19.53 11.52 29.17 9.02 17.70 6.39
Output Gap - HPA 0.19 3.39 -11.76 1.97 -2.31 3.25
Output Gap - Peak-to-Peak -2.50 1.54 -13.13 2.03 -5.20 3.29
1980 - 1997 1998 1999 - 2008
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the development of the CPI from January 1980 to December 
2008. We can see clearly from the graph (Figure 4.1) that there are two 
structural breaks in the series. One is the financial crisis in 1998 and another 
one is the domestic fuel price hike in October 2005. During the crisis, inflation 
went up to 57.6% on average, with the peak of inflation as high as 82.6% (year-
on-year) in September 1998. After the crisis, the inflation rate is 10.5% on 
average which is higher than that before the crisis (i.e. 9% on average).    
 
Figure 4.2 shows the development of the nominal exchange rate (USD/Rp) from 
January 1980 to December 2008. Before August 1997, Indonesia adopted a 
managed floating regime. During that period, the exchange rate was quite 
stable with the rate of depreciation being about 6% a year on average. When  
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Figure 4.1: Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
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Figure 4.2: Nominal exchange rate (USD/Rp) 
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the financial crisis hit the Indonesian economy, the exchange rate depreciated 
so severely so that USD1 was equal to Rp14,900 in June 1998 falling from 
Rp2.600/USD in July 1996. After the crisis, exchange rates move unpredictably 
coupled with high volatility.  
 
The development of M1 can be seen in Figure 4.3. The financial crisis in 1998 
has caused M1 to grow faster (29.2% p.a.) than before (19.5% p.a.) due to Bank 
Indonesia’s liquidity aid program (BLBI) for the ailing commercial banks. 
However, after the crisis, the growth of M1 decreased to 17.7% p.a. on average. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the output gap from 1980 to 2008. As we can see from the 
figure, the movement of the output gap calculated from the adjusted HP filter 
resembles that derived from the peak-to-peak method. However, they differ in 
magnitude. The output gap from the peak-to-peak method is more negative 
than that from the adjusted HP filter and its value never exceeds zero, by 
design. During the crisis, the output gap dropped to its lowest level since 
capacity utilization was very low due to shrinking demand and high costs.  
 
Comparing the output gap before the crisis and after the crisis, we can see that, 
on average, the output gap in the period after the crisis is smaller than the 
output gap before the crisis. However, in 2008 the output gap based on the 
peak-to-peak method approaches zero and the output gap based on the 
adjusted HP filter is positive. In recent years, both output gaps show an 
upward-sloping movement meaning that real output has caught up with 
potential output.    
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Figure 4.3: Broad money - M1 
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Figure 4.4: Output gap 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1  Exchange Rate Depreciation Threshold 
 
Table 4.3 shows the results of TSLS estimation of Equation (4.6) without a 
threshold effect (we set 21 γγ = ). From the table, we can see that all parameters 
are significant, except the constant term. Using the adjusted HP filter to 
calculate the output gap series, we find that the coefficient of exchange rate 
depreciation (year-on-year growth) is -0.050 and the coefficient of M1 growth is 
0.021. This result tells us that, on average, exchange rate depreciation has a 
larger impact than money growth on CPI inflation. This result is the same as in 
the previous chapter.       
 
To estimate the exchange rate depreciation threshold, we employ Equation 
(4.6). We search over the threshold from -30% to 0% with an increment of 
0.06%. It means that there are as many as 500 alternatives for the exchange rate 
 
Table 4.3: Phillips curve without threshold  
Coef Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.148 0.141 -1.051 0.294
Inflation(-1) 0.710 0.042 17.078 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.225 0.058 3.911 0.000
Output Gap(-9) 0.062 0.023 2.703 0.007
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.050 0.009 -5.223 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) 0.024 0.007 3.261 0.001
Dummy  Crisis 1.293 0.539 2.400 0.017
Dummy  Fuel 2.940 0.676 4.349 0.000
Dummy  Fitri 0.548 0.213 2.567 0.011
Adjusted R-squared 0.991
S.E. of regression 1.093
SSR 393.024  
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depreciation threshold values being evaluated. We find that the minimum 
value of SSR is 408.25 at 8.4% exchange rate depreciation. It means that the 
threshold for exchange rate depreciation is found at 8.4%. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the estimation of the model using the adjusted HP filter as 
the output gap. We can see from the table that the coefficient of exchange rate 
depreciation is -0.056 ( 1γ ) when it is below or equal to -8.4% and the coefficient 
of exchange rate depreciation is -0.045 ( 2γ ) when it is above -8.4%. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  
 
These coefficients tell us that, on the one hand, when the exchange rate 
depreciates by more than or equal to 8.4%, then the impact on inflation is 
0.056% for a 1% exchange rate depreciation. On the other hand, when the 
exchange rate depreciates by less than 8.4%, then the impact on inflation is 
 
Table 4.4: Phillips curve with exchange rate depreciation threshold 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.169 0.144 -1.179 0.239
Inflation(-1) 0.719 0.045 16.071 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.211 0.062 3.382 0.001
Output Gap(-9) 0.064 0.024 2.703 0.007
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) < =  -8.4% -0.056 0.012 -4.652 0.000
-8.4% >  Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.045 0.010 -4.567 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) 0.026 0.008 3.294 0.001
Dummy  Crisis 1.154 0.547 2.109 0.036
Dummy  Fuel 2.973 0.693 4.293 0.000
Dummy  Fitri 0.548 0.218 2.516 0.012
Adjusted R-squared 0.991
S.E. of regression 1.116
SSR 408.247  
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milder, i.e. 0.045% for a 1% exchange rate depreciation. Even though both 
values are significant, their value is not much different. Moreover, comparing 
this result with the estimation without the threshold effect, both coefficients on 
the threshold model, i.e. -0.056 and -0.045, do not differ much from that of the 
linear model, i.e. -0.050.    
 
The horizontal line in Figure 4.5 depicts the 90 percent confidence interval. The 
area below the horizontal forms the no-rejection region. The statistic LR(γ) takes 
a zero value at the optimal threshold. As we can see from the figure the 
confidence interval for the exchange rate threshold is too wide. The area below 
the dotted line which is LR(γ) = 5.9413 is found to be from -23.52% to -2.64%.  
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Figure 4.5: )(erLR  values and 90% confidence interval for exchange rate 
depreciation threshold 
                                                 
13 Note that this is the critical value for a 90% confidence interval from Table 1 of Hansen (2000).   
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This means that the estimated threshold value for exchange rate depreciation is 
imprecise. 
 
Is the -8.4% threshold value significantly different from the model without a 
threshold? To answer this question, we construct bootstrap estimates within 
1,000 iterations.  
 
We follow the procedure suggested by Hansen (1997) to generate critical 
values. We find that most of supF  are above the maximum of 0F , that is -12.12, 
so that the p-value is 0.957. It means that we accept the null hypothesis of 
21 γγ =  and we conclude that there is no significant difference between the 
impact of inflation over the threshold value and that under the threshold value. 
Therefore, the impact of exchange rate depreciation on inflation is linear, i.e. 
0.05% for every 1% exchange rate depreciation. Moreover, in terms of fitness of 
the model, we find that the model with the exchange rate threshold is not 
superior to the model without the threshold since the SSR of the threshold 
model is bigger than that of the linear model. 
  
For the purpose of comparability, we do a robustness check. We employ 
various models using different measures of the output gap, i.e. the peak-to-
peak methodology and using another type of inflation-output relationship, i.e. 
the L-shaped function. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Indonesian 
Phillips curve is best described by the non-linear model, i.e. L-shape function. 
The output gap function when using the adjusted HP filter is 





− t
t
gap
gap
5.8
*5.8
. The 
difference in each model can be seen on Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5: Alternative models for exchange rate depreciation threshold  
Model 
Output Gap 
Measurement 
Output Gap 
Function 
ER Dep. 
Threshold 
1 Peak-to-Peak Linear No 
2 Peak-to-Peak Linear Yes 
3 Adjusted HP Filter Non-Linear No 
4 Adjusted HP Filter Non-Linear Yes 
 
Table 4.6: Robustness check for Phillips curve with the exchange rate depreciation 
threshold  
Variable
Constant 0.007 0.011 -0.325 *** -0.358 ***
(0.186) (0.192) (0.122) (0.127)
Inflation(-1) 0.714 *** 0.730 *** 0.694 *** 0.705 ***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.037) (0.041)
Inflation(1) 0.223 *** 0.199 *** 0.249 *** 0.233 ***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.051) (0.056)
Output Gap Linear(-9) 0.071 ** 0.081 **
(0.03) (0.032)
Output Gap Non-Linear(-9) 0.0003 ** 0.0004 **
(0.00016) (0.00017)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.048 *** -0.047 ***
(0.009) (0.009)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) < =  Threshold -0.057 *** -0.054 ***
(0.013) (0.011)
Threshold <  Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.041 *** -0.041 ***
(0.009) (0.009)
M1 Growth(-2) 0.027 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 0.031 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Dummy  Crisis 1.228 ** 1.154 ** 0.652 0.462
(0.536) (0.547) (0.405) (0.422)
Dummy  Fuel 2.944 *** 2.973 *** 2.772 *** 2.805 ***
(0.683) (0.693) (0.648) (0.665)
Dummy  Fitri 0.551 ** 0.548 ** 0.554 *** 0.554 ***
(0.215) (0.218) (0.208) (0.213)
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.991
S.E. of regression 1.103 1.116 1.066 1.091
SSR 400.161 408.247 373.986 390.569
Threshold ER -8.40 -8.40
p-value 0.999 0.966
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
 
Note:  
• Number in the bracket is standard error. 
• ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.6 shows the results of estimation with and without the exchange rate 
depreciation threshold using both the adjusted HP filter and peak-to-peak 
methods for calculating the output gap and using both a linear output gap and 
a non-linear output gap. From the table we can see that the coefficient of 
exchange rate depreciation when below and equal to the threshold value ( 1γ ) 
and the coefficient of exchange rate depreciation when above the threshold 
value ( 2γ ) in models 2 and 4 are all negative and significant. We find that the 
threshold value for exchange rate depreciation is the same as before, i.e. -8.4%. 
The coefficient of 1γ  is in a range -0.054 to -0.057, whereas the coefficient of 2γ  
is -0.041.   
 
After bootstrapping 1,000 critical values, models 2 and 4 draw the same 
conclusions as the main model, i.e. a model with output gap derived from the 
adjusted HP filter, a linear function in output gap, and an exchange rate 
depreciation threshold. Overall, none of the bootstrap test statistics for these 
variables is statistically significant at any round of the selection process. The p-
values are found to be 0.999 and 0.966. This means that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of 21 γγ =  so that we can conclude that there is no significant 
difference between the impact of inflation over the threshold value and that 
under the threshold value. Moreover, comparing models 1 and 2, as well as 
models 3 and 4, we can see that the models with a threshold effect are no better 
than the model without a threshold effect since the SSR of threshold models are 
larger than that of the no-threshold models.   
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Figure 4.6: The impact of exchange rate depreciation on inflation: an illustration  
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the impact of exchange rate depreciation on inflation. As 
we can see from the figure, the slope of the line is the same for any value of 
exchange rate depreciation.  
 
4.5.2  Money Growth Threshold 
 
To estimate the threshold value for money growth, we employ Equation 4.12 
using the adjusted HP filter as the output gap. The grid search for the threshold 
value is exercised from 0% to 40%, with an increment of 0.08. It means that 
there are as many as 500 alternative threshold values. We find that the 
threshold for money growth is 9.84% which gives the minimum of SSR.  
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Table 4.7 shows the result of the threshold estimation using the adjusted HP 
filter as the output gap. Since the results on the core variables appear to be 
fairly robust to the threshold analysis we can turn immediately to the threshold 
results. As we can see from the table, the coefficient of money growth when it is 
below or equal to 9.84% ( 1θ ) is 0.099 and the coefficient of money growth when 
it is above 9.84% ( 2θ ) is 0.032. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  
 
This result implies that the impact of a 1% M1 growth on inflation is 0.099% 
when M1 grows below 9.84%. For example, if M1 grows at 5% in this month, 
then it causes CPI inflation to rise by about 0.50% in the next two months. On 
the other hand, the impact of a 1% M1 growth on inflation is 0.032% when M1 
grows above 9.84%. For example, if M1 grows 10% this month, the impact on 
inflation will be 0.98% in the next two months. 
 
Having established the existence of a threshold, the next important question is 
how precise is this estimate? This requires the computation of the confidence 
 
Table 4.7: Phillips curve with money growth threshold: first point  
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.361 0.150 -2.405 0.017
Inflation(-1) 0.695 0.039 17.947 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.241 0.054 4.468 0.000
Output Gap(-9) 0.053 0.022 2.455 0.015
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.047 0.009 -5.257 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) <= 9.84% 0.099 0.030 3.341 0.001
9.84% < M1 Growth(-2) 0.032 0.008 3.877 0.000
Dummy Crisis 1.229 0.516 2.384 0.018
Dummy Fuel 2.983 0.656 4.549 0.000
Dummy Fitri 0.583 0.207 2.821 0.005
Adjusted R-squared 0.992
S.E. of regression 1.057
SSR 366.404  
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Figure 4.7: )1(MLR  values and 90% confidence interval for money growth 
threshold: first point 
 
region around the threshold estimate. Figure 4.7 illustrates the likelihood ratio 
value versus the threshold value and the 90% confidence intervals. As 
mentioned above, the confidence region is simply the set of values of M1 
growth for which LR(M1) lies below the horizontal line. From the figure we can 
see that the confidence interval for money growth threshold is narrow, i.e. 
7.12% - 10%. This means that the estimated threshold is precise. 
 
However, it is of interest to examine whether this threshold value exists or not. 
Following Hansen (1997), we use the bootstrap (with 1,000 bootstrap samples) 
to estimate the percentiles of the asymptotic null distribution of *nF . The 
resulting p-value is 0.001. Therefore, we reject the null of linearity against the 
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alternative of a two-regime model. We conclude that the threshold for M1 
growth exists and the difference of the impact is significant.  
 
Moreover, comparing Table 4.7 (model with money threshold) and Table 4.3 
(model without money growth threshold), we can see that the SSR of the 
threshold model is smaller than that of the no-threshold model. It means that 
the threshold model is preferable to the no-threshold model.   
 
Having found the first threshold for M1 growth, i.e. 9.84%, it is of importance 
to analyse whether there is another threshold. We could find three regimes at 
the same time, however, this can be quite expensive in terms of computation 
time. Chong (1994) and Bai (1997) have shown that sequential estimation is 
consistent, thus avoiding this computation problem. This involves fixing the 
first threshold at 9.84% and searching for a second threshold assuming that the 
first threshold is fixed. 
 
We start considering the threshold values from 9.84% to 40%. Here, we have 
400 candidates of threshold value to evaluate as we search within the range 
with an increment of 0.075. We find that SSR is minimised at 17.13%. It means 
that 17.13% is the candidate for the second threshold for money growth.    
 
By splitting the sample into three regions, we report the TSLS estimation in 
Table 4.8. Since other variables, such as backward-looking inflation 
expectations, forward-looking inflation expectations, output gap, exchange rate 
depreciation, and dummy variables do not change much, our attention is on 
the coefficients of M1 growth. From the table we can see that when M1 grows  
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Table 4.8: Phillips curve with money growth threshold: second-upper point   
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.571 0.190 -3.000 0.003
Inflation(-1) 0.689 0.037 18.537 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.248 0.052 4.751 0.000
Output Gap(-9) 0.052 0.021 2.447 0.015
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.045 0.009 -5.302 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) < =  9.84% 0.127 0.035 3.502 0.001
9.84% <  M1 Growth(-2) < =  17.13% 0.057 0.018 3.079 0.002
17.13% <  M1 Growth(-2) 0.038 0.009 3.977 0.000
Dummy  Crisis 1.219 0.508 2.400 0.017
Dummy  Fuel 2.835 0.643 4.406 0.000
Dummy  Fitri 0.543 0.206 2.639 0.009
Adjusted R-squared 0.992
S.E. of regression 1.047
SSR 358.479  
 
by below 9.84% the impact on inflation is 0.127% per 1% M1 growth; when M1 
grows by between 9.84% and 17.13% the impact on inflation is 0.057% per 1% 
M1 growth; and when M1 grows above 17.13% the impact on inflation is 
reduced to 0.038% per 1% M1 growth. The M1 growth coefficients are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 4.8 plots the LR(M1) value versus threshold values for money growth 
from 9.92% to 40%. From the figure we can see that the minimum value of 
LR(M1) is at 17.13%. However, the 90% confidence intervals are too wide, that 
is from 9.92% to 27.51%. This figure tells us that the estimated second threshold 
value is imprecise.  
 
Are 0.057 (the coefficient of M1 growth when it grows between 9.84% and 
17.13%) and 0.038 (the coefficient of M1 growth when it grows above 17.13%) 
significantly different? We also test the null of a two-regime threshold model 
against the three- regime alternative. The p-values for the threshold are  
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Figure 4.8: )1(MLR  values and 90% confidence interval for money growth 
threshold: second-upper point 
 
obtained by 1,000 bootstrap replications. We find that the p-value for the three-
regime threshold model is marginally insignificant at 0.177, which is slightly 
greater than the 10% level. Therefore, we do not reject the null of a two-regime 
threshold model. It implies that there is no other threshold value above 9.84% 
or, in other words, we can say that the relationship between inflation and M1 
growth above 9.84% is linear. 
 
The next investigation is to find another threshold value for M1 growth 
between 0% and 9.84%. We search over the range with an increment of 0.028% 
so that we have 350 candidates for the third threshold value. The minimum 
SSR is found at 7.08%.  
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We report the TSLS estimation for two thresholds, i.e. 9.84% and 7.08%, in 
Table 4.9.  From the table we can see that the coefficient of M1 growth when it 
grows by less than or equal to 7.08% is 0.146; when it grows by between 7.08% 
and 9.84% the coefficient is 0.088; and when it grows by more than 9.84% the 
coefficient is 0.033. All coefficients are statistically significant. This tells us that 
the higher M1 growth, the less the impact on inflation is. 
 
From Figure 4.9 we can see that the likelihood ratio is minimized at 7.08% of 
threshold value. Interestingly, from the figure we can see that the 90% 
confidence interval is quite narrow, i.e. 6.94% to 8.04%. It indicates that 7.08% 
can potentially be a precise threshold value for M1.     
 
To formally test for the existence of this threshold value, we employ the same 
procedure as before. An interesting question is whether 0.146 (the coefficient of 
M1 growth when it grows below 7.08%) is significantly different from 0.088 
(the coefficient of M1 growth when it grows between 7.08% to 9.84%). Since the 
 
Table 4.9: Phillips curve with money growth threshold: second-lower point  
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.404 0.151 -2.671 0.008
Inflation(-1) 0.687 0.038 18.160 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.252 0.053 4.772 0.000
Output Gap(-9) 0.049 0.021 2.318 0.021
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.045 0.009 -5.152 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) <= 7.08% 0.146 0.049 2.997 0.003
7.08% < M1 Growth(-2) <= 9.84% 0.088 0.030 2.922 0.004
9.84% < M1 Growth(-2) 0.033 0.008 4.003 0.000
Dummy Crisis 1.151 0.506 2.276 0.024
Dummy Fuel 2.954 0.645 4.580 0.000
Dummy Fitri 0.602 0.204 2.951 0.003
Adjusted R-squared 0.992
S.E. of regression 1.041
SSR 354.107  
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Figure 4.9: )1(MLR  values and 90% confidence interval for money growth 
threshold: second-lower point 
 
distribution of LR is non-standard, so that critical values cannot be tabulated, 
we bootstrap 1,000 critical values and calculate the p-value.  We find that the p-
value is 0.004; this means that we reject the null hypothesis of two regimes. On 
the basis of these tests, we conclude that the three-regime threshold model is 
the appropriate choice within the class of threshold models for M1 growth. 
Here we find evidence of a significant second threshold, that is 7.08%.  
 
Again, we continue searching for another threshold value. The optimising grid 
search procedure is performed over a smaller number of values. We search 
over the possibility of threshold value between 0% and 7.08% with an 
increment of  0.028%. Thus, there are 250 candidates for threshold value. We 
find that the minimum SSR is at 4.93%.      
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Table 4.10: Phillips curve with money growth threshold: third point  
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.387 0.152 -2.549 0.011
Inflation(-1) 0.684 0.037 18.475 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.256 0.052 4.972 0.000
Output Gap(-9) 0.049 0.021 2.317 0.021
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.045 0.009 -5.186 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) <= 4.93% 0.085 0.077 1.097 0.273
4.93% < M1 Growth(-2) <= 7.08% 0.169 0.055 3.094 0.002
7.08% < M1 Growth(-2) <= 9.84% 0.085 0.030 2.848 0.005
9.84% < M1 Growth(-2) 0.031 0.008 3.900 0.000
Dummy Crisis 1.116 0.498 2.242 0.026
Dummy Fuel 2.926 0.639 4.576 0.000
Dummy Fitri 0.600 0.203 2.963 0.003
Adjusted R-squared 0.992
S.E. of regression 1.034
SSR 348.456  
 
Table 4.10 reports the results of TSLS estimation with three threshold values 
(four regimes). From the table we can see that the coefficient of M1 growth 
when it grows by less than or equal to 4.93% is 0.085; the coefficient of M1 
growth when it grows by between 4.93% and 7.08% is 0.169; the coefficient of 
M1 growth when it grows by between 7.08% and 9.84% is 0.085; and the 
coefficient of M1 growth when it grows by above 9.84% is 0.031. All coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level, except the first coefficient of M1 growth with p-
value equal to 0.273.  
 
Is this threshold value significant? The 90% critical values for LR(M1) are 
drawn as horizontal dashed lines in Figure 4.10. Visually, from the figure we 
can see that the 90% confidence interval is wide enough, that is from 3.34% to 
7.08%. This can be easily seen in the figure that all values below the dotted line 
are within 3.34% – 7.08%. Therefore, the estimated threshold value is imprecise. 
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Figure 4.10: )1(MLR  values and 90% confidence interval for money growth 
threshold: third point 
 
As pointed out earlier, the asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic on the 
threshold variable is non-standard and requires bootstrap methods to compute 
its significance level. To formally test for the existence of this threshold value, 
we bootstrap 1,000 critical values. The bootstrapped p-value is found to be 
0.191. This means that we accept the null hypothesis that there is a linearity 
from 0% to 7.12% of M1 growth. Therefore, the 4.93% threshold value does not 
exist. As the fourth threshold is not significant, no further splitting is possible 
with the existing threshold variables. 
 
As a robustness check, again, we use several models using different output gap 
measurements, i.e. the peak-to-peak method and using different output-
inflation relationship, i.e. the L-shape function. Table 4.11 summarizes the 
differences. 
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Table 4.11: Alternative models for money growth threshold 
Model 
Output Gap 
Measurement 
Output Gap 
Function 
M1 
Thresholds 
5 Peak-to-Peak Linear No 
6 Peak-to-Peak Linear Yes 
7 Adjusted HP Filter Non-Linear No 
8 Adjusted HP Filter Non-Linear Yes 
 
As seen in Table 4.12 our empirical results reveal the following important 
findings. First, all coefficients, except the constant term and the dummy for the 
crisis in some models, are significant. Second, the estimates of threshold levels 
are identical. In fact, the threshold values remain the same for models 6 and 8, 
i.e. 9.84% and 7.08%. Third, threshold estimates are somewhat different but 
very close. The coefficient of M1 growth when it grows by less or equal to 
7.08% is within the range 0.156 to 0.160; the coefficient of M1 growth when it 
grows by between 7.08% and 9.84% is within the range 0.094 to 0.096; and the 
coefficient of M1 growth when it grows by above 9.84% is within the range 
0.035 to 0.037. 
 
To test whether 1θ  is different from 2θ , we bootstrap the critical values 1,000 
times for models 6 and 8. As all p-values are less than 1%, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of 21 θθ = . Therefore, we conclude that the coefficients of 1θ  and 2θ  
are significantly different. Besides that, comparing the SSR of the threshold 
models (model 6 and 8) and the SSR of the no-threshold models (model 5 and 
7), we find that the threshold models are better than the no-threshold models. 
 
In summary, our results provide strong evidence that the money growth-
inflation relationship is described by a three-regime split of the sample based 
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Table 4.12: Robustness check for money growth thresholds  
Variable
Constant 0.062 -0.284 -0.279 ** -0.559 ***
(0.187) (0.183) (0.12) (0.137)
Inflation(-1) 0.714 *** 0.689 *** 0.694 *** 0.672 ***
(0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.034)
Inflation(1) 0.223 *** 0.250 *** 0.251 *** 0.273 ***
(0.059) (0.053) (0.051) (0.047)
Output Gap Linear(-9) 0.074 ** 0.060 **
(0.03) (0.028)
Output Gap Non-Linear(-9) 0.000334 ** 0.00033 **
(0.000161) (0.000153)
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.048 *** -0.043 *** -0.047 *** -0.042 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
M1 Growth(-2) 0.024 *** 0.026 ***
(0.007) (0.007)
M1 Growth(-2) < =  2nd Threshold 0.156 *** 0.160 ***
(0.049) (0.048)
2nd Threshold <  M1 Growth(-2) < =  1st Threshold 0.096 *** 0.094 ***
(0.031) (0.03)
1st Threshold <  M1 Growth(-2) 0.035 *** 0.037 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Dummy  Crisis 1.235 ** 1.122 ** 0.644 0.633
(0.539) (0.503) (0.406) (0.386)
Dummy  Fuel 2.929 *** 2.968 *** 2.752 *** 2.819 ***
(0.685) (0.65) (0.649) (0.619)
Dummy  Fitri 0.550 ** 0.608 *** 0.553 *** 0.611 ***
(0.216) (0.205) (0.209) (0.199)
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.992
S.E. of regression 1.107 1.045 1.070 1.014
SSR 403.146 357.419 376.347 336.461
1st Threshold 9.84 9.84
2nd Threshold 7.08 7.08
p-value 0.005 0.005
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
 
Note:  
• Number in the bracket is standard error. 
• ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 4.11: The impact of money growth on inflation: an illustration   
 
 
on money growth. Figure 4.11 illustrates the impact of money growth on 
inflation. As we can see from the figure, the slope of the line when M1 grows 
by up to 7.1% is steeper than the slope of the line when M1 grows from 7.1% to 
9.8%. Also, the slope of the line when M1 grows from 7.1% to 9.8% is steeper 
than the slope of the line when M1 grows by more than 9.8%. 
 
 
4.6.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter contributes the existing literature by searching for threshold 
effects using techniques recently developed by Hansen (1997, 2000). It has the 
advantage over many previous threshold studies in that it allows the data to 
determine the position of the threshold rather than imposing the break 
arbitrarily. Moreover, it allows the data to determine the number of thresholds, 
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which has usually been imposed as being one. If one threshold is imposed on 
the data when there are in fact more, then the resulting coefficient estimates 
could under/over estimate. 
 
This chapter throws light on the threshold effects of exchange rate depreciation 
and money growth on inflation in Indonesia. Using monthly data from 1980:01 
to 2008:12 the models provide strong and clear evidence that there are indeed 
threshold effects of money growth on inflation, but no threshold effect of 
exchange rate depreciation on inflation.  
 
All experiments are performed over 1,000 replications. Using two different 
measurements of the output gap, i.e. the adjusted HP filter and the peak-to-
peak method, and using two types of inflation-output relationship, i.e. a linear 
and L-shape function, our conclusions are the same. The threshold for 
exchange rate depreciation is found at 8.4%. However, the coefficients of the 
exchange rate when the depreciation is under the threshold value ( 1γ ) and 
when it is above the threshold value ( 2γ ) do not differ much. The F-test 
suggests that there is no significant difference between 1γ  and 2γ . Therefore, 
the impact of exchange rate depreciation on inflation is linear for all values of 
exchange rate depreciation (i.e. 0.05).     
  
For money growth, we find evidence that there are two estimated values of 
threshold, i.e. 7.1% and 9.8%. The F-tests suggest that the values are 
significantly different. These results demonstrate that the impact of money 
growth on inflation is not linear. The largest impact is when money grows by 
between 0% and 7.1% (i.e. 0.15), the moderate impact is when it grows by 
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between by 7.1% and 9.8% (i.e. 0.09), and the least impact is when it grows by 
more than 9.8% (i.e. 0.03). The higher the rate of M1 growth, the less the impact 
on inflation is.  
 
In a more general sense, our finding is in agreement with Galbraith (1996) who 
studies the relationship between money and output. He finds that money has a 
more powerful effect on output if the growth of money is below the threshold 
value than above it. Our results and his results are consistent with the 
proposition that monetary policy has little or no effect when monetary growth 
is high. 
 
Our results suggest that the impact of money growth on inflation when it 
grows by less than 9.8% is larger than the impact of exchange rate depreciation 
on inflation. This conclusion is different from the previous chapter, which does 
not take into account the threshold effect, that is the impact of exchange rate 
depreciation on inflation is larger than the impact of M1 growth for a given 
percentage change.     
  
Even though the impact of exchange rate depreciation is found to be linear, it 
does not mean that, as a monetary authority, Bank Indonesia should neglect 
exchange rate depreciation because the impact is moderate. Moreover, this 
study also suggests Bank Indonesia should take into account the growth of 
money since the impact on inflation is found to be larger than the impact of 
exchange rate depreciation when it is below a certain threshold value. Even 
though the impact of M1 growth on inflation is not linear, with much less effect 
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when M1 grows above the threshold value, this study does not suggest that the 
more M1 growth the better.  
 
Our results above are based on the methodology proposed by Hansen (1997, 
2000). However, our study does not explain the reason why a higher growth of 
money has less impact on inflation. Thus, future empirical work in this area 
should strive to explain the reasons underlying the observed asymmetric 
impact.  
 
The above discussion of effects of exchange rate depreciation and monetary 
growth on inflation is based on partial analysis (i.e. using a single equation 
model), although, in fact, the exchange rate and the money stock are not 
independent. Using a more complex model that treats the exchange rate and 
money as endogenous variables and evaluates the threshold value found in this 
chapter will become an interesting work for the central bank. This will be left 
for future work.         
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5 Heading 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Monetary Policy Rules:  
Which Type is the Most Efficient? 
 
 
“Inflation targeting is like the destination for a sail boat. A policy rule is how to sail the 
boat to get to the destination: for this you need to describe the angle of attack, the sail 
trim, the contingency for wind change, and so on.” (Taylor, 2000, page 11).  
 
“Why does the bank make things so complicated? Why doesn’t it just follow the Taylor 
rule?” (Svensson, 2000, page 1).  
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Following many countries, since 1999 Indonesia has selected inflation targeting 
as the preferred framework for pursuing a more independent and effective 
monetary policy. In order to implement this new framework, Bank Indonesia, 
the central bank of Indonesia, sets the policy rate.  
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To set the policy rate the central bank can take into account many indicators, 
such as price indices (consumer price index, wholesale price index, the 
producer price index), the term structure of interest rates, surveys (including 
surveys of inflation expectations), leading indicators, and forecasts from other 
analysts. The central bank also considers the level and growth rate of real and 
potential output, productivity, and unemployment. It is difficult to formulate 
into a precise algebraic formula how the policy rate should change. However, 
there is a consensus - it is that policy rules have major advantages over 
discretion in improving economic performance. 
 
In setting the policy rate, policymakers often need a policy rule as guidance. 
This rule is designed to be a benchmark for the bank’s governor to fulfil the 
central bank’s objective. As a guidance, a policy rule need not be followed 
mechanically, but it requires judgment (Taylor, 1993a). Moreover, the adoption 
of policy rules as guidelines can be helpful for communication, accountability, 
and credibility, as argued by many central banks and economists. 
 
The policy rule plays an important role in macroeconomic and policy analyses. 
It describes how the central bank adjusts monetary policy in response to 
economic developments. With a policy rule, one can assess monetary policy in 
the past, recommend policy actions in current time, and predict the future 
direction of monetary policy.  
 
Two common questions need to be addressed. First, which policy rule should 
the bank follow? Second, should it be complex or simple?  
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The simplest monetary policy rule is known as Friedman’s classic (1960) k% 
money growth rule (see below). However, when the bank changes its monetary 
policy from a monetary aggregate framework to inflation targeting this kind of 
rule becomes inappropriate. Also, exchange rate rules14 have been abandoned 
since mid 1997 because the bank has adopted a free floating exchange rate 
regime. The implementation of a free floating regime was due to a depletion of 
the international reserves as the central bank could not maintain the value of 
the Rupiah in the face of speculative attack.   
 
So, what kind of policy rule is the most appropriate to follow? In the last 
decade, many inflation targeting countries have relied on modern versions of 
the simple monetary policy rule, which typically embody a notion of ‘leaning 
against the wind’. In this case, a central bank plays an active role in stabilizing 
the economy to offset adverse shocks.  
 
The canonical modern example of a simple policy is Taylor’s (1993a) rule. The 
Taylor rule prescribes how a central bank should adjust its interest rate policy 
instrument in response to developments in inflation and macroeconomic 
activity. In principle, when the economy grows below its potential, monetary 
policy should be accommodative to stimulate aggregate demand. Likewise, 
when inflationary pressures develop, monetary policy should be tight to 
restore the central bank's price stability objective.  
       
                                                 
14 Taylor (2000) argues that fixed exchange rates, crawling pegs, and managed floating are types 
of monetary policy rule.     
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How about a more complex rule? A more complex structure of a policy rule is 
known as an “optimal” policy rule. This rule is basically a solution of the first 
order condition of an optimization problem, that is minimizing a weighted sum 
of variances, with the weights determined by policymakers’ tastes, subject to 
the model. Some discussions on optimal policy rules can be found in Svensson 
(1997a, b), McCallum and Nelson (2005), and Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and 
Rondina (2007). On the other hand, an “efficient” rule is one that is optimal for 
some choice of weights. An efficient rule puts the economy on the inflation 
variance / output variance frontier.     
 
Simple rules may be used widely in practice because of their transparency and 
communication benefits. Simple rules imply ease of implementation and 
verification. While this class does not include the globally optimal rule, a large 
number of studies (Taylor, 1999a; Williams, 1999; among others) have shown 
that this kind of simple rule is a fairly good approximation of an optimal rule.  
 
On the other hand, a complex rule may slightly reduce inflation and output 
gap variance, but it has a lower degree of transparency (Levin, Wieland, and 
Williams, 1999). Moreover, an optimal, fully-state-contingent rule for monetary 
policy is not a relevant possibility in a world in which knowledge about the 
macroeconomic structure and the nature of disturbances is incomplete (Flood 
and Isard, 1989).  
 
Many economists and policymakers argue that inflation targeting should be 
implemented through a ‘Taylor rule’ in which interest rates are adjusted in 
response to output and inflation. These views are supported by the theoretical 
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models of Svensson (1997b) and Ball (1997), in which the optimal policies are 
versions of inflation targets and the Taylor rules.  
 
In designing an interest rate rule, some issues are noteworthy. The first issue is 
what values the coefficients on inflation and output should take. When the 
coefficients are large, inflation returns more rapidly to the target and output 
returns more rapidly to its natural rate. However, large coefficients can cause 
inflation and output to overshoot the target and potential output, respectively. 
The second issue is how potential output should be measured. Most analysis of 
interest rate rules assumes that potential output is known, but in fact, potential 
output is highly uncertain. The value of potential output depends on the 
method employed to calculate it. The third issue is whether the rule should be 
forward-looking. Using forecasted variables would make policy respond more 
rapidly to new information. However, the accuracy of the forecast is an issue. 
The final issue is whether additional variables should be included in the rule, 
such as the exchange rate15. In general, an appreciation of the exchange rate, 
like a rise in the interest rate, dampens economic activity and lowers inflation.  
 
The literature on simple rules for monetary policy is vast. It contains theoretical 
research comparing rules that respond to alternative intermediate and final 
targets, backward-looking and forward-looking rules, and rules that include or 
exclude interest rate smoothing terms. It also contains work on historical 
estimates of monetary policy rules for various countries. However, little work 
                                                 
15 In designing a policy rule, some researchers suggest including the exchange rate (for example 
Ball, 1999; Svenson, 2000; Batini, Horison, and Millard, 2001, among others), while others 
suggest not including it (for example, Taylor, 2000, among others).  
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is done for developing countries, such as Indonesia, where the exchange rate 
channel of monetary policy plays an important role in the transmission 
mechanism. 
 
This chapter asks which simple policy rule is the most efficient in a small 
macroeconomic model for Indonesia. The design of the optimal rule is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Deterministic simulations are carried out to evaluate 
economic performance. To the best of our knowledge, no similar approach has 
been used for this country.  
 
Particularly, this chapter tries to answer the following questions: What are the 
parameters for the inflation gap and for the output gap that minimize the loss 
function? How forward-looking should the rule be? Is there some optimal 
forecasting horizon from which to feed back? Is it necessary to include the 
exchange rate in the policy rule? Is it essential to smooth interest rate 
movements? Under different preferences in the loss function, which type of 
policy rule is the most efficient? By incorporating an asymmetric Phillips curve, 
what is the best policy rule?   
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The next section reviews the literature. 
Section three explains the methodology. The data are described in section four. 
Section five reports estimate of the model, analyzes simulations of the model, 
and conducts robustness checks. Finally, section six sums up and concludes.  
 
 
   
  197 
5.2  Literature Review 
 
a. Discretion versus Rules 
 
Monetary policy can be conducted either in a discretionary manner or by 
following a policy rule.  
 
Under pure discretion, the policy is determined period by period without 
following a direction path for the future. Therefore, policymakers decide what 
seems to be the best policy using their judgment. Since the preferences of 
policymakers change over time, such that the preferred decisions at one point 
in time may be inconsistent with those at another point in time, this may cause 
a low credibility as people do not believe what the policymaker says (time-
inconsistency problem).   
 
Under policy rules, policymakers follow a rule so that they can avoid the 
inefficiency associated with the time-inconsistency problem. Following a rule 
allows policymakers to communicate and explain their policy action more 
effectively. The advantage of using the rule is that a central bank can gain 
credibility since accountability of the central bank is enhanced. Also, the rule 
reduces uncertainty since the policy decision becomes more predictable for 
financial market participants, businesses, and households (Orphanides, 2007). 
 
A precise analytical distinction between policy rules and discretion can be 
drawn from the time-consistency literature (see, for example, Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; or Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). 
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Discretionary policy is referred to as the ‘inconsistency’, the ‘cheating’, or the 
‘short-sighted’ solution, while a policy rule is referred to as the ‘optimal’, the 
‘rules’, or the ’recommitted’ solution. Many researchers focus on policy rules 
rather than discretionary policy because of the advantage of rules over 
discretion, which is like the advantage of cooperative over non-cooperative 
solution in game theory (Taylor, 1993a). 
      
A policy rule is a tool to guide policymakers to adjust their instruments, but 
need not be followed mechanically. There should be adjustments to the policy 
rule since not all variables and information are captured by the model. Even 
though no central bank follows a policy rule in a mechanical way, researchers 
normally derive particular rules to assess their consequences under different 
modelling formulations. 
 
b. Kinds of Policy Rule 
 
There are many types of policy rule, for example constant money growth, 
nominal income targeting, price level targeting, and inflation targeting.  
 
The traditional approach is to follow a ‘Friedman rule’. Friedman (1960) 
proposes a k-percent rule whereby the central bank maintains a constant rate of 
growth of money supply. The rule draws on the equation of the quantity theory 
of money expressed in growth rate terms:  
yvm ∆+=∆+∆ pi ,   (5.1) 
where pi  is inflation, m is money stock, v is velocity of money, and y is real 
output.  
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From the above identity, selecting the constant growth of money, k-percent, to 
correspond to the sum of a desired inflation target and the economy's potential 
growth rate and adjusting for the trend in the velocity of money, suggests a 
simple rule that can achieve, on average, the desired inflation target: 
vym ∆−∆+=∆ pi  . (5.2) 
 
Another way to interpret this policy rule is in terms of the growth of nominal 
income. If the velocity of money were fairly stable ( 0=∆v ), this simple rule 
becomes:  
ym ∆+=∆ pi  . (5.3)  
With the nominal income defined as the sum of the central bank's inflation 
target and the real output, a rule for constant money growth can be seen as 
targeting the growth of nominal income. Friedman (1960) and others argue that 
a central bank should aim to keep the money stock growing steadily at an 
annual rate of k percent (where k is some small number, such as 2 or 3) to 
stabilize the economy.  
 
Which monetary aggregate should be fixed? M0, or high-powered money, is a 
definition of the money stock that the central bank can control, but this is not 
closely linked to aggregate demand, whereas M2 is more closely linked to 
aggregate demand, but difficult to control16. An advantage of a constant money 
growth rule is that very little information is required to implement it. 
                                                 
16 M0 consists of the total of all physical currency plus accounts at the central bank that can be 
exchanged for physical currency. M1 consists of M0 minus those portions of M0 held as 
reserves or vault cash plus the amount in demand accounts ("checking" or "current" accounts). 
M2 consists of M1 plus most savings accounts, money market accounts, and time deposits. 
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Nevertheless, in many countries, the relationship between money stock growth 
and aggregate demand has broken down in recent decades.     
 
Simple modifications allowing for some automatic response of money growth 
to economic developments have also been proposed as simple rules that could 
deliver improved macroeconomic performance. Among the simplest of such 
alternatives is the rule associated with Bennett McCallum (1988, 1993):  
)( ** xxvxm x ∆−∆−∆−∆=∆ ∆φ , (5.4)  
where x∆  is growth of nominal income ( yx ∆+=∆ pi ), *x∆  is natural growth of 
nominal income, and x∆φ  is a parameter. McCallum (1988) shows that if a rule 
such as this (for example with x∆φ  = 0.5) had been followed, the performance of 
the U.S. economy likely would have been considerably better than actual 
performance, especially during the 1930s and 1970s, the two periods of the 
worst monetary policy mistakes in the history of the Federal Reserve.    
    
The problem with these kind of rules is that the velocity of money, v, is no 
longer stable because of instability in the demand for money which is due to 
temporary disturbances or due to persistent changes resulting from financial 
innovation. Part for this reason, central banks generally prefer to adjust 
monetary policy using an interest rate instrument. 
 
Many economists, such as Hall and Mankiw (1994) and McCallum (1993, 1995), 
advocate policies that target nominal income. They argue that such policies 
would produce better outcomes, and particularly more stable output, than 
inflation targets. A common argument for income targets over an inflation 
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target is that it is easier to control income (see, for example, McCallum, 1995). 
The reason is that policy affects spending more quickly than it affects inflation. 
However, nominal income growth is an unnatural variable to target, because it 
is the sum of the inflation and output growth, and because policy affects these 
components at different lags.  
 
On the other side, a growing number of economists and policymakers advocate 
a target for the level of inflation. A study by De Brouwer and O’Regan (1998) 
shows a preference for inflation targeting rather than nominal income targeting 
and price level targeting. Another study by Ball (1997) also shows that inflation 
targeting is preferable to price level targeting since the latter performs poorly 
as it ends up with higher variances of output and inflation.  
 
Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) evaluate the performance of different 
monetary policy rules from nine different multi-country econometric models. 
In their analysis, the monetary authorities are assumed to adjust their interest 
rate in response either to (1) deviations of the money supply from some target, 
(2) deviations of the exchange rate from some target, or (3) weighted deviations 
of the inflation rate (or the price level) and real output from some target. They 
find that there are substantial differences from model to model, and there is no 
agreement on a particular policy rule with particular parameters; but there is 
some consensus. Policy rules that focus on the price level and real output 
directly deliver better performance (measured in output and price variability) 
than policies that focus on the exchange rate or policies that focus on the money 
supply.  
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c.   The Taylor Rule 
 
Taylor (1993a) proposes a slightly different approach. Modern central banks do 
not target the money supply. Instead, they adjust the policy rate to achieve a 
target for interest rates, and they adjust the interest rate target in response to 
movements in output and inflation. The intuition behind such a rule is that a 
rise in inflation should be countered with an increase in the real interest rate, 
which reduces demand and inflationary pressures.  
 
In contrast to a k-percent rule, an interest rate rule cannot be passive. If there is 
a demand shock that pushes output above its natural rate and causes inflation 
to rise, with the nominal interest rate fixed, it reduces the real interest rate that 
raises output further, which causes inflation to rise even faster.  
 
The original formula that Taylor proposes is:  
yr 5.0)2(5.02 +−++= pipi ,  (5.5) 
where r is the federal funds rate, pi  is the rate of inflation over the previous 
four quarters and y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target or trend. 
In this case, interest rates increase in response to rises in inflation above an 
implicit target and to a positive output gap.  
 
The result was what has become known as the classic Taylor rule. Taylor 
argues that the rule provides a good description of U.S. monetary policy 
starting around 1985. However, this rule is not optimal in two senses: (1) the 
coefficient is not optimal among the class of reaction functions responding only 
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to current inflation and the output gap; and (2) it disregards information not 
captured by current inflation and the output gap (Svensson, 2000).    
 
After the seminal work of Taylor (1993a), a large amount of work has been 
devoted to estimation of monetary policy reaction functions, concentrating 
mainly on developed economies. Subsequent research (see Orphanides, 2003b, 
for a survey) suggests a generalized form of Taylor's classic rule:  
)()()())(1( ***1
** yyyyiri yyii ∆−∆+−+−+++−= ∆− θθpipiθθpiθ pi , (5.6) 
where i  is a short-term nominal interest rate, *r  is the assumed equilibrium 
real interest rate, pi  is an inflation rate, *pi  is an inflation target, y is the 
logarithm of real output, and y* is the logarithm of potential output.  
 
This specification allows for inertial behaviour in setting interest rates and 
allows a policy response to an inflation gap, the level of output gap, and the 
difference between output growth and its potential. Including the lagged 
interest rate, iθ  > 0, might be desirable since it can reduce the short-run interest 
rate volatility.  
 
A simple rule like Equation (5.5) cannot capture the tendency of the central 
bank to smooth changes in interest rates (see, for example, Goodfriend, 1991). 
Some reasons for a central bank to smooth interest rate changes are to avoid 
capital market disruption, to minimize loss of credibility from sudden large 
policy reversals, and to build a consensus to support a policy change. The 
motivations for smoothing interest rates are also reviewed by Sack and 
Wieland (1999). They mention measurement errors of macroeconomic variables 
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as a possible explanation. In models with forward-looking expectations, inertial 
policy can also be optimal.               
 
Recent research shows that Taylor-type rules provide a good fit to actual policy 
in several countries since the mid-1980’s. These countries include the U.S. 
(Taylor, 1993a, 1994), the U.K. (Stuart, 1996), and Germany (Jondeau and Le 
Bihan, 2000). However, it is worth emphasizing that one should interpret 
empirical results on Taylor-type rules as parsimonious representations of 
central bank behaviour. This does not necessarily mean that the rule should be 
followed mechanically. 
 
d.  Inflation Forecast - Based Rules 
 
One variant of the Taylor rule is an inflation forecast-based (IFB) rule. Batini 
and Haldane (1999) argue that this type of rule embodies explicitly 
transmission lags, potentially embodies all information useful for predicting 
future inflation, and can achieve a degree of output smoothing. This rule 
adjusts the policy instrument in response to a model-consistent projection of 
the deviation of inflation from its target. Because they are forecast-based, the 
rules mimic monetary policy behaviour among inflation targeting central banks 
in practice.  
 
The idea of an IFB rule is based on the existence of lags in monetary policy, that 
is the lag between the enactment of monetary policy and its effect on inflation 
and output. Therefore, a central bank needs a forward-looking dimension and 
should react pre-emptively and not to be myopic. Such myopic policy may 
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become a source of cyclical instability. “Failure to take proper account of lags is, I 
believe, one of the main sources of central bank error” (Blinder, 1997, page 8). Also, 
as Keynes (1923) observes in A Tract on Monetary Reform, “If we wait until a 
price movement is actually afoot before applying remedial measures, we may be too 
late”.  
 
This class of rules can be expressed as:  
∑
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where tr  is a short term nominal interest rate, 
*
tr  is an equilibrium nominal 
interest rate, e it+pi  is a model-consistent inflation projection, 
Tpi  is the inflation 
target, j is the targeting horizon of the central bank when forming its forecast, 
and iθ  is a policy feedback parameter. A higher value of iθ  implies a more 
aggressive policy response for a given deviation of the inflation forecast from 
its target. The horizon of the inflation forecast (j) and the size of the feedback 
coefficient ( iθ ) dictate the speed at which inflation is brought back to target.    
 
Under IFB rules, the inflation expectation can be thought of as the intermediate 
variable for monetary policy. Expected inflation embodies all information and 
indicators which are relevant for predicting the future dynamics of inflation. 
For this reason, it may approximate the optimal state-contingent rule.                                 
 
One might add an output gap in the above specification to provide the so-
called inflation forecast-based with a contemporaneous output gap (IFBG) rule. 
This class of rules is given by:  
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Several authors have recently argued that, in certain settings, expected inflation 
targeting rules have desirables properties (King, 1997; Svensson, 1997a, b). 
Monetary policy in G7 countries appears in recent years to have been driven 
more by anticipated future outcomes than by lagged actual outcomes (see, for 
example, Clarida and Gertler, 1997; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998; 
Orphanides, 1997).  
 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) report that estimated output gap-augmented 
IFB rules offer a good portrait of the behaviour of actual short-term nominal 
interest rates in Germany, Japan, and the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. By having 
the central bank respond to forecasts of inflation and output they incorporate a 
very realistic feature of policy-making, namely that central banks consider a 
broad array of information. The linear reaction function (Taylor rule) proposed 
by Clarida et al. (1998) is derived from a combination of a quadratic objective 
function for the central bankers and a linear aggregate supply relation (Phillips 
curve). 
 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) find that monetary policy during the Volcker-
Greenspan years (March 1979 to April 1996) was forward looking, in that the 
monetary policy instrument responded to forecasts of its target variables. 
Similar results are obtained by Nelson (2003) for the U.K. during the period 
1992 to 1997, whilst Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) find that monetary 
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policy in the U.K. was forward-looking in terms of inflation, but responded to 
the current output gap. 
 
In some models, Taylor rules responding to several-quarters-ahead forecasts of 
inflation appear more promising for stabilization than rules focusing only on 
near-term conditions. However, this conclusion is not robust and is overturned 
once the potential unreliability of longer-term forecasts due to model 
misspecification is factored into the analysis (Levin, Wieland and Williams, 
2003). 
 
e. Exchange Rate Augmented Policy Rule 
 
Other types of policy rules include the use of exchange rates. Ball (1999) argues 
that, in an open economy17, the suitable policy rule is using the monetary 
condition index (MCI), which is the weighted average of interest rates and 
exchange rates18. On the rule proposed, the left hand side is the MCI, while on 
the right hand side are long-run inflation and the output gap:  
)()1( 1−−+=−+ eyer γpiβαωω , (5.9) 
where r is the real interest rate, e is the change in the real exchange rate 
(appreciation or depreciation), y is the output gap, and )( 1−− eγpi  can be 
                                                 
17 For further discussion of an open economy see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and McCallum 
and Nelson (2000). 
18 A MCI can be expressed in real or nominal terms. Because it has the potential to quantify the 
degree of tightness (ease) that both the interest rate and the exchange rate exert on the 
economy, MCIs are often used to measure the stance of monetary policy in an open economy. 
Standard MCIs are linear combinations of the short real interest rate and the negative real 
exchange rate, usually with weight between 1:2 and 1:3 (Svensson, 2000).  
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interpreted as long-term inflation. The use of long-run inflation is to filter out 
the transitory effect of exchange rate movements.    
 
However, MCIs have been criticised on both empirical and theoretical grounds 
(see, among others, Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon, 1998). One conceptual 
shortcoming of the MCI, when used as an operating target, is that different 
types of shocks have different implications for monetary policy.  
 
Svensson (2000) examines alternative policy rules in an open-economy model. 
That study differs from Ball (1999) and from Svensson (1997b) in stressing 
micro-foundations and forward-looking behaviour. He gives a little support to 
Ball’s MCI rule since it combines the expected future real exchange rate and the 
expected future long real interest rate which is not directly observable and 
verifiable by external observers. He argues that the monetary policy impact on 
inflation, which is transmitted via different channels with different lags, is too 
complex to be summarized by any single index.      
 
Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2001) also argue that Ball’s (1999) rule based on 
the MCI may perform poorly in the face of specific types of exchange rate 
shocks and thus cannot offer guidance for the day-to-day conduct of monetary 
policy. They employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which is 
theoretically derived on the assumption that consumers maximise utility and 
firms maximise profits. They do so by examining the performance of a battery 
of simple rules, including the familiar Taylor rule and MCI-based rules à la 
Ball. They find that adding a separate response to the level of the real exchange 
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rate (contemporaneous and lagged) appears to reduce the difference in 
adjustment between output gaps, but the improvement is only marginal. 
 
 To describe an open economy, one can add an exchange rate to the Taylor rule:  
14321 −+++= ttttt eeyi κκκpiκ ,  (5.10) 
where ti  is the annualized inter-bank lending rate, tpi  is the inflation gap 
(deviation from target), ty  is the output gap, and te  is the change in the 
(nominal or real) exchange rate. Positive te  implies exchange rate appreciation. 
One interpretation of the rule of thumb discussed by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) and mentioned above would be that 3κ  is less than zero and 4κ  is more 
than or equal to zero. A higher than normal exchange rate changes would 
induce the central bank to lower the short-term interest rate. The positive 
coefficient 4κ  prevents this additional easing. However, 43 κκ +  is still less than 
or equal to zero. 
 
Equation (5.10) has been studied by Ball (1999). The interest rate rule that reacts 
to the exchange rate as well as to output and inflation reduces the standard 
deviation of the inflation rate around the inflation target from 2.0 percent to 1.9 
percent (Ball, 1999, p. 134) compared with a rule that reacts only to inflation 
and output.  
 
Using another model with forward-looking agents and more explicit micro-
foundations, Svensson (2000) considers a policy rule that is very similar to the 
rule examined by Ball (1999). His simulations show that this rule reduces the 
standard deviation of inflation from 2.1 to 1.8 percent; however, it also 
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increases the variance of output from 1.7 to 1.8 percent. Thus, a policy rule that 
reacts to the exchange rate in this way can actually lead to a deterioration of 
output performance and therefore does not dominate a rule without the 
exchange rate.     
 
Taylor (1999a) examines a monetary policy rule that has the same form as the 
one examined by Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000). He examines a candidate for 
a monetary policy rule for the European Central Bank. Compared to the rule 
that does not react to the exchange rate, he finds that the exchange rate reaction 
led to better performance for some countries in Europe (France and Italy), but 
has poorer performance in Germany.   
 
In responding to the importance of the exchange rate, Taylor (2000) argues that 
simple policy rules might actually work well in emerging market economies. 
The simple rule should focus on a smoothed inflation measure and real output, 
but not necessarily react too much to the exchange rate. Based on Ball (1999), 
Taylor (1999c) and Svenson (2000), Taylor (2000) finds that there are small 
improvements from reacting to exchange rates, but that such reactions can 
make performance worse. However, the model he used in his seminal paper 
may understate the exchange rate effects in small open economies and 
therefore tends to underestimate the cost of exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
Taylor (2001) comments on the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy. 
Based on some other previous work, he suggests not including exchange rates 
directly in the policy rule. The reason is first, there may be deviations from 
purchasing power parity all the time that should not be offset by changes in 
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interest rate. The changes in exchange rate might reflect changes in 
productivity or irrational expectations. Second, temporary fluctuations in 
exchange rates may not have much effect on inflation expectations. Reacting 
too much to the exchange rate will not work better in stabilizing inflation and 
output since it results in more erratic fluctuation in the interest rate. He argues 
that the exchange rate reaction is already there in the implied interest rate 
decision. 
 
f. The Loss Function 
 
To evaluate policy rules the literature on optimal policy rules has traditionally 
relied on quadratic loss functions that are additive in the deviation of inflation 
from target, the output gap, and sometimes also the change in the nominal 
interest rate (see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Wieland, 1998). 
Typically, there are two alternative forms of the loss functions: 
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When yω  and iω  are set to zero, it implies that the authority only concerns 
itself with inflation or it is said to be an ‘inflation hawk’, in that volatility in the 
other variables is not considered. This condition corresponds to a ‘strict’ 
inflation targeting (IT) country. When inflation deviates from its target, strict 
targeting eliminates the deviation as quickly as possible.  
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In the case of yω  and iω  not being set to zero, it refers to a ‘flexible’ IT country. 
Some researchers evaluate economic performance based on the inflation gap 
and the output gap, while others evaluate it based on the inflation gap, the 
output gap, and interest rate smoothing. The appropriate policy is generally 
less activist meaning that the instrument is generally less adjusted to a given 
shock, and inflation should be brought more gradually in line with the inflation 
target. Thus, the flexible IT country has a longer target horizon than that of the 
strict IT country.   
 
g.  Evaluating Policy Rules 
 
Monetary policy rules have become a widely discussed topic. There are three 
approaches to obtaining a policy rule specification, i.e. estimating via a single 
equation, deriving an optimal rule from an optimization procedure, and 
deriving an efficient rule from simulation.  
 
First Approach 
 
The first approach consists of the empirical estimation of reaction functions that 
is regressing the policy rate on the inflation gap, the output gap, and other 
variables, as a single equation. The purpose of this approach is to assess the 
central bank’s behaviour in past time.  
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In this approach, the loss function is not guaranteed to be minimal. Moreover, 
the structural parameters, which are associated with preferences of the 
monetary authority and the structure of the economy, cannot be retrieved. As 
Favero and Rovelli (2002) argue, estimation of an interest-rate rule in a single 
equation specification is not a good recommendation, except if the researcher is 
only interested in the behaviour of the parameters.  
 
Taylor (1993a) estimates U.S. monetary policy from 1987 to 1992 in a single 
equation. He considers observed inflation and output gaps in the policy rule. 
Taylor (1999c) also uses a single equation and claims that the Fed funds rate 
movement during the period 1986 to 1997 was well predicted by the Taylor 
rule. During this period he shows that fluctuations of inflation and real output 
were small. However, during the period 1879 to 1914 and 1960 to 1979 
monetary policy deviated significantly from the Taylor rule in that the nominal 
interest rate was not very responsive to both inflation and real output. During 
those periods macroeconomic performance was not as good. 
 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) evaluate US monetary policy for the post-
World War II period and assume that the central bank does not react to 
observed inflation, but to expected inflation. They estimate U.S. monetary 
policy on a single-equation basis using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach. They employ a GMM since there is a future value of inflation 
to be estimated in their specification. Employing a standard business cycle 
model and a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule they find that the 
interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period was more responsive to 
changes in expected inflation than it had been in the pre-Volcker period. They 
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show that the estimated pre-Volcker rule produces larger fluctuations in 
inflation and real output than the Volcker-Greenspan rule.  
 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) estimate forward-looking versions of the 
Taylor rule for G7 countries, including the U.S., but they do not examine the 
role of the bond rate. Mehra (1999), on the other hand, does consider the 
response of policy to the bond rate. He estimates U.S. monetary policy reaction 
functions using GMM from 1960 to 1997. The policy rule considered has both 
backward and forward-looking components, i.e. actual inflation, expected 
future inflation, expected output gap, and the bond rate. He also includes 
money growth. It is found that, in the pre-1979 period, the Fed funds rate is not 
sensitive to the bond rate or money growth, while, since 1979, the Fed is very 
sensitive to long-term expected inflation, evidenced by the behaviour of the 
bond rate. He also finds that policy reaction functions during the Paul Volker 
period and the Alan Greenspan period have not been changed.    
 
Hasanov and Omay (2008) also use GMM to estimate a monetary policy rule in 
Turkey within the period 1990:01 to 2000:10. The reason for employing GMM is 
that there are inflation expectations to be estimated in their specification. They 
include other variables in the policy rule specification, i.e. the real exchange 
rate, money growth, and net foreign assets (NFA). They focus on investigating 
whether an asymmetric reaction exists when the economy is in expansion 
(positive output gap) or in recession (zero and negative output gap). It is found 
that the central bank reacted more aggressively towards output stabilisation 
during recessions than expansions.  
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Second Approach 
 
The second approach is to derive an ‘optimal’ rule from minimizing the loss 
function with respect to a relatively simple macroeconomic model. The optimal 
policy can generally be expressed as a feedback rule, but the rule depends on 
the parameters of the economy and on the parameters of the central bank’s loss 
function. Since the central bank’s loss function is not known, researchers often 
assume the central bank’s preferences. Thus, optimal rules depend virtually on 
any variable of the model.  
 
The model has at least three equations; the demand equation (IS curve), the 
supply equation (Phillips curve), and the policy rule equation. A more 
theoretical approach has relied on deriving the monetary policy rule that is 
obtained by maximizing the welfare of the representative agents.  
 
Compared to large-scale models, small-scale models have the advantage of 
being easy to solve and relatively transparent. System properties are a function 
of a small set of parameters that often favour straightforward interpretation. 
Properties of large-scale models, on the other hand, depend on a large number 
of parameter values, sectoral linkages, and shocks, which complicates the 
interpretation of results. 
 
This approach, however, needs a rather complicated procedure and 
mathematical ability. To solve the model, one has to derive the relevant first 
order conditions of the model (the objective function subject to the constraints) 
and, if necessary, take a log-linear approximation of the results. For big models, 
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this is generally done using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. It is superior from a theoretical point of view since it may include 
many agents, each of which behaves optimally. However, it may suffer from 
the fact that its conclusions could be specific to the model being studied and 
may not be robust to further modelling extensions.  
 
An abundant literature has investigated monetary policy using fully-calibrated 
models derived from optimization behaviour (see, for example, King and 
Wolman, 1996; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1998; Yun, 1996). Batini and Haldane 
(1999) and Svensson (2000), while putting less emphasis on micro-foundations, 
have also used a calibrated model to analyze monetary policy issues. 
 
Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2001) evaluate a comprehensive set of simple 
monetary policy rules for an open economy. They use a general equilibrium 
model calibrated on the U.K. economy to examine policy rules, including the 
Taylor rule and the MCI-based rule. The model has a rich structural 
specification since it is derived from maximizing consumer utility and firm 
profits. It is found that an inflation forecast-based (IFB) rule with or without 
real exchange rate adjustment appears robust to different shocks, in contrast to 
the Taylor rule and the MCI-based rule.     
 
In Svensson (2000) policy rules are proposed for open economy inflation 
targeting (IT). He compares optimal policy rules under strict IT, flexible IT, and 
the conventional Taylor rule. However, the reaction function found is generally 
not of the form frequently used in the literature. The form is complex. It also 
depends on foreign inflation, the output gap, exchange rates, real interest rates 
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and natural output. The negative coefficients on expected domestic inflation 
and on the output gap stand out. Also, the coefficients on the foreign interest 
rate and the foreign exchange risk premium are relatively large, that is, about 
one, rather than zero. 
 
Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2005) investigate the implication of a non-
linear Phillips curve for derivation of optimal monetary policy rules. Using a 
quadratic loss function, it is found that the optimal policy rule is also non-
linear, with the policymaker increasing the interest rate by a larger amount 
when inflation or output are above the target than the amount it will reduce it 
when they are below target. Different from the basic specification, the implied 
optimal policy rule contains exogenous variables and an interaction term 
between inflation and the output gap. They find empirical support for this type 
of asymmetry for the European Central Bank, but not for the U.S. Federal 
Reserve.   
 
Third Approach 
 
The third approach is to find an ‘efficient’ rule. An efficient rule is a rule with a 
certain combination of weights on the right hand side of the rule that puts the 
economy on the output variance and inflation variance frontier, or closest to the 
origin. To trace out the efficient frontier, one can do either deterministic or 
stochastic19 simulations of the model. To determine the set of efficient policy 
rules, both the magnitudes of parameters and the targeting horizon are 
                                                 
19 In a stochastic simulation, equilibrium cannot be characterized as an actual fixed point of a 
process. The results are the mean value around which the actual values lie and to which they 
return eventually. 
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searched over. For stochastic simulation, the resulting moments are calculated 
by averaging the result from a number of draws. The resulting output and CPI 
inflation variability pairs are graphed in Figure 5.1. Points to the south-west in 
the figure are clearly welfare-superior and points to the northeast are inferior.   
 
From Figure 5.1, one can see that Rule 2 outperforms Rule 1, producing an 
efficient rule with minimal inflation-output variability. If the loss function has 
the same weight on output variability and inflation variability, then point C is 
the best point since the loss value is minimal. Point B has minimum variability 
of output, but large inflation variability. On the other hand, point A has the 
least variability of inflation, but large output variability. Point A, B, and C are 
the same type of rule, but have different specification.    
 
This approach provides a perspective that may be useful in suggesting how 
policymakers should adapt the overall aggressiveness of their policy reaction 
function. By using the simulation experiments, one can explore how the  
 
A
SD of Inflation
Rule 2
SD of Output
Rule 1
B
C
 
Figure 5.1: The efficient rules 
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optimal calibration of simple policy rules varies with key characteristic of the 
macro model. 
   
Analysis of the efficient policy rule can be found in Batini and Haldane (1999), 
De Brouwer and O’Regan (1998), Drew and Hunt (2000), and many others. 
Using a New Zealand macroeconomic model, Drew and Hunt (2000) evaluate 
three classes of policy rules, i.e. Taylor rules, inflation forecast-based (IFB) 
rules, and inflation forecast-based with contemporaneous output gap (IFBG) 
rules. It is found that the IFBG rule is the efficient rule that gives the minimum 
loss function. Their result is different from those presented in Batini and 
Haldane (1999) where the inclusion of the contemporaneous output gap does 
not shift the efficient frontier downwards. The Batini and Haldane (1999) result 
leads the authors to conclude that IFB rules are ‘output encompassing’.  
 
Simple Rule: Some Advantages 
 
There are some advantages of using simple policy rules over complicated, 
optimal targeting rules. First, simple rules are clearly understandable and 
transparent, so that the objectives of monetary policy are well understood. 
Second, uncertainty regarding the future path of nominal interest rates would 
be reduced given the predictability of the rule. Third, they are comparable to 
other rules, e.g. Taylor rules. Fourth, they are more robust when there is 
uncertainty about the ‘true’ structure of the economy. Fifth, they may be easy to 
monitor so that it helps the central bank gain credibility (Batini and Haldane, 
1999). Moreover, an optimal, fully-state-contingent rule for monetary policy is 
not a relevant possibility in a world in which knowledge about the 
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macroeconomic structure and the nature of disturbances is incomplete (Flood 
and Isard, 1989). Also, an optimal policy rule should be cautiously used as the 
policymaker has the option of changing it in response to new information that 
affects the model (Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina, 2007).   
 
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) compare simple policy rules, which are 
based on the inflation rate, the output gap and the interest rate as instruments, 
and complex policy rules, which incorporate all available information in state 
variables. They conclude that complex rules slightly reduce inflation and 
output-gap variances, but that such benefits can be offset by the lower degree 
of transparency associated with complex rules.   
 
William (1999) evaluates monetary policy rules using the FRB/US large-scale 
open-economy macro-econometric model, which, in response to the Lucas 
critique, features explicit inter-temporal optimization-based micro-foundations 
and rational expectations. He finds that increases in rule complexity yield only 
trivial reductions in aggregate variability.   
    
5.3  Methodology 
 
Our objective here is to simulate the model under alternative policy rules. We 
use standard methodology for this purpose. To derive an efficient policy rule, 
we use a normative approach. The first step is to place a policy rule into a 
macro model; the second step is to solve the model using some numerical 
algorithm; the third step is to examine the stochastic behaviour of the variables 
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(i.e. inflation, output, and interest rate); and the last step is to choose the rule 
based on the minimum loss function.  
 
We adapt methods used by Ball (1999), Batini and Nelson (2000), De Brouwer 
and O’Regan (1998), Drew and Hunt (2000), and Isard, Laxton, and Elliason 
(1999). To evaluate the performance of the policy rules, we use a small, open 
economy macro model representing the Indonesian economy. The model 
describes an economy that is ‘small’ with respect to the rest of the world. In 
practice, this means that the supply of exports does not affect the foreign price 
of these goods. It also means that the foreign interest rate is exogenous in this 
model.   
 
To describe openness we include exchange rates in the model. As Svensson 
(2000) argues, including exchange rates in the discussion of inflation targeting 
has several important consequences. First, the exchange rate allows additional 
channels for the transmission of monetary policy. There is an indirect channel 
where the exchange rate affects the relative price between domestic and foreign 
goods, which in turn affects aggregate demand. There is also a direct channel 
where the exchange rate affects domestic currency prices of imported final and 
intermediate goods. Second, as an asset price, the exchange rate is inherently a 
forward-looking and expectations-determined variable. Third, some foreign 
disturbances will be transmitted through the exchange rate, for instance, 
changes in foreign inflation.    
 
The size of the model is kept deliberately small to ease the computational 
burden. A compact model is also useful in helping to clarify the transmission 
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mechanism channels. Despite its size, the model embodies the key features of 
the small forecasting model used by Bank Indonesia for its inflation projection. 
A small scale model is often employed by many researchers to evaluate policy 
rules; for example Ball (1997), Batini and Haldane (1999), Svensson (2000), 
among others.   
 
The main virtue of the model is simplicity and realism. The model comprises 
three endogenous variables (i.e., the output gap, CPI inflation, and exchange 
rate depreciation), two exogenous variables (i.e., money growth and the Fed 
funds rate), and one control variable (i.e., the BI rate). The complete structure of 
the model is as follows:  
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where ty  is the output gap measured by the adjusted HP filter
20, tpi  is CPI 
inflation, tm  is M1 growth, te  is the nominal exchange rate in terms of 
domestic currency (so a rise means appreciation), ti  is the nominal domestic 
interest rate (BI Rate), and *ti  is the nominal foreign interest rate (Fed funds 
rate).   
 
                                                 
20 Many researchers estimate policy rules using the potential output generated from the HP 
filter, such as Taylor (1999c) and Mehra (1999). As in Chapter 3, we use the adjusted HP filter. 
We split the sample into two, with a break in 1998 and adjust the trend during the financial 
crisis period and for some years after that.  
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Equation (5.13) is an IS curve, where the aggregate demand, in this case output 
gap, depends on lagged output gap, real interest rates, the nominal exchange 
rate change, and money growth. The real interest rate is defined as the nominal 
interest rate less expected inflation. The nominal interest rate is the instrument 
of the central bank. 2α  is expected to be negative. If exchange rate depreciation 
is contractionary, as suggested by the neo-structuralist critique, 3α  will be 
significantly positive, indicating that, with other things given, an appreciation 
will result in an increase in output, or in other words, a depreciation will result 
in a decline in output. On the other hand if, as indicated by the more traditional 
approach, depreciation is expansionary, the estimated value of 3α  would be 
negative. Output movements are persistent because lagged output enters the 
equation, reflecting an adjustment cost. ytε  represents demands shocks, for 
example shocks from foreign output or fiscal policy. 
 
Equation (5.14) defines the aggregate supply curve. This Phillips curve 
equation can be seen as a reduced form of many macroeconomic models. The 
structure of this price equation is the same as that used in Chapter 3 where CPI 
inflation depends on inflation expectations (backward and forward looking), 
the output gap, the exchange rate, and money growth. piε t  captures 
disturbances to supply. It is similar to Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995b) and 
Svensson’s (2000) Phillips curve in that inflation depends on both lagged 
inflation and expected future inflation. The exchange rate in Equation (5.14) 
represents the effect of expected costs of imported intermediate inputs (or 
resulting wage compensation). Hence, there are potentially two channels of 
effect for monetary policy: through output gaps and through expectations. 
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Forward-looking expectations are derived as a modelled-consistent forecast, so 
that Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is 
employed. This procedure produces efficient instrumental variables estimates.   
 
Equation (5.15) posits a link between the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
We do not include any explicit foreign exchange risk premium. It captures the 
idea that a rise in the interest rate makes domestic assets more attractive, 
leading to an appreciation. The shock e
tε  captures other influences on the 
exchange rate, such as expectations, investor confidence, exchange rate 
premium, and foreign interest rates. Equation (5.15) is similar to reduced-form 
equations for the exchange rate in many textbooks.  
 
A key feature of the model is that policy affects inflation through two channels. 
A monetary contraction reduces output and thus inflation through the Phillips 
curve, and it also causes an appreciation that reduces inflation directly. In this 
framework, there is a conventional real interest rate channel, working through 
the output gap and thence onto inflation. There is also an exchange rate 
channel, operating through two distinct channels. First, there is an indirect 
output gap route running through net exports and thence onto inflation. 
Second, there is a direct price effect via final and intermediate imported goods’ 
prices.     
 
Monetary policy is represented by a reaction function. This approach has 
proved to be an empirically successful characterization of central banks’ 
behaviour (Clarida and Gertler, 1997; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998; Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998). We observe that the main operating instrument of monetary 
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policy at Bank Indonesia is a short-term interest rate, i.e. the BI rate. 
Accordingly, the empirical policy reaction function we develop here 
characterizes how the central bank chooses the level of the short-term rate from 
period to period.  
 
There is a menu of rules for policymakers to choose. The rules we consider here 
differ from those in Svensson (1997a, b) in that they are simple, feedback rules 
for the policy instrument, rather than complicated, optimal targeting rules. 
These rules are analogous to the Taylor rule specifications, which have recently 
been extensively discussed in an academic and policy-making context. As in 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) we add interest rate smoothing into the rule. 
The six nominal interest rate rules evaluated here are:  
(rule 1) Inflation Forecast-Based (IFB) rule  11 )]()[1( −+++ +−++−= t
T
jtjttt iri θpipiαpiθ  
(rule 2) IFB with output gap (IFBG)  11 ])()[1( −+++ ++−++−= tt
T
jtjttt iyri θβpipiαpiθ  
(rule 3) Taylor rule  1331 ])()[1( −−−+ ++−++−= tt
T
tttt iyri θβpipiαpiθ   
 
Another three policy rules are the same as the above rules, but with an addition 
of the exchange rate:   
(rule 4) IFBE rule  11 ])()[1( −+++ +−−++−= tt
T
jtjttt ieri θγpipiαpiθ   
(rule 5) IFBGE rule 11 ])()[1( −+++ +−+−++−= ttt
T
jtjttt ieyri θγβpipiαpiθ  
(rule 6) Taylor-E rule  1331 ])()[1( −−−+ +−+−++−= ttt
T
tttt ieyri θγβpipiαpiθ  
where ti  indicates the nominal interest rate (BI rate), tpi  the inflation rate, 
T
jt+pi  
the inflation target, jt+pi  the model-consistent projection of inflation j months 
ahead, ty  the output gap, te  the exchange rate change (positive means 
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appreciation), and r  is a desired neutral interest rate when both inflation and 
output are at their target levels.  
 
We assume that the neutral real rate is stationary and is determined by non-
monetary factors in the long run, consistent with conventional wisdom. 
Accordingly, r  is a constant in the short run and is independent of monetary 
policy. We set r  equal to 2.0 as the estimate of the long run real rate. This 
number is the average real interest rate over the observed period, excluding the 
financial crisis period.  
 
The policy choice variables for the authorities are the parameters α , β , γ , and 
θ . α  is a reaction parameter for the inflation gap, that is a policy feedback 
parameter. A higher value for α  implies a more aggressive policy response for 
a given deviation of the inflation forecast from its target. β  is a reaction 
parameter for the output gap, and γ  is a reaction parameter for the exchange 
rate change.  
 
The assumption that the parameters α  and β  are positive implies that the 
interest rate responds positively to output and inflation deviation; while γ  is 
negative means that the higher the value of the exchange rate (it appreciates), 
the lower the interest rate as appreciation of the currency decreases CPI 
inflation. An appreciation of the exchange rate leads to a cut in the interest rate. 
The negative interest rate response is called for because appreciation reduces 
inflation. The magnitude of the parameter θ  measures the degree of interest 
rate smoothing in bank behaviour (see, for example, Sack and Wieland, 1999; 
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Williams, 1999). Therefore, for example, with θ  equal to zero there is no 
instrument smoothing. Finally, j is the targeting horizon of the central bank 
when forming its forecast. For example, in the U.K., the Bank of England’s 
targeting horizon is around two years ahead (King, 1997). 
 
The coefficients in the policy rule depend on the constant α , β , γ , θ , and 
horizon (j), which are not yet determined. The horizon of the inflation forecast 
and the values of these parameters determine the speed at which inflation is 
brought back to target following an inflationary disturbance. They also 
influence output dynamics and interest rate dynamics.  
 
The only condition necessary for stability and uniqueness is that the long-run 
response of the interest rate to year-on-year inflation must be greater than one, 
that is α >1. If value of α  is above unity, it indicates that both the nominal and 
real interest rate rise in response to inflation; it is concluded that monetary 
policy has been adequate in this scenario. On the other hand, if the value of α  
is less than unity, then it indicates that the real interest rate declined in 
response to inflation. Representative research on this aspect is given in papers 
by Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Isard et al. (1999), 
Mehra (1999), and Nelson (2003).  
 
In this chapter, we define the loss function as the weighted sum of inflation 
variability, output variability, and instrument variability. The weights depend 
on policymakers’ tastes where the total weight is assumed to be unity. If the 
weights on output variability and instrument variability are set to be zero, then 
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the economy is said to be subject to strict inflation targeting. As in Svensson 
(2000), we use the following loss function:       
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where piω  is the weight on the inflation gap, yω  is the weight on the output 
gap, and iω  is the weight for interest rate smoothing. The first term 
corresponds to CPI-inflation targeting. The second term corresponds to output-
gap stabilization, and the third to instrument or nominal interest rate 
smoothing. 
 
The optimal policy frontier here is defined as the set of efficient combinations 
of unconditional variances of the inflation gap, the output gap, and the 
smoothness of interest rate policy attainable by the central bank. In many 
models, when interest-rate variability is not taken into account, optimal rules 
generate implausibly large fluctuations in the interest rate. In other studies, the 
optimal policy frontier has been defined in the inflation/output gap variance 
plane (see, for instance, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995b; Fuhrer, 1997a; Ball, 1997).  
 
In this chapter, we use deterministic simulation to derive efficient policy rules 
based on a grid search under different model variants and parameterization of 
the loss function. We simulate the performance of the economy for a range of 
policy reaction function parameters with α  varying from 0.15 to 2.90, β  from 
0.00 to 1.31, γ  from 0.00 to 0.99, and θ  from 0.00 to 0.99. When α  and β  are 
running over in an interval of 0.145, and γ  and θ  are running over in an 
interval of 0.111, there are 20,000 combinations. We evaluate the lead of 
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inflation from 1 quarter (3 months) to 8 quarters (24 months) ahead. We also 
evaluate the first quarter lag of inflation (lag 3 months).   
 
We then compute the value of the loss function under assumed weights on 
inflation variability, output variability, and interest rate variability in order to 
evaluate how the monetary authorities’ preferences would influence the 
optimal parameters in the policy rule. There are three scenarios evaluated here. 
The first scenario is that the policymakers care about inflation, output, and 
financial stability. They put high weight on inflation variability, moderate 
weight on output variability, and small weight on interest rate variability ( =piω  
0.6, =yω  0.3, =iω  0.1). The second scenario is that the policymakers put the 
same weight on inflation variability and output variability, yet put a zero 
weight on interest rate variability ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, =iω  0.0). The third 
scenario is that the policymakers act as an inflation hawk, which is they only 
consider inflation variability, while neglecting output variability and interest 
rate variability ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, =iω  0.0). 
 
In each case, the values of these loss functions are calculated based on the 
values for α , β , γ , θ , and the horizon (j) in the policy rule equation. The 
above model is simulated from 2000:1 to 2007:12.   
 
We then considered several alternative variants of the model in order to see 
how specific modelling assumptions influence the optimal calibration. As a 
robustness check, we use a different measure of the output gap, i.e. the peak-to-
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peak method (model 2). The structure of the model is the same as above (model 
1), but output gap, *ty , is calculated using the peak-to-peak method.  
 
We are also interested in evaluating the policy rule when the Phillips curve is 
non-linear. We use the ‘adjusted HP filter’ potential output, but we replace 
Equation (5.14) with the following equation: 
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where ϖ  is the ‘wall’ parameter measuring a capacity constraint where the 
effect on inflation will be infinity when the output gap approaches this ‘wall’ 
value.       
    
5.4  Data 
 
Policymakers are relatively unconcerned about month-to-month variation in 
inflation and instead are more concerned about medium and longer terms 
trends. However, we use monthly data since a quarter or a year is too long to 
hold the central bank rate fixed between adjustments. Moreover, the monthly 
model mimics Bank Indonesia’s practice in setting the policy rate every month, 
which is based on the development of key macroeconomic indicators and their 
trends. Clarida et al. (1998) also use monthly data to evaluate policy rules for 
the U.S. and Germany.    
 
We collect data mainly from Bank Indonesia (BI) and the Indonesian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Table 5.1 shows the data used in this chapter. For the 
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analysis, we use data from 1980 to 2008. Since in the simulation the model 
includes a forward-looking variable, that is inflation, the end point is the length 
of horizon (from three months to twenty four months) prior to the latest 
available data. We end some months early because the year-ahead ex-post 
inflation rate is one of our right hand-side variables. 
 
Table 5.1: Data 
No Data Frequency Period Source 
1 CPI 
inflation21 
Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Central Bureau of Statistics  
2 Output gap Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Author, calculated from Chapter 3 
3 Exchange 
rate  
Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Bank Indonesia 
4 M1 Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Bank Indonesia 
5 SBI, BI rate Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
Bank Indonesia 
6 Fed fund 
rate 
Monthly 1980:1 to 
2008:12 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/mark
ets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html 
 
 
                                                 
21 CPI inflation is defined by 
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pi  where P is the consumer price index (CPI).  
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5.5  Empirical Results 
 
In this section, in order to compare the results we use two types of output gap 
series, i.e. those calculated from the adjusted HP filter and the peak-to-peak 
method. Also, for comparison with the linear Phillips curve, we employ a non-
linear Phillips curve.   
 
5.5.1   Estimations 
 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the model consists of three 
behavioural equations and one policy rule. The three behavioural equations are 
the IS curve, the Phillips curve, and the exchange rate equation. We follow De 
Brouwer and O’Regan (1998) in estimating the parameters in the model. We get 
the parameters of the model by estimating each equation separately because 
there is no contemporaneous effect of endogenous variable in each equation. 
Estimating each equation when the model contains lags of endogenous 
variables on the right hand side is the same as estimating model as a system.  
  
The IS curve, with output gap as a dependent variable, is estimated using OLS 
and the result can bee seen in Table 5.2. The result shows that all parameters 
are statistically significant, except the constant. As predicted by the theory, we 
obtain a negative parameter on the real interest rate. The current output gap 
depends on the previous output gap, lag nine of the real interest rate, previous 
exchange rate changes, and lag two of money growth.  
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Table 5.2: Estimation of the IS curve – using ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap  
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant -0.092 0.065 -1.405 0.161
Ouput Gap(-1) 0.895 0.015 61.638 0.000
Sbi(-9) - Inflation(-8) -0.012 0.006 -1.975 0.050
Exchange Rate Dep (-1) 0.007 0.002 3.952 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) 0.008 0.003 2.501 0.013
Dummy for Crisis -1.455 0.194 -7.502 0.000
Adj R2 0.988
SE of Reg 0.401
Durbin-Watson stat 1.124
Prob (F-Stat) 0.000  
 
The sign of the exchange rate change is positive meaning that the impact of 
exchange rate appreciation is positive. In the standard IS model, the sign of the 
exchange rate change is negative as depreciation of the currency will boost 
exports. However, this is not the case for Indonesia. The more the depreciation 
of the currency, the more real output suffers. This is because domestic demand 
will decrease as the prices of import goods and the prices of goods that need 
imported raw materials increase. Moreover, the ability to pay the foreign debt 
decreases. Our estimation is consistent with SSMX, Bank Indonesia’s small 
scale macro model (extended version), where the sign of the exchange rate 
change is positive.  
 
The existing evidence regarding the effect of devaluation/depreciation on real 
economic activity is mixed; while some studies suggest that devaluations have 
an expansionary effect, others indicate that they generate a contraction in the 
economy. Edward (1986) finds that the depreciation in the value of domestic 
currency in 12 developing countries (India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri 
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Lanka, Thailand, Greece, Israel, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, South Africa, 
and Yugoslavia) from 1965 to 1980 is contractionary in aggregate output.  
 
There are several theoretical reasons why, contrary to the traditional view, a 
depreciation can generate a decline in real activity. First, a depreciation causes 
prices to go up generating a negative real balance (or Pigou) effect. This will 
lead to lower aggregate demand. Second, a depreciation can redistribute 
income from groups with a low marginal propensity to save to groups with a 
high marginal propensity to save. If money wages are rigid in the short run, 
devaluation lowers the real wage as home goods prices go up in response to 
increased intermediate export costs. On the other hand, domestic currency 
export receipts also go up, producing windfall profits. If the marginal 
propensity to save out of profits is larger than the marginal propensity to save 
out of wages, this change in income shares will reduce aggregate demand (see, 
for example, Diaz-Alejandro, 1965; Krugman and Taylor, 1978).  
 
Third, the trade balance expressed in domestic currency may worsen when the 
price elasticities of imports and exports are low. Depreciation raises export 
prices as well as import prices, but the quantity of exports and imports do not 
change much. If initially imports exceed exports, the net result of depreciation 
is a reduction in real income within the country. Forth, government revenues 
are increased by depreciation when there are significant export taxes. Higher 
traded goods prices will redistribute income to the government. 
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Our result provides statistical support for the view that, in the short run, 
depreciation can have a contractionary effect on aggregate output. That is, it 
supports the short-run version of the contractionary devaluation hypothesis.   
 
The Phillips curve equation has the same specification as that in Chapter 3 
where current inflation depends on expected inflation (both backward-looking 
and forward-looking expectations), the output gap, the exchange rate change, 
and the growth of money. Since the future value of inflation is included as a 
regressor, the residual terms are no longer orthogonal to these values. 
Therefore, as in Chapter 3, the model is estimated using the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM).  
 
The empirical work here is performed using a constant and two lags of the 
instruments22. The choice of instruments is motivated by the view that the 
bank’s forecast of expected inflation depends upon the past history of inflation, 
the output gap, exchange rate depreciation, and monetary growth.  
 
Since the number of instruments exceeds the number of parameters to be 
estimated, the J-test is used to test over-identifying restrictions. The J-statistic 
tests the null hypothesis that restrictions imposed under GMM estimation are 
consistent with the data. If this statistic is small, then it indicates the restrictions 
are not rejected by the data, therefore GMM estimates are consistent. 
 
                                                 
22 The overall fit of the regression, as measured by the standard error of estimate, is better when 
two lagged values of the instruments are used in estimation than it is when three or four lagged 
values are used. 
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Using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap for a sample of 1980:1 to 2008:12, the 
estimation of the Phillips curve with CPI inflation as the dependent variable 
can be seen in Table 5.3.  
 
A number of interesting results stand out (see Table 5.3). The estimates of 
parameters generally have the expected sign and are significant in most cases. 
In forming inflation expectations, backward-looking expectations seem to 
dominate compared to forward-looking expectations. The output gap affects 
inflation after 9 months (3 quarters). The exchange rate pass-through is gradual 
and incomplete. Money (M1) growth also affects inflation after a two-month 
lag. When ‘Idul Fitri’ takes place inflation generally increases. The reported p-
value of J-statistic is big, which indicates the restrictions imposed in deriving 
GMM estimates are consistent with the data. The estimation above is as same 
as the estimation of Phillips curve in chapter 3 and 4. We use the same data and 
 
Table 5.3: Estimation of the Phillips curve – using ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap 
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant -0.048 0.228 -0.210 0.834
Inflation(-1) 0.706 0.050 14.223 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.226 0.081 2.810 0.005
Output Gap(-9) 0.066 0.033 1.975 0.049
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.049 0.015 -3.194 0.002
M1 Growth(-2) 0.021 0.007 2.796 0.006
Dummy for Crisis 1.439 0.898 1.602 0.110
Dummy for Fuel 2.932 1.334 2.198 0.029
Dummy for Fitri 0.550 0.204 2.694 0.007
Adj R2 0.991
SE of Reg 1.095
Durbin-Watson stat 1.637
J-statistic 0.004
p-value 0.521
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the same Phillips curve specification in this chapter with those in the previous 
chapters since we want to have a link from one chapter to other chapter.      
 
Table 5.4 shows the result of OLS estimation for the exchange rate equation. 
From the table we can see that current exchange rate change depends on a one-
period lag of exchange rate change and a two-period lag of the interest rate 
differential. All parameters are statistically significant.  
          
The above model suggests that policy can offset shocks only with a lag. The 
lags in the IS curve, the Phillips curve, and the exchange rate equation imply 
that the first channel takes time to work; a tightening of policy raises the 
exchange rate within two periods; it takes one period for the exchange rate to 
affect the output gap and another nine periods for output to affect inflation. In 
contrast, the direct effect of an exchange rate change on inflation takes only one 
period. These assumptions capture the common view that the direct exchange 
rate effect is the quickest channel from policy to inflation. This structure also 
captures the stylised fact that policy affects output more quickly than it affects 
inflation. 
 
Table 5.4: Estimation of exchange rate equation  
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant -2.412 0.922 -2.616 0.010
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) 0.926 0.033 27.999 0.000
Sbi(-2)-Fed(-2) 0.187 0.070 2.666 0.008
Adj R2 0.791
SE of Reg 9.487
Durbin-Watson stat 1.703
Prob (F-Stat) 0.000  
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Table 5.5: Estimation of the IS curve – using ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap  
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant -0.307 0.067 -4.611 0.000
Ouput Gap(-1) 0.921 0.011 83.038 0.000
Sbi(-9) - Inflation(-8) -0.014 0.005 -2.694 0.008
Exchange Rate Dep (-1) 0.008 0.002 4.771 0.000
M1 Growth(-2) 0.010 0.003 3.762 0.000
Dummy for Crisis -1.207 0.152 -7.948 0.000
Adj R2 0.990
SE of Reg 0.358
Durbin-Watson stat 1.341
Prob (F-Stat) 0.000  
 
In the second model, we use the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap. When the ‘peak-to-
peak’ output gap is used, the results are almost the same as those reported here 
for the adjusted HP filter. Table 5.5 presents the OLS estimation of the IS curve.  
All parameters are statistically significant. Comparing Table 5.5 with Table 5.2, 
we can see that the parameters in Table 5.5 are slightly higher than those in 
Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.6 reports the GMM estimation of the Phillips curve. All parameters are 
also statistically significant. The validity of the over-identifying restrictions is 
confirmed by the J-statistic.  
 
While in the third model we use the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap, but with a 
non-linear output-inflation relationship, that is an L-shape function. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the ‘wall’ parameter is found to be 8.5. This indicates 
that the impact of the output gap on inflation increases when the output gap 
approaches 8.5%. Table 5.7 shows the results of the GMM estimation. The non- 
linear formulation for the Phillips curve is successful at characterizing the data,  
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Table 5.6: Estimation of the Phillips curve – using ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap 
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant 0.090 0.292 0.308 0.759
Inflation(-1) 0.711 0.051 13.899 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.223 0.083 2.684 0.008
Output Gap(-9) 0.072 0.038 1.899 0.058
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.047 0.015 -3.113 0.002
M1 Growth(-2) 0.024 0.008 2.866 0.004
Dummy for Crisis 1.312 0.883 1.486 0.138
Dummy for Fuel 2.935 1.343 2.185 0.030
Dummy for Fitri 0.556 0.203 2.744 0.006
Adj R2 0.991
SE of Reg 1.107
Durbin-Watson stat 1.616
J-statistic 0.004
p-value 0.527
 
 
with the coefficients on inflation being significant. The probability of the J- 
statistic is not significant at 10%, indicating that the choice of instruments is 
appropriate.  
 
Table 5.7: Estimation of non-linear Phillips curve  
Coef SE t-stat p-value
Constant -0.258 0.174 -1.484 0.139
Inflation(-1) 0.695 0.042 16.673 0.000
Inflation(1) 0.248 0.075 3.292 0.001
8.5*Output Gap(-9)/(8.5-Output Gap(-9)) 0.0004 0.0001 6.193 0.000
Exchange Rate Dep(-1) -0.047 0.016 -3.029 0.003
M1 Growth(-2) 0.025 0.011 2.361 0.019
Dummy for Crisis 0.669 0.556 1.203 0.230
Dummy for Fuel 3.513 0.825 4.259 0.000
Dummy for Fitri 0.520 0.195 2.669 0.008
Adj R2 0.991
SE of Reg 1.073
Durbin-Watson stat 1.668
J-statistic 0.001
p-value 0.776  
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Now, we can see the differences between Table 5.7 and Table 5.3. The non-
linear output gap has a much smaller coefficient than the linear one. The 
coefficient of backward-looking expectations is smaller, but that of forward-
looking expectations and that of money growth are higher in the non-linear 
Phillips curve; while the exchange rate pass-through remains the same. 
 
5.5.2  Simulations 
 
In this sub section, we report our findings from simulation of the models. There 
are three models that will be evaluated, i.e. model 1 (using the ‘adjusted HP 
filter’ output gap and a linear Phillips curve), model 2 (using the ‘peak-to-peak’ 
output gap and a linear Phillips curve), and model 3 (using the ‘adjusted HP 
filter’ output gap and a non-linear Phillips curve). Each model contains three 
behavioural equations (i.e., the IS curve, Phillips curve, and the exchange rate 
depreciation equation) estimated above and one policy rule.  
 
We use econometric software Eviews version 6.0 to conduct simulations. We 
put three behavioural equations and the policy rule into the model. Then we 
solve the model from 1992:01 to some periods before the last sample (2008:12). 
For example, when we solve the model which includes a 6-month-forward-
looking policy rule, we end the simulation at 2008:6. The software can solve the 
future-value variable, i.e. inflation, by using the Gauss-Seidel algorithm. The 
algorithm involves a looping through every observation in the forecast sample. 
At each observation the model is solved by treating the past and the future 
values as fixed. The loop is repeated until changes in the values of the 
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endogenous variables between successive iterations become less than a 
specified tolerance.      
 
As mentioned in the methodology section, we evaluate the loss function of each 
combination of parameter α  (for the inflation gap), β  (for the output gap), γ  
(for the exchange rate change), θ  (for interest rate smoothing), and lead (for 
horizon of forecasted inflation). Therefore, each combination of policy rule 
parameters (α , β ,γ , and θ ) produces one loss value. In lead -3 (1 quarter lag), 
we search over α  from 0.15 to 2.90, β  from 0.00 to 1.31, γ  from 0.00 to 0.99, 
and θ  from 0.00 to 0.99, so that we have 20,000 values of the variance of 
inflation gap, variance of output gap, variance of interest rate smoothing, and 
the loss. We do the same procedure for lead 3 (1 quarter ahead) until lead 24 (8 
quarters ahead).  
 
We also have three scenarios to be compared. Each scenario has different 
values of the loss since the policymakers put different weights on the inflation 
gap, the output gap, and interest rate smoothing. In scenario 1 (first flexible 
inflation targeting), policymakers are not only concerned about inflation and 
output, but also the interest rate movement; we set more weight on inflation 
than on output, and the least weight on interest rate smoothing ( =piω  0.6, =yω  
0.3, and =iω  0.1). In scenario 2 (second flexible inflation targeting), 
policymakers are concerned with inflation and output; we set equal weight for 
both the inflation gap and the output gap, but zero weight for interest rate 
smoothing ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0). While in scenario 3 (strict 
inflation targeting), policymakers are only concerned with inflation; we set 
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unity as the weight for the inflation gap and zero as the weight on the other 
variables in the loss function ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0). 
 
In each model we evaluate the performance of six types of policy rule, i.e. the 
inflation forecast-based rule (IFB), the inflation forecast-based rule with output 
gap (IFBG), the Taylor rule (T), the inflation forecast-based rule with exchange 
rate (IFBE), the inflation forecast-based rule with output gap and exchange rate 
(IFBGE), and the Taylor rule with exchange rate (TE). 
 
a.  Simulation on Model 1 – using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output 
gap and a linear Phillips curve 
 
Table 5.8 summaries the results of model 1 simulation under scenario 1 where 
the policymaker cares about inflation, output, and financial stability. Each 
column represents the horizon of the inflation forecast and in each horizon 
there is one rule that minimizes the loss. For example, for horizon 15 (5 
quarters ahead) among the 20,000 values of the loss function the minimum loss 
is 5.02 which is given by α  = 2.47, β  = 0.87, γ  = 0.00, and θ  = 0.78.  
 
Comparing all horizons, the minimum loss is found at lead one year (4.74) 
which is given by IFBG with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.73, γ  = 0.00, θ  = 0.78.  With α  = 
2.90, a rise in expected annual inflation of one percent induced the central bank 
to raise real rates by 42 (=(1-0.78)*(2.90-1)*100) basis points. With β  = 0.73, 
holding constant expected inflation, a one percent rise in the output gap 
induces the central bank to increase nominal rates by 16 (=(1-0.78)*0.73*100)  
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Table 5.8: Summary of scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1)  – model 1 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 8.30 7.64 5.90 4.99 4.74 5.02 5.53 6.19 7.35
Var P 11.65 10.02 6.78 5.72 5.56 5.93 6.95 8.08 10.01
Var Y 3.86 3.87 3.76 3.96 4.04 4.10 4.08 4.03 3.98
Var I 1.53 4.68 7.06 3.72 1.89 2.31 1.30 1.32 1.51
Alpha 0.15 1.02 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.02 0.73 0.87 0.58 0.73 0.87 0.87 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.33 0.00 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBGE IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
 
basis points. The efficient rule yields similar coefficients for the autoregressive 
parameter, over 0.50, which is consistent with the results obtained by Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler (2000). 
 
Table 5.8 shows that the minimum losses in each horizon are found when α  is 
high for forward-looking monetary policy, but α  is low for backward-looking 
monetary policy. The minimum loss is also given when γ  equals zero for the 
horizon above 2 quarters. This means that the central bank is better to ignore 
the exchange rate change when the bank sets the policy rate based on the 
forecasted inflation in 3 quarters and above. The result also suggests that the 
central bank might be better off if it smoothes the interest rate movement. The 
longer the horizon, the higher θ  is.  
 
For scenario 2, when the central bank is concerned about inflation as well as 
output, the efficient rule is given by IFBG with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.58, γ  = 0.00, θ  
=0.00, and lead 3 quarters (see Table 5.9). This rule gives a minimum loss value 
with variance of inflation equal to 5.17, variance of output equal to 4.01, and 
variance of interest rate equal to 23.97.  
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 Table 5.9: Summary of scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0) – model 1 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 7.68 5.83 4.80 4.59 4.69 5.01 5.52 6.05 6.99
Var P 11.53 7.95 5.76 5.17 5.31 5.93 6.95 8.08 10.01
Var Y 3.84 3.70 3.84 4.01 4.06 4.10 4.08 4.03 3.98
Var I 2.72 24.57 23.87 23.97 6.46 2.31 1.30 1.32 1.51
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.02 1.16 0.58 0.58 0.73 0.87 0.87 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.11 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBGE IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
 
The efficient rule in scenario 2 is different from that in scenario 1 in β , θ , and 
horizons, where as in scenario 2 β  is lower, there is no smoothing parameter, 
and the lead is shorter. Comparing to the efficient rule in scenario 1, the 
variance of inflation and the variance of output in scenario 2 are smaller, but 
leave a high variance of interest rates. This result emerges since the 
policymakers do not care about the volatility of interest rates.   
 
From Table 5.9 we can see that, across the horizon, α  is high when the central 
bank behaves in a forward-looking manner. For all horizons, the rules suggest 
that the central bank should take into account the output gap. As in scenario 1, 
the efficient rules also suggest that the central bank ignores the exchange rate 
movement when setting the policy rate based on the forecasted inflation in 3 
quarters and above. Interest rate smoothing is needed when setting the policy 
rate based on forecasted inflation in one year and above.  
 
For scenario 3 where the policymaker acts as an inflation hawk, the minimum 
loss is found when the central bank sets the current policy rate based on a 
future inflation gap and current output gap (IFBG rule) with parameters α  = 
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Table 5.10: Summary of scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0) – model 1  
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 11.53 7.94 5.76 5.17 5.31 5.93 6.95 8.08 10.01
Var P 11.53 7.94 5.76 5.17 5.31 5.93 6.95 8.08 10.01
Var Y 3.84 3.72 3.85 4.01 4.06 4.10 4.08 4.03 3.98
Var I 2.72 24.59 23.90 23.97 6.46 2.31 1.30 1.32 1.51
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.02 1.02 0.44 0.58 0.73 0.87 0.87 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.11 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBGE IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
 
2.90, β  = 0.58, γ  = 0.00, θ  = 0.00, and lead 3 quarters (see Table 5.10). This rule 
suggests that if the central bank is only concerned with inflation, the best rule is 
to put a high parameter on the inflation gap at three quarters ahead, to put a 
moderate parameter on the current output gap, to ignore exchange rate 
movements, and to ignore interest rate smoothing. Even though, in the loss 
function the central bank does not care about the output gap, efficient rules 
suggest that β  is not equal to zero. The efficient rule found in scenario 3 is the 
same with that in scenario 2. 
 
We draw several general conclusions from Tables 5.8 to 5.10. First, looking just 
at the performance of the backward-looking rules (Taylor rule and Taylor rule 
with exchange rate), it appears that placing a higher weight on output than on 
inflation yields welfare improvement. However, α , which measures the 
response of the BI rate to inflation, is less than unity, indicating that the BI rate 
does not adjust one-for-one with inflation. Those rules with α  less than one are 
likely to be destabilizing or, at best, accommodative of shocks to the economy. 
Under this condition, although the central bank raises the nominal rate in 
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response to an expected rise in inflation, for example, it does not increase it 
sufficiently to keep the real rate from declining. 
 
Second, for all scenarios, we find that the efficient rule is when α  = 2.90. This 
indicates that the interest rate adjusts to stabilize inflation. As Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (2000) and among others argue, interest rate rules characterized by α  
greater than one will tend to be stabilizing.  
 
Third, when the central bank is also concerned about interest rate volatility, the 
rules suggest that the central bank should smooth the policy rate for all 
horizons, except lead 1 quarter. The longer the horizon, the greater the θ .  
 
Fourth, the central bank will take into account the exchange rate change in the 
policy rule only when the horizon is less than three quarters. On the contrary, 
when the central bank behaves in a forward-looking way in three quarters and 
above the exchange rate movement should be ignored. The final conclusion is 
evidence of the superiority of IFBG rules.     
 
Table 5.11 compares the performance of six types of policy rules under scenario 
1 (when the central bank is concerned about inflation, output, and interest 
rates). From the table we can clearly see that the minimum loss is 4.74, which is 
the loss of the IFBG rule, while the greatest loss is produced by the Taylor rule 
(8.32). 
 
Eliminating the output gap from the efficient rule will produce higher variance 
of output as well as variance of inflation (see IFB rule). While, adding an 
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Table 5.11: Rules in scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1) –  model 1 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 4.96 4.74 5.03 4.80 8.32 8.30
Var P 5.90 5.56 6.02 5.66 11.63 11.65
Var Y 4.10 4.04 4.08 4.02 3.88 3.86
Var I 1.88 1.89 1.92 1.93 1.79 1.53
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.73 1.02 1.02
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.22 0.33
Lead 12 12 12 12 -3 -3  
 
exchange rate change in the forward-looking rule (IFB and IFBG) will increase 
the variance of inflation. Nevertheless, adding exchange rate changes to the 
Taylor rule increases economic performance.          
 
Under scenario 2, Table 5.12 shows that the best rule is IFBG, while the worst 
rule is the Taylor rule. The second best rule is IFBGE, the third one is IFB, and 
the fourth is IFBE. As in scenario 1, including exchange rate changes in the 
policy rule will increase the variance of inflation. For example, the variance of 
inflation in the IFBG rule is 5.17, while the variance of inflation in the IFBGE 
 
Table 5.12: Rules in scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0) –  model 1 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 4.71 4.59 4.77 4.63 7.70 7.68
Var P 5.34 5.17 5.48 5.28 11.54 11.53
Var Y 4.07 4.01 4.06 3.99 3.86 3.84
Var I 23.73 23.97 24.47 24.80 2.58 2.72
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.73 1.02 1.02
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
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Table 5.13: Rules in scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0)  –  model 1 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.34 5.17 5.48 5.27 11.54 11.53
Var P 5.34 5.17 5.48 5.27 11.54 11.53
Var Y 4.07 4.01 4.06 4.00 3.86 3.84
Var I 23.73 23.97 24.47 24.73 2.58 2.72
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.58 1.02 1.02
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
 
rule increases to 5.28. On the other hand, adding the exchange rate in the 
Taylor rule decreases both the variance of inflation (from 11.54 to 11.53) and the 
variance of output (from 3.86 to 3.84).  
 
Under scenario 3 (when the central bank acts as an inflation hawk), the best 
rule is also IFBG (see Table 5.13). Adding the exchange rate to a forward- 
looking rule will increase the variance of inflation and the variance of interest 
rate. However, for the Taylor rule, adding the exchange rate will reduce the 
loss, as the variance of inflation and the variance of output are both lower.    
 
Relative to the other rules in the battery, the IFBG rule performs the best. The 
IFBG rule gives a better control than the IFBGE rule of inflation and interest 
rates, but a slightly worse control of output. The IFBG rule gives a marginally 
better control of inflation and output than the IFB rule, but a slightly worse 
control of interest rates. Adding separate exchange rate terms to the IFB rule 
and IFBG rule moderately worsens its stabilisation properties. The rule now 
delivers a higher volatility of inflation and volatility of interest rate than 
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without the exchange rate terms. If we rank the rules based on their 
performances, the best rule is the IFBG rule, the second best is the IFBGE rule, 
and the third best is the IFB rule, then the IFBE rule, the TE rule, and lastly the 
Taylor rule. 
 
Compared to Taylor rules, the rules that are based on inflation forecasts give 
considerably lower inflation variability. Since the Taylor rule reacts to current 
rather than expected inflation, this makes policy myopic rather than pre-
emptive, and hence may require more aggressive changes in the interest rate, 
which in turn affects the exchange rate and thereby inflation. The IFBGE rule 
and IFBE rule are second-best options. Because they also account for the 
exchange rate channel of transmission, as expected they are significantly more 
efficient than Taylor rules in stabilising inflation in our open economy model of 
Indonesia. 
 
Black, Macklem and Rose (1997) find that strict inflation targeting produces a 
large output variance in simulations of the Bank of Canada’s model. Their 
interpretation of this result is similar to ours where variance of output under 
scenario 3 (4.06) is higher than that under scenario 1 (4.04) at lead one year.   
 
Figure 5.2 presents the results in a graph. This figure plots three dimensions of 
the variance of inflation, variance of output, and variance of interest rate on the 
model 1 simulation at lead 12. There are 20,000 dots in the figure representing 
the values of those variances23. Figure 5.2 also plots the variances in two  
 
                                                 
23 As we search over the loss from the combination of 20 α ’s, 10 β ’s, 10 γ ’s, and 10 θ ’s. 
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Figure 5.2: 3D diagram and scatter plot of one year lead – model 1 
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Figure 5.3: Locus of alpha – model 1 
 
dimensions.   
 
Figure 5.2 shows all results from α , β , γ , and θ  combinations. Since there are 
20,000 dots in the figures, it is difficult to analyze the movement of each 
parameter. To make it easier to analyze, we choose the best parameters that 
produce the minimum loss in scenario 1, that is α  = 2.90, β  = 0.73, γ  = 0.00, θ  
= 0.78, and lead one year.    
 
By setting γ  = 0.00, θ  = 0.78, and a lead of one year, Figure 5.3 depicts the 
movement of α  from 0.15 to 2.90. In this figure four values of β  are presented, 
i.e. 0.44, 0.73, 1.02, and 1.3124.  As we can see from the figure, for all values of 
                                                 
24 In fact, there are ten values of β , i.e. from 0.44 to 1.31, but in the figure we only show four of 
them.  
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β  the greater the value of α , the less the variance of inflation, but the higher 
the variance of output. The minimum variance of inflation is achieved when α  
= 2.90 and β  = 0.73. 
 
We find that, in our efficient rules, α  is much greater than one, which 
indicates that the rule is stabilizing. As Clarida et al. (2000) argue, an α  equal 
to or just above unity suggests that the central bank comes close to fully 
accommodating inflationary pressures, by raising nominal rates to keep real 
rates roughly constant. Furthermore, if α  is below unity, a rise in anticipated 
inflation leads to a decline in the real interest rate. The decline in the real rate 
then stimulates aggregate demand which, in turn, induces a rise in inflation.   
   
Figure 5.4 plots the variance of inflation and variance of output as a result of 
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Figure 5.4: Locus of beta – model 1 
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varying β . With γ  = 0.00, θ  = 0.78, and a lead of one year, we can see that the 
movement of β  from 0.00 to 1.31 follows a ‘curve’ shape, not a straight line. 
Actually, there are 20 curves which can be drawn in the figure, but to make it 
easier to observe we choose only four values of α , i.e. 0.73, 1.45, 2.18, and 2.90.  
 
We choose these four values out of twenty values in order to describe the 
minimum value, the maximum value, and two values between the minimum 
and the maximum. Comparing the movement of β  for each α , we can easily 
see that α  = 2.90 dominates others. With α  = 2.90, the minimum loss is found 
when β  = 0.73.   
 
Figure 5.5 describes the movement of γ  from 0.00 to 0.99 for different values of 
θ . We can see from the figure that for each value of θ  the higher γ , the greater 
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Figure 5.5: Locus of gamma – model 1 
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Figure 5.6: Locus of theta – model 1 
 
the variance of inflation is. On the other hand, as the value of γ  increases, the 
variance of output decreases, except when θ  = 0.99. When θ  = 0.99 the 
variance of inflation is high while the variance of output is low and produces a 
big loss, while with θ  = 0.78 and γ  = 0.0 the loss is minimized.   
 
Holding α  = 2.90 and β  = 0.73 the movement of θ , the interest rate smoothing 
parameter, can be seen in Figure 5.6. As θ  increases from 0.00 to 0.78, the 
variance of output decreases, leaving the variance of inflation relatively 
unchanged. With θ  = 0.89 both variances increase. With θ  equal to 0.99 the 
variance of inflation increases, while the variance of output decreases.  The 
minimum loss is when θ  = 0.78 and γ  = 0.00.   
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Figure 5.7: Locus of lead – model 1 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the movement of the lead from -3 (1 quarter lag) to 24 (2 
years ahead). For all values of α  evaluated here, we can see that the highest 
loss is produced by a backward-looking rule (i.e. lead -3) and the third highest 
loss is produced by a ‘too far’ forward-looking rule (i.e. lead 24). The minimum 
loss is found when the policy rate is set in a ‘moderate’ forward-looking way, 
e.g. one year ahead. When α  = 2.90 the loss is at a maximum when the rule is 
backward looking, but the loss is at a minimum when it is forward-looking 
with the inflation gap being one year ahead.              
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b. Model 2: using the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap and a linear 
Phillips curve 
 
As a robustness check, we use a similar model to the previous model where 
the Phillips curve is modelled as linear, but the output gap is estimated by 
using the peak-to-peak methodology instead of using the adjusted HP filter.  
 
Table 5.14 summarizes the efficient rules from simulation on model 2 under 
scenario 1 (policymakers are concerned about inflation, output, as well as 
interest rates). From the table, we can see when monetary policy is conducted 
in a backward-looking way, the Taylor rule with exchange rate is better than 
the Taylor rule.  
 
When monetary policy is conducted in a forward-looking way, we find that 
the IFBG rule dominates other rules. However, if the lead equals 2 quarters the 
efficient rule is given by the IFBGE rule. Overall, it is found that the efficient 
rule, the rule that minimizes the loss, is IFBG with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.87, γ  = 0.00, 
θ  = 0.78, and a lead of one year.  
 
Table 5.14: Summary of scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1) – model 2 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 8.45 7.84 6.18 5.22 4.96 5.25 5.80 6.60 7.99
Var P 11.55 10.06 6.46 5.68 5.50 5.87 6.94 8.26 10.54
Var Y 4.58 4.71 4.52 4.80 4.90 5.06 5.13 5.13 5.11
Var I 1.52 3.88 9.44 3.71 1.92 2.06 1.04 1.06 1.31
Alpha 0.15 0.87 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.16 0.87 1.02 0.73 0.87 1.02 1.16 1.16 1.02
Gamma 0.11 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.33 0.00 0.44 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBG IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
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Table 5.15: Summary of scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0) – model 2 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 7.98 6.28 5.21 4.98 5.08 5.47 6.03 6.69 7.82
Var P 11.42 8.14 5.85 5.15 5.25 5.87 6.94 8.26 10.54
Var Y 4.53 4.42 4.56 4.82 4.91 5.06 5.13 5.13 5.11
Var I 2.70 24.25 24.20 24.03 6.59 2.06 1.04 1.06 1.31
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.16 1.31 1.02 0.87 0.87 1.02 1.16 1.16 1.02
Gamma 0.11 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBGE IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
 
Under scenario 2, where the policymaker is equally concerned about inflation 
and output, the efficient rule is also given by IFBG with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.87, γ  = 
0.00, θ  = 0.00, and a lead of three quarters (see Table 5.15). The rule 
specification under scenario 2 is different from that under scenario 1 in 
smoothing parameter and horizon of inflation forecast. Since the interest rate is 
neglected in this scenario, the efficient rule produces high variance of interest 
rate, i.e. 24.03 in scenario 2 compared to 1.92 in scenario 1, but yields lower 
inflation and output variability. From the table we can see that interest rate 
smoothing is required when the horizon is one year and above. As the horizon 
becomes longer, the smoothing parameter increases. Since the optimal horizon 
for this scenario is three quarters, the efficient rule does not need interest rate 
smoothing (θ  = 0).  
 
Table 5.16 summarizes the results of the simulation on model 2 under scenario 
3 where the policymaker acts as an inflation hawk. It is clearly seen that the 
least loss is 5.13 given by the IFBG rule with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.73, γ  = 0.00, θ  = 
0.0, and a lead of 3 quarters. The efficient rule in scenario 3 is the same as the 
efficient rule in scenario 2, except the output gap parameter in scenario 3 is  
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Table 5.16: Summary of scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0) – model 2  
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 11.42 8.14 5.79 5.13 5.25 5.87 6.94 8.26 10.54
Var P 11.42 8.14 5.79 5.13 5.25 5.87 6.94 8.26 10.54
Var Y 4.53 4.42 4.66 4.85 4.91 5.08 5.13 5.14 5.11
Var I 2.70 24.25 23.77 23.95 6.59 2.08 1.04 1.09 1.31
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.47 2.32 2.18 2.18
Beta 1.16 1.31 0.58 0.73 0.87 0.87 1.16 1.02 1.02
Gamma 0.11 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBGE IFBGE IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG IFBG  
 
smaller. This rule specification gives the smallest variability of inflation.   
 
From Tables 5.14 to 5.16 we can see that, when interest-rate variability is not 
taken into account in the loss function, optimal rules generate implausibly 
large fluctuations in the interest rate. 
 
Table 5.17 compares the performance of six policy rules under scenario 1. From 
the table we can see that the loss of IFB rule is 5.25. If we consider the IFB rule 
with an output gap, the loss reduces to 4.96; if we then add in the exchange 
rate, the loss becomes higher, i.e. 5.34. Adding the exchange rate to the IFBG  
 
Table 5.17: Rules in scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1) – model 2 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.25 4.96 5.34 5.03 8.48 8.45
Var P 5.93 5.50 6.09 5.63 11.48 11.55
Var Y 5.04 4.90 5.00 4.84 4.58 4.58
Var I 1.86 1.92 1.90 1.98 2.15 1.52
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.87 0.00 1.02 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.11 0.33
Lead 12 12 12 12 -3 -3  
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rule will also increase the loss. This indicates that the putting exchange rate 
change in the policy rule will increase the loss. However, when monetary 
policy is conducted in a backward-looking way the inclusion of the exchange 
rate in the policy rule reduces the loss. In summary, among the six rules tested 
here, IFBG is the best rule.  
 
Six types of policy rules are also compared under scenario 2 and scenario 3 on 
Table 5.18 and Table 5.19, respectively. Both tables paint the same story with 
Table 5.17 showing that the best rule is IFBG and adding the exchange rate  
 
Table 5.18: Rules in scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0) – model 2 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.18 4.98 5.26 5.02 8.00 7.98
Var P 5.38 5.15 5.57 5.27 11.43 11.42
Var Y 4.99 4.82 4.96 4.78 4.57 4.53
Var I 23.58 24.03 19.92 24.88 2.56 2.70
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.87 0.00 1.02 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
 
Table 5.19: Rules in scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0) – model 2 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.38 5.13 5.56 5.24 11.43 11.42
Var P 5.38 5.13 5.56 5.24 11.43 11.42
Var Y 4.99 4.85 4.96 4.83 4.57 4.53
Var I 23.58 23.95 24.31 24.70 2.56 2.70
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.73 1.16 1.16
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
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change to the policy rule will result in an increase in the loss. Interestingly, no 
significant difference arises across the rules. We demonstrate that, in each 
instance, the insights from the baseline case remain intact. Thus, overall, the 
baseline model seems to provide a good characterization of the central bank’s 
reaction function.        
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the outcome of this experiment with a lead of one year. 
As in model 1, there are 20,000 dots in the figure where each dot represents the  
result from a combination of α , β , γ , and θ . The overall picture (the frontier) 
of model 2 is somewhat similar to that of model 1. 
 
Figure 5.9 portrays the movement of α  from 0.15 to 2.90 when β  = 0.87, θ  = 
0.78, and a lead of one year. There are four γ ’s to be evaluated here, i.e. 0.00, 
0.56, 0.78, and 0.99. From the figure we can see that for each value of γ , the 
higher α , the higher the variance of output is, but the smaller the variance of 
inflation is. We can also see that the higher γ , the higher the variance of 
inflation is, but the lower the variance of output is.   
 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the changes in β  from 0.00 to 1.31 when α  = 2.90, γ  = 
0.00, and a lead of one year. Four θ ’s are examined, i.e. 0.00, 0.56, 0.78, and 
0.99. Except for θ  = 0.99, the higher β , the less the variance of output is. From 
the figure, we can clearly see that θ  = 0.99 generates the highest loss, while the 
smallest loss is found when θ  = 0.78 combined with β  = 0.87.  
 
 
  261 
 
Figure 5.8: 3D diagram and scatter plot of one year lead – model 2 
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Figure 5.9: Locus of alpha – model 2 
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Figure 5.10: Locus of beta – model 2 
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γ ’s movement can be seen in Figure 5.11. Setting α  = 2.90, θ  = 0.78, and with a 
lead of one year, we plot the variance of inflation and variance of output as a 
result of varying γ  from 0.00 to 0.99. Four β ’s are evaluated here, i.e. 0.00, 
0.44, 0.87, and 1.31. The figure tells us that the more value we put on the 
exchange rate change, the more variance of inflation, but the less variance of 
output we get. For a higher value of β , the variance of output is reduced. The 
minimum variance of inflation is given when β  = 0.87 combined with γ  = 0.00.   
 
Setting β  = 0.87, γ  = 0.0, and a lead of one year Figure 5.12 demonstrates the 
impact of changes in θ  on the variance of inflation and variance of output. We 
evaluate α  = 0.73, 1.45, 2.18, and 2.90. From the figure we can see that the 
higher α , the less the variance of inflation is. With α  = 2.90 the minimum loss 
is found when θ  = 0.78. 
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Figure 5.11: Locus of gamma – model 2 
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Figure 5.12: Locus of theta – model 2 
 
Figure 5.13 exemplifies how the change in horizon (lead) affects the variance of 
inflation and variance of output. Setting β  = 0.87, γ  = 0.00, and θ  = 0.78 we 
draw the movement in horizon from one quarter lag to two years lead. From 
the figure we can see that the biggest loss is produced when lead = -3 that is 
when the monetary policy is backward looking, while the least loss is yielded 
when lead = 12 for any value of α . With α  = 2.90 the variance of inflation is 
extremely large, that is 587.83, when lead = -3. Also with α  = 2.90 the model 
does not converge when lead = 18 and above. The minimum loss is found 
when the lead = 12 and α  = 2.90. Taken together, these results suggest that we 
can reject the backward-looking specification in favour of our forward-looking 
one. It similarly appears that the forward-looking specification outperforms 
the backward-looking one. 
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Figure 5.13: Locus of lead – model 2 
 
c.  Model 3: using an ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap and a non-
linear Phillips curve 
 
In the baseline case we assumed that the Phillips curve was linear. We now 
consider allowing for an alternative-shaped Phillips curve. This sub-section 
reports the results of simulations of the model where the inflation-output 
relationship is described as non-linear. We use an output gap calculated from 
an adjusted HP filter and capture the relationship as an L-shaped function.  
 
Table 5.20 sums up the efficient rule in each lead under scenario 1. When the 
policymaker is concerned about inflation, output, and interest rates the best 
rule is to set the policy rate based on inflation forecast in one year, neglecting  
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Table 5.20: Summary of scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1) – model 3 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 9.97 8.23 6.09 5.54 5.12 5.20 5.60 6.38 7.89
Var P 14.01 9.68 6.80 6.41 6.10 6.08 6.95 8.23 10.80
Var Y 4.24 3.96 3.95 4.06 4.21 4.30 4.27 4.24 4.17
Var I 2.85 12.39 8.19 4.77 1.96 2.64 1.47 1.66 1.57
Alpha 0.15 2.03 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.61 2.47 2.47 2.03
Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
Gamma 0.11 0.99 0.99 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.22 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBE IFBE IFBE IFB IFB IFB IFB IFB
 
 
the output gap and the exchange rate change. The preferred specification for 
the IFB rule is α  = 2.90, β  = 0.0, γ  = 0.0, θ  = 0.78, and a lead of one year.  
 
Adding the exchange rate change in the rule will be preferable when the 
horizon of the inflation forecast is up to 3 quarters ahead. With a horizon of 4 
quarters and above, the best rules are to discard the exchange rate from the 
policy rule specification.  
 
The smoothing parameter enters the rule specification when the policymaker 
behaves in a forward-looking manner. The more forward looking the rule, the 
higher θ  is. This might be explained by the fact that there is uncertainty in 
predicting inflation. The longer the horizon, the higher the uncertainty is. 
Therefore, central bank needs to adjust its policy rate more gradually in order 
to form public’s inflation expectation and give a clear signal of monetary 
stance. This result is consistent with Clarida et al. (2000) on the lagged interest 
rate of around 0.80 when evaluating U.S. monetary policy. 
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Table 5.21: Summary of scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0) – model 3 
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 9.13 6.06 5.10 4.91 4.96 5.19 5.61 6.24 7.48
Var P 14.05 8.20 6.20 5.65 5.68 6.08 6.95 8.23 10.78
Var Y 4.20 3.93 3.99 4.16 4.24 4.30 4.27 4.24 4.18
Var I 2.99 26.33 27.85 24.66 6.84 2.64 1.47 1.66 1.70
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.61 2.47 2.47 2.18
Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
Gamma 0.22 0.99 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBE IFBE IFB IFB IFB IFB IFB IFB  
        
Table 5.21 recapitulates the efficient rules under scenario 2. When the 
policymaker is concerned about inflation and output the best rule suggested is 
IFB with α  = 2.90, β  = 0.00, γ  = 0.00, θ  = 0.00, and a lead of three quarters. 
This rule produces small variance of inflation, but high variance of interest 
rate.  
 
Under scenario 3, the result is somewhat similar to that under scenario 2 in 
terms of the variance of inflation, variance of output, and variance of interest 
rates in each horizon (see Table 5.22). The loss in scenario 3 is the same as the 
variance of inflation.  
 
Table 5.22: Summary of scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0) – model 3  
Lead -3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Loss 14.01 8.20 6.20 5.65 5.67 6.08 6.95 8.23 10.76
Var P 14.01 8.20 6.20 5.65 5.67 6.08 6.95 8.23 10.76
Var Y 4.24 3.93 3.99 4.16 4.26 4.30 4.27 4.24 4.21
Var I 2.85 26.33 27.85 24.66 10.09 2.64 1.47 1.66 1.99
Alpha 0.15 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.61 2.47 2.47 2.47
Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
Gamma 0.11 0.99 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.89
Rule TE IFBE IFBE IFB IFB IFB IFB IFB IFB  
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Tables 5.23, 5.24, and 5.25 contrast the performance of six types of rule under 
scenario 1, scenario 2, and scenario 3, respectively. We find that policy rules 
that respond aggressively to inflation with no reaction to the output gap 
generally produce the best performance. This result is in line with the findings 
in Batini and Haldane (1999) based on a small-scale, open economy model of 
the U.K. economy. The second best rule is IFBG. It is also worth emphasizing 
that, as in model 1 and model 2, adding the exchange rate to the IFB rule and 
the IFBG rule will only cause deterioration in economic performance. 
 
Table 5.23: Rules in scenario 1 ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, and =iω  0.1) – model 3 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.12 5.17 5.18 5.23 10.03 9.97
Var P 6.10 6.20 6.20 6.29 14.12 14.01
Var Y 4.21 4.19 4.19 4.18 4.29 4.24
Var I 1.96 1.96 2.01 2.01 2.72 2.85
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.00 0.00
Lead 12 12 12 12 -3 -3  
 
Table 5.24: Rules in scenario 2 ( =piω  0.5, =yω  0.5, and =iω  0.0)  – model 3 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 4.91 4.95 4.91 4.95 9.21 9.13
Var P 5.65 5.76 5.67 5.77 14.12 14.05
Var Y 4.16 4.14 4.16 4.14 4.29 4.20
Var I 24.66 24.72 25.44 25.50 2.72 2.99
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.22
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
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Table 5.25: Rules in scenario 3 ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, and =iω  0.0) – model 3 
IFB IFBG IFBE IFBGE T TE
Loss 5.65 5.76 5.67 5.77 14.12 14.01
Var P 5.65 5.76 5.67 5.77 14.12 14.01
Var Y 4.16 4.14 4.16 4.14 4.29 4.24
Var I 24.66 24.72 25.44 25.50 2.72 2.85
Alpha 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 0.15 0.15
Beta 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Gamma 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11
Theta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lead 9 9 9 9 -3 -3  
 
Figure 5.14 maps out the variance of inflation, variance of output, and variance 
of interest rates from model 3 simulation with one year lead. 20,000 dots are 
drawn in the figure. Each dot corresponds to the result of the model simulation 
with certain values of α , β , γ , and θ . Overall, the frontier shape of model 3 is 
different from that of model 1 and that of model 2.   
 
Figure 5.15 tracks the movement of α  for different values of θ , while setting 
the other parameters fixed, i.e. β  = 0.00, γ  = 0.00, and a lead of one year. For 
each θ , the higher α , the less the variance of inflation is. The least variance of 
inflation is generated when α  = 2.90 and θ  = 0.78.  
 
Figure 5.16 traces β  from 0.00 to 1.31 while keeping the other parameters 
unchanged, i.e. α  = 2.90, θ  = 0.78, and a lead of one year. The higher β , the 
less the variance of output is. Comparing with other values of γ , γ  = 0.00 has a 
smaller variance of inflation, but a higher variance of output. For γ  = 0.00, the 
least variance of inflation is yielded when β  = 0.00, but this leaves the highest 
variance of output. Since the weight of the variance of inflation is greater than  
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Figure 5.14: 3D diagram and scatter plot of one year lead – model 3 
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Figure 5.15: Locus of alpha – model 3 
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Figure 5.16: Locus of beta – model 3 
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Figure 5.17: Locus of gamma – model 3 
 
the weight of the variance of output in the loss function, then the preferred rule 
is chosen when the variance of inflation is at a minimum.  
 
The movement in γ  from 0.00 to 0.99 can be seen in Figure 5.17 where β , θ , 
and the lead are fixed at 0.00, 0.78, and 12, respectively. From the figure we can 
see that, α  = 2.90 dominates other values of α . For each value of α  the higher 
γ , the less the variance of output, but the more the variance of inflation is. 
Within α  = 2.90, the least loss is reached when γ  = 0.00.  
 
In Figure 5.18 we can see how the variance of inflation and the variance of 
output evolve as θ  changes from 0.00 to 0.99. The higher θ , the greater the 
variance of inflation is. Four β ’s are evaluated here, i.e. 0.00, 0.44, 0.87, and 
1.31. The higher β  is, the less the variance of output, but the greater the  
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Figure 5.18: Locus of theta – model 3 
 
3.5
3.7
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.5
4.7
4.9
5.1
5.3
5.5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Alpha = 0.73
Alpha = 1.45
Alpha = 2.18
Alpha = 2.90
Var (y)
Var (pi)
Varying Lead with
Beta = 0.00
Gamma = 0.00
Theta = 0.78
24
-3
12 3
24
0
3
 
Figure 5.19: Locus of lead – model 3 
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variance of inflation. Within β  = 0.00, the least variance of output is yielded 
when θ  = 0.78.  
 
Figure 5.19 draws the locus of the lead from 1 quarter lag to 2 years ahead with 
other parameters remaining unchanged, i.e. β  = 0.00, γ  = 0.00, and θ  = 0.78. 
Lag one quarter generates a high variance of inflation and variance of output 
for every α . The highest loss is produced when combining α  = 2.90 with a lead 
of -3. However, combining α  = 2.90 with lead = 12 (one year) yields a 
minimum loss.    
 
Table 5.26 summarizes the findings. A number of fascinating results emerge. 
The first concerns the shape of the Phillips curve. When it is modelled as linear, 
the efficient policy rule is IFBG; while when it is modelled as non-linear, the 
efficient policy rule is IFB.  
 
Table 5.26: Efficient rules  
Rule Alpha Beta Gamma Theta Lead
Scenario 1
Model 1 IFBG 2.90 0.73 0.00 0.78 12
Model 2 IFBG 2.90 0.87 0.00 0.78 12
Model 3 IFB 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.78 12
Scenario 2
Model 1 IFBG 2.90 0.58 0.00 0.00 9
Model 2 IFBG 2.90 0.87 0.00 0.00 9
Model 3 IFB 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 9
Scenario 3
Model 1 IFBG 2.90 0.58 0.00 0.00 9
Model 2 IFBG 2.90 0.73 0.00 0.00 9
Model 3 IFB 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 9  
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Second, the minimum loss is yielded when α  is set at 2.90 and γ  is set at 0.00. 
This implies that the central bank must put higher parameter on inflation 
deviation, but ignore the exchange rate change when setting the policy rate. 
Also, in forward-looking rules, there would seem to be benefit from placing a 
higher relative parameter on the expected inflation gap than on output gap. 
The use of future inflation gaps reflects the fact that policy can affect inflation 
only with a lag. 
 
Third, as in Ball (1999) and Jondeau and Le Bihan (2000), we find that it is 
always optimal to put a positive parameter on the output gap, whatever the 
central bank’s preferences. Even if policymakers only care about inflation, the 
best rule is to include an output gap in the specification. When policymakers 
also care about output, then they should assign a value to β  in the policy rule. 
The inclusion of an output gap reflects the output gap’s usefulness as an 
additional indicator of latent inflationary pressure. The results show important 
sensitivities of the parameter assigned to the output gap according to which 
measure of output gap is used. 
 
Fourth, to avoid excessive volatility in the instrument settings, interest rate 
smoothing is necessary when setting the policy rate based on the forecasted 
inflation in 4 quarters ahead. Another finding is that the optimal parameter of 
interest rate smoothing increases as the central bank becomes more concerned 
with interest rate smoothing and as the target horizon lengthens.  
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Fifth, even when the weight on interest rate smoothing in the loss function is 
assumed to be low ( =iω 0.1), we obtain a large smoothing parameter, θ = 0.78, 
in all models. This is consistent with the result highlighted by Levin, Wieland, 
and Williams (1998), deriving from the forward-lookingness of interest rates. A 
high autoregressive parameter is needed to help stabilize the economy by 
generating expectations of a persistent rise (or decrease) in short term interest 
rates. 
           
Through deterministic simulations, we find that the IFBG rule is the best rule 
for modelling with a linear Phillips curve, while the IFB rule is the best rule for 
modelling with a non-linear Phillips curve. Under a non-linear Phillips curve 
since the coefficient of the output gap is relatively small, it means that the 
impact of the output gap is small, so that interest rate reaction to the output 
gap is unnecessary. This might explain why the optimal rule in model 3 is IFB. 
Compared to the IFBG rule, the efficient IFB rules have the same length of 
horizon.    
 
Our results also suggest that putting some weight on the exchange rate in the 
rule will make performance even worse. These results support the argument of 
Taylor (2000) about the unimportance of including exchange rates in the policy 
rule. 
 
In terms of the inflation forecast horizon, our result is consistent with Batini 
and Haldane’s (1999) study where 3-6 quarters appears to deliver the best 
performance. Shorter horizons risk raising both output and inflation variability, 
while longer horizons risk macroeconomic instability. The optimal forecast 
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horizon implied by our simulations (of 3-4 quarters) is rather different to that 
used by inflation targeting central banks in advanced economies in practice (of 
6-8 quarters).   
 
5.6  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter attempts to shed light on what type of monetary policy rule is 
suitable for Indonesia. To answer the question, we consider the simplest 
version of the inflation targeting problem, as described by Svensson (1997). We 
present a relatively simple model of a small open economy, with stylized, 
reasonably realistic relative lags for the different channels for the transmission 
of monetary policy. The direct exchange rate channel to the CPI has the shortest 
lag (one month), the exchange rate effect on the output gap also has one-month 
lag, and the aggregate demand’s effect on CPI inflation has the longest lag 
(nine months). 
 
In this chapter we specify and evaluate a family of simple monetary policy 
rules, namely an inflation forecast-based (IFB) rule, an inflation forecast-based 
rule with contemporaneous output gap (IFBG), and the Taylor rule. We also 
looked at parsimonious modifications of these rules that account for the 
exchange rate transmission channel in various ways. These policy rules are 
evaluated through deterministic simulation from the model. In the policy rule 
specification there are some parameters to be assessed, i.e. α  (the inflation gap 
parameter), β  (the output gap parameter), γ  (the exchange rate parameter), θ  
(the interest rate smoothing parameter), and the lead (horizon). In each 
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horizon, the simulation produces 20,000 outcomes as results for different 
combinations of α , β , γ , and θ . We then search the combination of these 
parameters to find the efficient rule, i.e. the rule that generates minimum loss. 
 
Within this model, we have examined the properties of a flexible inflation 
targeting regime with interest rate concern ( =piω  0.6, =yω  0.3, =iω  0.1), 
flexible inflation targeting regime without interest rate concern ( =piω  0.5, =yω  
0.5, =iω  0.0), and strict inflation targeting regime ( =piω  1.0, =yω  0.0, =iω  0.0). 
Within each regime, we examined the properties of the IFB rule, the IFB rule 
with exchange rate (IFBE), the IFBG rule, the IFBG rule with exchange rate 
(IFBGE), the Taylor rule (T), and the Taylor rule with exchange rate (TE).  
 
This examination shows that under all regimes the IFBG rules give the best 
performance. Under a flexible inflation targeting regime with interest rate 
concern the optimal horizon is one year, while under a flexible inflation 
targeting regime without interest rate concern and under a strict inflation 
targeting regime the optimal horizon is three quarters. Using the peak-to-peak 
methodology to calculate the output gap, the conclusion is similar. However, if 
we use a non-linear Phillips curve, the IFB rules perform the best for all 
regimes. The optimal horizons found for IFB rules are the same as those for 
IFBG rules.   
 
These results show that our forward-looking specification works quite well 
against the backward-looking specification. The IFBG rule, a rule that reacts to 
deviations of expected inflation from target and the current output gap, is 
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found to be the best. When the horizon is chosen appropriately, this rule 
generates the minimum loss compared to the alternative rules. This is our 
general finding.  
 
We find that an efficient monetary policy reacts strongly to the inflation gap. 
α , the parameter of the inflation gap in the policy rule, is found to be much 
greater than one. Changing the interest rate by more than one for one with the 
inflation rate is an essential property of a good monetary policy rule (Taylor, 
2000). This suggests that the central bank should increase the real interest rate 
to anticipate an increased inflation deviation from the target. 
 
With a lead of 3-4 quarters the central bank should respond aggressively 
enough to future inflation indicators so that the real rate increases in response 
to actual inflation. In most cases, lengthening the measure of inflation beyond 
one year causes stabilization performance to deteriorate. Our results are 
consistent with Batini and Haldane (1999) who showed that the optimal 
horizon is about three or six quarters. Such is not the case when the monetary 
policy is conducted in a backward-looking way using the Taylor rule. 
 
In contrast, β , the parameter of the output gap in the policy rule, is found to be 
moderate. This indicates that, even with no preference for output stabilization, 
the output gap should always matter in the reaction function. Putting a 
moderate weight on output implies that policy does not lean hard enough 
against output fluctuations. 
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When the central bank is also concerned about the fluctuation in interest rates, 
we also find that an efficient monetary policy implies a strong degree of 
interest rate smoothing. With interest rate smoothing the rule responds 
gradually to inflationary pressures, and thus minimises interest rate and output 
volatility compared to Taylor rules. As highlighted by Levin, Wieland, and 
Williams (1998) and Williams (1999), a small, but persistent, change in the short 
rate stabilizes the economy. Thus, our results confirm the conventional wisdom 
that the central bank smoothes adjustments in the interest rate.  
 
Even though the best policy rules under flexible inflation targeting without an 
interest rate concern (scenario 2) and under strict inflation targeting (scenario 3) 
are IFBG with θ  (interest rate smoothing) equal to 0.00 and the lead equal to 3 
quarters, they produce high variability in interest rates. We find that the second 
best rules are IFBG with θ  = 0.56 and lead = 1 year. The second best rules 
produce slightly higher loss, yet much lower interest rate variability than the 
best rule under scenario 2 and 3. These findings are surprising for 
policymakers, including those at Bank Indonesia.     
 
We consider two alternative measures of the output gap. The key results from 
the baseline case are robust to the use of alternative output gap measures. In 
fact, the signs and magnitudes of the parameters remain largely unchanged. 
There is, however, one minor difference; the parameter of the output gap in 
model 1 (using the ‘adjusted HP filter’ output gap) is generally smaller than 
that in model 2 (using the ‘peak-to-peak’ output gap). While in model 3, when 
the output-inflation relationship is non-linear, the parameter of the output gap 
is best to set at zero.   
 281 
 
Our findings also show that, even though we employ an open economy model, 
including the exchange rate in the policy rule is inefficient. Adding a separate 
response to the exchange rate depreciation (contemporaneous) appears to 
reduce the performance of the rule. No improvement is shown in any 
preferences of monetary policy. Our results support the work of Taylor (1999), 
Huang, Margaritas, and Mayes (2001), Taylor (2001), and Allsopp, Kara, and 
Nelson (2006). Taylor (1999) argues that it is not necessary to put weight on the 
exchange rate in an “open economy monetary policy rule”. Huang et al. (2001) 
find that, even in a small economy such as New Zealand, the implied interest 
rate decisions during 1989-1999 are well explained by a monetary policy rule 
without a reaction to the exchange rate. Taylor (2001) is sceptical of including 
the exchange rate in the policy rule, as it is likely to worsen the outcome of 
stabilization policies. Allsopp et al. (2006) also argue that, under an inflation 
targeting regime with a flexible exchange rate, rendering a direct reaction to 
exchange rate is unnecessary.  
 
Our finding is also in agreement with Batini and Nelson (2000) who state that 
reacting to the exchange rate is not optimal (over and above its effects on 
inflation and the lagged interest rate). A related argument holds that, since 
inflation-targeting central banks focus on inflation expectations, they need not 
target asset prices directly, but rather can use them to improve their prediction 
of the path of future inflation (Bean, 2003). 
 
Knowing that, under a free-floating exchange rate regime (adopted mid 1997), 
the movement of exchange rates could be erratic responding to economic 
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indicators, shocks, and news which sometimes bear no relationship with a 
country’s economic fundamentals. Even a random change in the exchange rate 
- due perhaps to irrational expectations - may have small consequences relative 
to the cost of smoothing them out. We agree with Taylor (2001) that those 
deviations of the exchange rate from purchasing power parity should not be 
offset by changes in interest rates. The required changes in interest rates will 
have adverse affects on real output and inflation that may be worse than the 
swings in the exchange rate themselves. If there were a direct reaction from the 
exchange rate to interest rates, such movements could result in harmful swings 
in interest rates.  
 
Temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate may not have much effect on 
expectations of inflation. People learn from experience that under a free-
floating regime the exchange rate, by nature, fluctuates all the time and they 
get used to it. They believe that if exchange rates are too volatile or too weak, 
the central bank will smooth it out. Thus, people do not easily alter their 
inflation expectations because of temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
This finding supports Taylor (2000) in which the indirect effect may have 
advantages compared with the direct effect because it results in fewer and less 
erratic fluctuation in the interest rate.       
    
Our results suggest that simple-efficient policy rules that focus on a smoothed 
inflation measure and real output and do not react to the exchange rate might 
actually work well in Indonesia. The efficient monetary policy rules derived 
here are only rough approximations to actual central bank behaviour. It is 
worth noting that the parameters of the efficient policy rule found in our 
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simulations are indicative. The parameters will change when one employs a 
different model or specification.  
 
Many economists (see, for example, Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999; 
Svensson, 2000) warn that the prescribed policy rule is highly model-specific. 
Because it is indicative and sensitive to model choice, the policy rule should not 
be followed mechanically, as many researchers suggest. Professional judgments 
are absolutely needed based on many indicators and information that cannot 
be captured by the core model, such as surveys, leading indicators, the shape of 
the yield curve, the auxiliary models, and anecdotal information. Moreover, 
policymakers, on occasion, may need to change the interest rate because of 
some special factor that cannot be included in the policy rule. 
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6 Heading 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
Chapter two tests the ‘relative’ law of one price and price convergence in 
Indonesia. The chapter finds that the law holds within the observed period. It 
can be shown by the fact that the variability in prices of each product across 
cities is less than the price variability for all products in each city. The 
variability in product price might be explained by the costs of transportation 
and the level of development.  
 
The chapter also finds that city prices converge to the national prices. The 
speed of convergence is found to be fast for perishable goods, moderate for 
services, and slow for non-perishable goods. The more volatile the product’s 
price, the faster the speed of convergence is. The chapter also reveals that the 
speed of convergence is non-linear for some products, but the speed of 
convergence itself does not depend on the distance between cities. Since price 
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convergence exists for all cities, the policymaker’s attention can be focused on 
national prices (CPI inflation). For example, policymakers should focus on 
those factors which determine national inflation, and how to bring national 
inflation within the central bank’s target.    
 
Chapter three answers the question of what factors might influence national 
inflation. It is found that both backward-looking and forward-looking inflation 
expectations significantly determine current inflation with backward-looking 
inflation expectations being dominant. The output gap, which reflect the 
business cycle, plays an important role in determining CPI inflation. Exchange 
rate pass-through and money growth are found to be significant factors also. 
Idul Fitri, the Moslem festive after the fasting month, contributes positively to 
CPI inflation in Indonesia. The chapter also demonstrates that the output-
inflation relationship in Indonesia is non-linear.     
 
As exchange rate pass-through and money growth are shown to be significant 
in affecting CPI inflation in Indonesia, chapter four analyzes whether these two 
factors have threshold values. The chapter finds that there is no threshold value 
of exchange rate pass-through on inflation. This means that the impact of 
exchange rate depreciation on inflation is the same or linear for any given sized 
exchange rate depreciation. A different conclusion is reached for money 
growth, where two threshold values are found. The chapter finds that the 
impact of money growth on inflation is high when the money growth is below 
the first threshold, moderate when it is between the two thresholds, and low 
when it is above the second threshold.          
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After understanding the behaviour of prices and identifying the factors 
determining CPI inflation, chapter five derives efficient policy rules as a 
prescription for policymakers to control inflation. The rules suggest that the 
central bank should aggressively respond to inflation’s deviation from the 
target. Whatever the policymakers’ preference, the efficient rules are to respond 
moderately to the output gap. When financial stability is also the central bank’s 
concern, the efficient rules suggest putting a rather high coefficient on interest 
rate smoothing. This chapter concludes that the inflation forecast-based rule 
with contemporaneous output gap (IFBG) is the best rule to adopt. The optimal 
horizon is found to be one year ahead. These results also show that forward-
looking rules are more preferable to backward-looking rules (Taylor rule).        
 
As most economists and central bankers acknowledge, no central bank should 
follow the prescribed policy rule blindly. Rather, the policy rule should be used 
as a benchmark. Monetary policy cannot rely on models alone. There must 
always be room for judgmental adjustment and the use of extraneous 
information, such as leading indicators, surveys, the shape of the yield curve, 
the auxiliary models, and anecdotal information. The suggested policy rule 
above should be accompanied by an ‘escape clause’ notion where monetary 
authorities should have a degree of flexibility to deviate from simple rules. The 
central bank needs to be prepared to adjust its reaction pattern and to exercise 
discretion intelligently, particularly when macroeconomic behaviour deviates 
substantially from the model on which previous reaction functions were 
conditioned.   
 
 287 
In order to implement inflation targeting effectively, not only should the 
central bank be equipped with models, policy rules, indicators, and 
information, but it should also be credible. The central bank should deliver for 
the public inflation within the target for several years. The governor must 
explain the disinflation process and then convince the public that the central 
bank will commit to achieving it. In this case, the governor should be very 
sincere and determined in his intentions despite facing many uncertainties, 
such as lack of political support, model uncertainty, parameter instability, and 
unexpected shocks. Establishing credibility together with a better coordination 
mechanism is the key to disinflation with minimal pain.  
 
6.2 Contributions 
 
This thesis makes four main contributions to the literature, especially on the 
empirical front.  
 
First, the thesis provides answers to questions regarding whether the ‘relative’ 
law of one price holds and whether prices converge in Indonesia. Most recent 
studies focus on developed countries, although some of them focus on 
developing countries, but none focus on Indonesia. In particular, using 
disaggregated data (35 products in 45 cities) from January 2002 to April 2008, 
the thesis has tested whether the law of one price holds, analyzed the impact of 
transportation costs and the level of development on the price variability, 
estimated the speed of convergence for each product, and examined whether 
the price convergence is non-linear and depends on the distance between cities. 
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Second, the thesis provides estimations of a hybrid NKPC for Indonesia, with 
the exchange rate and money growth as additional explanatory variables. It 
also calculates the output gap based on three different measurements, i.e. using 
the adjusted HP filter, the adjusted SVAR, and the peak-to-peak method. The 
last mentioned is never used by Bank Indonesia. It also addresses the question 
of whether the Phillips curve in Indonesia is linear or non-linear.  
 
Third, the thesis estimates threshold values for the impact of exchange rate 
depreciation and money growth on Indonesian inflation. A modern technique 
proposed by Hansen (1997, 2000) is applied to estimate the threshold values 
and test whether the values are statistically significant. To the best of our 
knowledge, no similar study or approach has been done for Indonesia.   
 
Fourth, the thesis derives efficient policy rules for Indonesia. To determine the 
most efficient rule, it carries out a simulation on a small, open macroeconomic 
model using a large number of combinations of parameters ( θγβα ,,, ) and 
horizons in the policy rule specifications. It also compares the results using 
different output gap measurement techniques and different Phillips curve 
specifications.       
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Appendix 1: Deriving the NKPC Formula 
 
 
This is to show the steps taken to derive the NKPC formula set out as equation 
(3.11) in the text. We have 3 equations for firms to set prices as in the text: 
ttt ypp α+=
** , (1) 
∑
=
+−=
n
j
jtt
j
t pEx
0
*)1( λλ ,  (2) 
∑
=
−
−=
n
j
jt
j
t xp
0
*)1( λλ  . (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) are the same as equations (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. 
 
By the law of iterated expectations equation (2) can be expressed as  
1
* )1( +−+= tttt xEpx λλ ,  (2’) 
and equation (3) can be expressed as  
1)1( −−+= ttt pxp λλ  . (3’) 
 
The following is to prove that equation (2’) is the same as equation (2): 
Start with equation (2’) 
1
* )1( +−+= tttt xEpx λλ  . (2’) 
Substitute for 1+tx   
])1()[1( 2
*
1
*
++ −+−+= tttt xppx λλλλ . 
Substitute for 2+tx   
]])1()[1()[1( 2
*
2
*
1
*
+++ −+−+−+= ttttt xpppx λλλλλλ , 
and substitute for the following jtx +  
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Then open the bracket  
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The above expression can be written as  
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Also, the following is to prove that equation (3’) is the same as equation (3). 
Start with equation (3’) 
1)1( −−+= ttt pxp λλ .  (3’) 
Substitute for 1−tp   
])1()[1( 21 −− −+−+= tttt pxxp λλλλ . 
Substitute for 2−tp   
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The above expression can be written as  
∑
=
−
−=
n
j
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j
t xp
0
*)1( λλ . (3) 
 
Now we use equation (1), (2’) and (3’) to derive the NKPC. 
From (3’) we have 
1)1( −−+= ttt pxp λλ . (3’) 
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Changing position from LHS to RHS  
ttt ppx =−+ −1)1( λλ . 
Take the tx  term on the LHS  
1)1( −−−= ttt ppx λλ , 
then define for  tx  
λ
λ 1)1( −−−
=
tt
t
pp
x .  (4) 
 
Substitute (4) into (2’) for tx  and 1+tx  
1
* )1( +−+= tttt xEpx λλ ,  (2’) 
)
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)(1(
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λλλλ
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−+=
−− +− . 
Open the bracket in the nominator 
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λλλλ
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ttt pppp
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Open the bracket on RHS 
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Knowing that ttt pp pi=− −1  and 11 ++ =− ttt pp pi , then  
)()( 11*1 λ
λpiλλ
λpiλλ
λpi tttt
t
tt ppp
p +
−
+
+=
+ ++− . 
Multiply both sides with λ   
ttttttt pppp
2
11
*2
1 λλpiλpiλλpi −−++=+ ++− . 
 
Substitute *tp as in equation (1)  
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1
2
11
2 )(
−++ +−−+++= tttttttt pppyp λλλpiλpiαλpi . 
Open the bracket  
ttttttt pyp
2
11
22 λλpipiλpiαλλpi −−+++= ++ , 
then simplify  
1
2 )1()1( +−+=− ttt y piλαλpiλ , 
and finally we get  
1
2
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−
= ttt y piλ
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pi  . (5) 
Equation (5) is the same as equation (3.11) in the text.  
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Appendix 2: Steps in estimating potential output using SVAR 
 
 
 
1. Before employing the VAR model, make sure that all variables used are 
stationary. We perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test. We 
select lag length based on the minimum Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC).     
 
Table A.1.1: ADF unit root test 
Variable t-Statistic   Prob.*
GDP 3.32 1.00
CONS 5.12 1.00
DEP3 -2.60 0.10
D(GDP) -3.87 0.01
D(CONS) -2.95 0.05  
Note: * MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
   
From Table A.1.1 we can see that variables GDP and consumption are I(1), 
while the variable deposit rates is I(0). Therefore, I choose as variables the 
first difference of GDP, the first difference of consumption, and deposit 
rates.       
 
2. Find the appropriate lags in the VAR model. Table A.1.2 shows the value of 
SIC from lag 1 to lag 4. From the table, we can conclude that the optimum 
lag is 1 since it gives the minimum value of SIC.   
 
Table A.1.2: The value of SIC in VAR model 
Lag dlog_GDP dlog_Cons log_Dep3
4 -2.766 -2.780 1.115
3 -3.086 -3.017 1.149
2 -3.323 -3.098 0.913
1 -3.451 -3.353 0.721  
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3. Estimate the VAR model with lag 1. Table A.1.3 reports the results from 
Eviews.   
Table A.1.3: VAR estimation 
DLOG(GDP) DLOG(CONS) LOG(DEP3)
DLOG(GDP(-1)) 0.264226 0.171691 1.010986
(0.17087) (0.17949) (1.37622)
[ 1.54638] [ 0.95653] [ 0.73461]
DLOG(CONS(-1)) 0.216464 0.063499 -0.476668
(0.16082) (0.16894) (1.29528)
[ 1.34602] [ 0.37588] [-0.36801]
LOG(DEP3(-1)) 0.000279 -0.024092 0.801175
(0.01453) (0.01527) (0.11705)
[ 0.01921] [-1.57808] [ 6.84459]
C 0.031568 0.100610 0.443420
(0.04396) (0.04618) (0.35410)
[ 0.71805] [ 2.17851] [ 1.25226]
R-squared 0.148697 0.152020 0.620439
Adj. R-squared 0.071305 0.074931 0.585934
Sum sq. resids 0.046490 0.051302 3.015917
S.E. equation 0.037534 0.039429 0.302310
F-statistic 1.921364 1.971999 17.98089
Log likelihood 71.06879 69.24665 -6.120968
Akaike AIC -3.62534 -3.526846 0.547079
Schwarz SC -3.451187 -3.352693 0.721233
Mean dependent 0.059642 0.052840 2.524301
S.D. dependent 0.038948 0.040994 0.469805
1.57E-07
1.11E-07
138.7111
-6.849248
-6.326788
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 05/02/09   Time: 17:22
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2008
Included observations: 37 after adjustments
Akaike information criterion
Schwarz criterion
Standard errors in ( ) &  t-statistics in [ ]
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)
Determinant resid covariance
Log likelihood
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4. Calculate shocks or residuals for each equation in the VAR.   
E_LR_Y (@e1) for DLOG(GDP) residuals 
E_LR_C (@e2) for DLOG(CONS) residuals 
E_LR_I (@e3) for LOG(DEP3) residuals 
 
5. Identify the long-run restriction matrix, which is a lower triangle matrix.   
@LR1(@u2) = 0 
@LR1(@u3) = 0 
@LR2(@u3) = 0 
 
6. Estimate the SVAR model and find the matrix B.    
Table A.1.4: SVAR estimation 
 Structural VAR Estimates
 Date: 05/02/09   Time: 16:18
 Sample (adjusted): 1972 2008
 Included observations: 37 after adjustments
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analy tic derivatives)
 Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
 Structural VAR is just-identified
Model: Ae =  Bu where E[uu' ]= I
Restriction Type: long-run text form
Long-run response pattern:
C(1) 0 0
C(2) C(4) 0
C(3) C(5) C(6)
CoefficientStd. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.0561 0.0065 8.6023 0.0000
C(2) 0.0325 0.0081 4.0252 0.0001
C(3) -0.0564 0.0536 -1.0524 0.2926
C(4) 0.0434 0.0050 8.6023 0.0000
C(5) 0.0632 0.0526 1.2013 0.2296
C(6) 0.3171 0.0369 8.6023 0.0000
Log likelihood 130.0257
Estimated A matrix:
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
Estimated B matrix:
0.0354 -0.0092 0.0060
0.0146 0.0381 0.0021
-0.1633 0.0607 0.2563  
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7. Find the matrix which is the inverse of B and calculate the structural shocks 
(@u1, @u2, and @u3). From Ae = Bu, since matrix A is an identity, we can 
find u = B-1e.  










=
−
2.827416.39307.8209
2.3085-18.840318.2924-
0.6390-5.534322.5357
1B   
 
U_LR_Y = 22.5357*E_LR_Y + 5.5343*E_LR_C + -0.6390*E_LR_I 
U_LR_C = -18.2924*E_LR_Y + 18.8403*E_LR_C + -2.3085*E_LR_I 
U_LR_I = 7.8209*E_LR_Y + 16.3930*E_LR_C + 2.8274*E_LR_I 
 
8. Estimate GDP using structural shocks as independent variables.   
DLOG(GDP) = 0.05936 + 0.03403*U_LR_Y + 0.01268*U_LR_Y(-1) -  
  (0.001215)  (0.001318)  (0.001282)    
 
0.0095*U_LR_C + 0.0032*U_LR_C(-1) + 9.582e-005*U_LR_I +  
 (0.001286)  (0.001294)  (0.001285) 
 
0.00540*U_LR_I(-1)   
 (0.001284) 
 
Adjusted R2  0.96 
F-statistic  159.36 
Standard errors are in bracket. 
 
9. Generate the series for potential GDP by adding the constant and supply 
shocks from the above equation.   
DLOG_POT_LR = 0.05936 + 0.03403*U_LR_Y + 0.01268*U_LR_Y(-1) 
 
 
 
